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ABSTRACT 
 
This research presents the case of growth in Buenos Aires since the late 1970s, when the 
decentralization of urban planning powers in the Province of Buenos Aires began, until 2001, when an 
economic crisis submerged -even if transitorily- more than half of all metropolitan households below the 
poverty line. This thesis explores why social inequality within municipal boundaries increased after the 
municipalities acquired autonomous planning powers. It counts with three sections: Section I 
investigates how the decentralized planning practices of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires have 
impacted the growth of Buenos Aires. It explains the cluster of affluent gated communities in the 
poorest municipalities of the urban periphery as the outcome of the special permits that these 
municipalities gave to real estate developers. Section II explains how national development policies have 
contributed to the impoverishment of these municipalities. It depicts how these policies have generated 
a persistent flow of poor residents to Greater Buenos Aires at the same time that they have diminished 
the economic sufficiency of local governments. Section III explains why these municipalities did not 
resist these transformations.  
This research has found that national industrialization policies determined much of the fate of 
Greater Buenos Aires. Because of the limitations that the preexisting geography of development 
imposes on local participants, decentralization cannot prevent social polarization when only the highest 
income sectors have the resources that can activate local economies. Nevertheless within these 
circumstances, municipal planning practices and local polities have determined the specific geography of 
social inequality. Thus, participatory institutions are necessary, but not sufficient to transcend social 
inequality. Social inequality in the metropolis will diminish only after a development project on the 
national scale is developed. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
GROWTH AND POVERTY IN THE URBAN FRINGE  
Decentralization, Dispersion, and Inequality in Greater Buenos Aires  
 
 
One only needs to travel a few minutes on the upgraded northern highway, away from 
the Buenos Aires downtown, to notice the transformation of the city. Once one leaves behind 
the bustling, busy, dense urban fabric and takes the road to the suburbs, a different kind of 
landscape appears. Instead of multi-story multi-family buildings bordering the sidewalks, there 
are gated communities sitting next to the highway; instead of small deli-shops populating the 
streets, there are large supermarkets directly accessible from the road. Truly, this description 
could fit just about any contemporary American city. It makes sense that new developments 
would follow a transportation upgrade and that the farther one travels from the city, the 
cheaper the land and the less dense the built environment will be. In addition, if we consider 
that during the eighties and nineties numerous economic crises hit Argentina, it is no wonder 
that many residents favored life in gated communities, as living conditions in the city worsened 
and fear of crime intensified.  
 However, some things do not correspond to the classic story of suburbanization. To 
begin with, gated communities were not being built on empty lands but amidst industrial 
regions. Also, as crime was rising in the City of Buenos Aires, it was rising even more in the 
suburbs where these new gated communities were flourishing. Moreover, not only were these 
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communities appearing in close proximity to informal settlements and decaying industries, they 
were concentrated in the poorest suburban regions. Why were affluent gated communities 
clustering in the impoverished municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires? 
 We cannot answer this question without looking at the institutional dimensions of this 
overall shift to private development. The story of gated communities in poor suburbs is not only 
a story about suburbanization and private developers, it also is a story about the ways in which 
suburban municipalities coped with national economic crises and changing development 
priorities. It is not a coincidence that right after the decentralization of planning capacities, 
municipal governments of poor localities almost tripled the number of planning exceptions for 
private developers.  Thus, ironically, social and spatial contrasts within and between municipal 
boundaries increased after these municipalities became more politically autonomous.   
 Here, I am trying to look beyond the spatial and political understandings of inequality in 
the city. That is, studies of decentralization evaluate the impact of this change by comparing the 
performance of decentralized units (i.e. municipalities) before and after they have been given 
autonomy.  By doing so, they account for the relative changes in these units over time, but not 
for the transformations of the social contrasts inside these municipalities. Likewise, solely 
mapping the contrasts in the city does not explain how these correspond to institutional, rather 
than solely spatial, boundaries. Inasmuch as social realities within institutional territories are 
not even, social indicators at the level of the municipality might be concealing significant 
inequalities. The promotion of a just, prosperous city demands an understanding of the causal 
links between uneven urban development and institutional transformation. Therefore, it is 
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critical that we understand the connections and mismatched between social and institutional 
territories.  
More important yet, the belief that allocating decision power to local governments 
promotes bottom-up forces and thus even development, as many developing agencies claim1, is 
contestable in cases in which there are already important inequalities in place.2 In the case of 
Buenos Aires, the rapid development of gated communities in the poorest municipalities 
following the decentralization of planning authority has not only deepened the development 
contrasts within these municipalities as gated communities flourish side by side with informal 
settlements; it has also called into question the role of municipal governments in promoting 
gated developments. Are poor municipalities sponsoring exclusive developments in their lands? 
And if that is the case, what circumstances led these local governments and suburban residents 
to foster an urban growth model based on gated enclaves?  
In order to answer these questions, while considering both the interaction between 
spatial and institutional transformations, I looked for both the pull and the push forces of urban 
growth. On the push side, I recognize the role of changing national development policies. In 
that sense, local planning choices are constrained by previous and current national 
                                                          
1
 See the 2007 Supplement to Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency “Fighting Poverty in an 
Urban World”.  
2
 Although relying on a very different methodology, the observation that decentralization might deepen 
inequalities when applied to an already unevenly developed metropolitan region coincides with recent studies on 
the impact of decentralization on Mexico. For more on this topic see Raich, Uri. 2006. “Unequal development: 
decentralization and fiscal disparities in the Metropolitan Zone of the Valley of Mexico”. MIT Department of Urban 
Studies  and Planning Doctoral thesis. (http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/34407). 
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development models, whose spatial consequences outlive the ideologies –or the 
constituencies- that supported them. In particular, as Argentine government changed hands, its 
commitment to subsidizing the industrial development of the nation faded, the municipalities 
of the periphery of the City of Buenos Aires suffered the loss of national investments in their 
urban infrastructure. Thus, in this particular scenario, the end of national industrialization 
projects increased the dependency of suburban planners on private capital for the 
development of their land.  
On the pull side, I focus on the municipal planning practices and on the characteristics of the 
population already living on Greater Buenos Aries. The diversity of interest within the suburban 
population was instrumental for the formation of a landscape of contrasts. New gated 
communities and slums are not only inaugurating an era of social disparity but they are also the 
outcome of the deep social contrasts already existing in these peripheries. The national 
industrialization project of the 1960s generated a convergence of interests among large 
entrepreneurs, petty industrialist owners, and poor migrant workers, who landed in Greater 
Buenos Aires. However, once this national project ended, large and small entrepreneurs 
diverged in their commitments to the metropolis. Given the splintering of this suburban society 
and the continuing immigration flow of poor residents to the outskirts of the city, it is not 
surprising that suburban middle income residents feared the stagnation of their localities and 
thus welcomed affluent gated communities3.  
                                                          
3
 Also, given this context of deindustrialization and unemployment, it is even less surprising that the suburbanizing 
urbanites would choose to gate themselves.  
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 In the following pages, I explore these issues further. I present a brief introduction to 
the case of Buenos Aires. Then, I sketch some of the main theories informing our thinking on 
urban expansion. Next, I present the structure of this dissertation. Finally, I highlight some of its 
main points. 
MAP 1 Poor Households  and Gated Communities in Buenos Aires In 2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dark Grey:  NBI Households above 25%  
Light Grey:  NBI Households Between 10% and 25%  
Red Dots:  Gated Community Development  
Red Line:  Main Highway Black Line: Municipal Boundaries  
 
Source: INDEC, 2001. Censo Nacional de Población de la República Argentina; Clarín Newspaper. Suplemento Casas 
Country. Edición Especial. 2002.  
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Spatial and Social Contrasts in Greater Buenos Aires  
 
Why are the people living in the most dynamic, populous, and productive region of a 
nation also the poorest? Why, after years of being the center of public and private investments, 
is the urban periphery experiencing an increase in social contrasts?  
Few countries present a pattern of territorial concentration as persistent and extreme 
as Argentina does (Keeling, 1997; Suarez, 1999). With more than a third of the country’s 36 
million residents, more than half of the national GDP (INDEC, 2004) and less than 2% of its land 
(307,571 square kilometers), Buenos Aires is by far the largest metropolis in Argentina. 
Although Argentine geographical development has been uneven since Hispanic times, Buenos 
Aires only became the economic node it is today after the industrialization of mid–20
th 
century. 
Thanks to the combined effects of its trading port and transportation infrastructure (Scobie, 
1964), abundant labor and consumption centers (Dorfman, 1983), and the favor of those 
political leaders who found their constituency in the masses of urban workers (D. Davis, 2004; 
Mora and Araujo, 1983), Buenos Aires accounts for a disproportionate share of the national 
industrial development (UIA, 2001). This trend has been evident since the national industrial 
census of the mid-20th century, according to which the metropolis (that is, the City of Buenos 
Aires, plus the surrounding municipalities of the Province of Buenos Aires) contained more than 
half of Argentina’s industrial establishments and 65% of its labor (see Table 1). However, and in 
accordance with the transformation of many of the largest metropolises, by the 1980s it 
become clear that in Buenos Aires, service and commercial activities were growing faster than 
industrial activities (Kulfas, 2000).  
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TABLE 1 
Distribution of Industrial Establishments and Industrial Labor in Argentina 1954-1974 (in %) 
 
  CBA PBA Cordoba Santa Fe 
Rest of 
Argentina 
1954 Establishments 26 31 11 10 22 
 Labor 32 33 9 6 20 
1964 Establishments 21 38 12 10 19 
 Labor 26 40 10 8 16 
1974 Establishments 20 37 12 11 20 
 Labor 24 44 9 8 15 
1994* Establishments 11 43 10 13 23 
 
 
Sources: Own extrapolation based on Ricardo Ferrucci. La Promoción Industrial en la Argentina. Buenos 
Aires: Eudeba, 1986; *INDEC, 1997. “Productos Industriales Argentinos”. En Encuesta Industrial Anual. I. 
Buenos Aires:Republica Argentina. 
  
While it is a customarily assumed that the growth of the tertiary sector signals a more 
advanced economy and that independent workers are better off than waged ones, in Greater 
Buenos Aires these changes have a different meaning. To begin with, both secondary and 
tertiary sectors contained a wide diversity of situations, from wealthy industrial owners to petty 
entrepreneurs. But what is more, neither people nor organizations were committed to these 
categories. As we shall see, after the end of the era of the developmentalist state, urban 
residents shifted back and forth between secondary and tertiary occupations. That is, not only 
were former industrial workers likely to be categorized as independent service workers while 
moving from manufacturing to construction jobs, but petty entrepreneurs became urban shop 
owners, small factory owners turned into importers of goods, and owners of large enterprises 
extended their holdings into financial activities. Therefore, it is difficult to read in the rise of 
tertiary activities, a progress in local living conditions.  
Regarding its institutional framework, metropolitan Buenos Aires does not work as a 
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single political unit, but is divided between the City of Buenos Aires (CBA) and the municipalities 
comprising Greater Buenos Aires (GBA). The CBA enjoys full political autonomy, is the main 
connecting node to the new international economy, and its population tends to relate to 
“global patterns of consumption” (Coy and Pholer, 2002). The municipalities of the GBA are 
under the rule of the Province of Buenos Aires (PBA), have a deficient infrastructure, and an 
average poverty level that is double –if not triple – that of the CBA (Torres, 2001;). This 
fragmented institutional geography was strengthened by the government reforms of the early 
1980s, when a series of Provincial decrees began the decentralization of planning capacities on 
the municipal level.  
Eventually, Buenos Aires’s centrality to the national economy curbed the sustainability 
of its own development. That is, each time the rest of the country became impoverished, a 
continuous flow of migrants moved to the metropolis. The urban vision of the 1950s 
distinguishes clearly between the urban core and its periphery. Industrial establishments and 
labor resided on the borders and fed the consumption needs of the more affluent urban core. 
By the 1960s, this model was showing signs of exhaustion, and more than 460,000 city dwellers 
– or about 5% of the whole metropolitan population – were living in shantytowns (Pirez, 1994). 
But it is in the urbanization policies of the late 1970s dictatorship government, that most 
scholars perceive a troubling discontinuity in the metropolitan course of development (Azpiazu 
and Khavisse, 2004; Bermudez, 1985; Di Tella and Dombusch, 1989; Garaffo et al, 1987; 
Kosacoff and Ramos, 2001; Kulfas and Schnorr, 2000; Schvarzer, 1987; Smith, W. C, 1989; 
Svampa, 2001). Qualitative and quantitative studies concur that it was during those years that 
the distribution of earnings in Argentine society, and in particular in Buenos Aires society, 
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began widening its gap between the top and bottom socio-economic quintiles (see Table 2).  
 
TABLE 2 
Variation in GINI coefficient in Argentina 1964-1998 
 
Year Argentina Gini Coefficient 
 
1964 0.358 
1974 0.357 
1983 0.417 
1990 0.439 
1993 0.433 
1998 0.456 
 
Source: FIEL Study 1999. In Frederick Turn and Marita Carballo. “Argentine, Economic Disaster and the 
Rejection of the Political Class.” Comparative Sociology. Vol. 4. No. 1-2. 2005 
Briefly, this dictatorship regime reinterpreted this vision of the city according to its own 
discriminatory principles, and imposed it through police power. First, it halted national 
subsidies for suburban industries. Accordingly, hundreds of urban residents began to take 
unstable and underpaid jobs while many suburban structures became obsolete. In addition, 
believing that the city life of the urban core was only “for those who deserved” it (Oszlak, 1991), 
the regime relocated urban slums into the urban periphery. Ironically, two decades later, 
affluent city residents would move to these regions in search of a pleasant suburban life in a 
gated community. Although a couple of gated communities date back to the early 1930s, only 
in the 1990s did they become a popular housing choice among urban upper-middle class 
households. In the 1990s, when the industries of Greater Buenos Aires were declining, the 
number of gated communities in this region quadrupled. By the late 1990s there were more 
than 500 gated communities and their combined area was 1.6 times that of the city of Buenos 
Aires itself (Pirez, 2002).  
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Overall, while the national imbalance has remained constant, within the metropolis 
itself there have been remarkable population shifts. According to the 2001 decennial Census, as 
the suburban region added more than 700,000 new residents, the City of Buenos Aires, which 
has maintained the same boundaries since 1890, decreased its population by 9% or about 
200,000 residents (see Table 3). Eventually, a novel geography of social inequality became 
apparent: fortified pockets of wealth superimposed on top of declining industrial infrastructure 
and scattered slums. Consequently, towards the end of the 20th century, the former concentric 
urban model was uprooted and replaced by a more extreme (yet subtler) geographical 
distribution of poverty and prosperity. Today it is common to find shantytowns and gated 
communities on opposite sides of the same wall.  
TABLE 3  
Population in CBA, GBA, PBA, and Argentina according to 1980, 1991, and 2001 
Censuses. 
 
 1980 1991 2001 Area  
(Sq Km)  Total Pop. Poor* Total Pop. Poor* Total Pop. Poor* 
 
CBA 
 
2,797,719 
 
231,872 
 
2,871,519 232,203  
 
2,725,488 212,489  
 
200 
GBA ** 7,007,216 1,873,878  8,225,715 1,576,000  9,095,055 1,616,785  4,312 
PBA  10,865,408 2597831  12,594,974 2121943  13,827,203 2,161,064  307,571 
Argentina 27,432,998 7,603,332  32.245.467 6,427,257  35,927,409 6,343,589  3,761,274 
 
*Poor: NBI Households. According to INDEC, to be classified as an NBI (Unsatisfied Basic Needs) a 
household has at least one of the following characteristics: a) More than three people per room; b) 
unsound building structure, c) no water-closet; d) at least one child aged between six and twelve who 
does not attend school; e) four or more people dependent on a single breadwinner who has no 
schooling beyond third grade. 
**Municipalities included in GBA: Avellaneda, Berazategui, Esteban Echeverria, Ezeiza, Florencio 
Varela, Escobar, General San Martin, Hurlingham, Ituzaingo, Jose C Paz, La Matanza, Lanus, Lomas de 
Zamora, Malvinas Argentinas, Merlo, Moreno, Moron, Quilmes, San Fernardo, San Isidro, Pilar,Tigre, 
Tres de Febrero, Vicente Lopez 
 
Source: INDEC, 2001. Censo Nacional de Población de la Republica Argentina.  
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Beyond Globalization: A Consideration of “Push” vs. “Pull” Theories  
 
Because this spatial transformation was visible at the same time that the country was 
shifting from a state to a market-led economy, and because gated communities where 
perceived as imports from the United States, this new geography was attributed to 
globalization (Cicollela et al., 2002; Prevot-Schapira, 2000). However, it is not evident how 
globalization affects the correlation of social inequality to a particular urban distribution. On 
one hand, it is true that international money circuits were involved in some of these 
geographical changes. For example, the revitalization of the City of Buenos Aires old port area, 
Puerto Madero, owes much of its success to the availability of international capital (Cicollela, 
1999). Likewise, a consortium of local and international companies funded and managed the 
expansion of the northern highway, a key enabler for the expansion of the metropolis (Abadia 
and Spiller, 1999). On the other hand, this increased participation in the international economy 
did not mean that the complex legacy of Peronism and anti-Peronism rules governing land 
acquisition, development, and planning in the Province of Buenos Aires were irrelevant in 
shaping the impact of large investments and population movement in the municipalities 
surrounding the City of Buenos Aires. Moreover, it is still unclear what role local residents and 
governments may have played in this outcome – a significant question as these transformations 
have run parallel to the democratization of the country.  
The origins of inequality in the metropolis cannot be fully illuminated through a 
reference to globalization theories. The spatial outlay in which the 1990s metropolis expanded 
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explains much of the inequality that we see now. In Greater Buenos Aires, the combination of 
stagnating local industries and the absence of national investments on urban infrastructure 
facilitated the allocation of land for real estate developments. Thus, as the development of new 
land uses took place in previously undervalued jurisdictions, gated communities often were 
located in close proximity of a shantytown. Likewise, the actual geography of the metropolis is 
one of the causes for the persistence of social inequality. As new nodes of affluence appeared 
in the periphery of the City of Buenos Aires, new shantytowns developed in order to benefit 
from the jobs that these new gated communities demanded. This micro-pattern of social 
polarization is highly relevant in light of the political configuration of the region, which has been 
undergoing a series of decentralization reforms since the late 1970s, therefore increasing the 
weight of locals in planning matters.  
In addition, considering the influence of some specific features of the periphery in the 
transformation of the metropolis, such as obsolete industrial buildings and lack of urban 
infrastructure, suburbanization and sprawl are not sufficient explanations of urban growth. 
That is, these theories disclose urban growth through studying the changes on the urban 
centers, for instance urban expansion cycles (McKenzie, 1925), land prices (Gans, 1967), class 
preferences (Alonso, 1976) and most recently, the consumption patterns of “suburbanizing 
elites” (Low, 2003; Torres, 2001; Webster et al, 2001; Prevot-Schapira, 2000; Cicollela, 1999; 
Blakely et al, 1995), all of which present the changes in the periphery as the corollary of those 
in the core. Moreover, since urban scholars constructed these theories after the characteristics 
of the population leaving the city, they depict a rather homogeneous perception of suburban 
societies.  
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Valid as they are, these perspectives can only tell half of the story, as they account only 
for the growth, and not for the preexisting condition and polarization, taking place in these 
localities. Especially in the case of Argentina, where the population living in Greater Buenos 
Aires was essential to the support of the Peronist model of industrialization, we should not 
overlook the role of the residents of these peripheral municipalities in allowing or fostering new 
land uses in GBA.  
In sum, the previous theories revolving around the processes of globalization, 
suburbanization, and sprawl present the city through the vantage point of the urban core. 
Accordingly, they have focused on the ‘pushing forces’ behind metropolitan growth, that is, the 
conditions and needs of the city that demanded its expansion beyond its own boundaries. Still, 
understanding why social polarization at the intra-locality level characterized the growth of the 
suburbs during the 1990s demands an explanation of the ‘pulling factors’ of the periphery, 
which shaped the specifics urban growth. Moreover, assessing the role localities play in shaping 
urban expansion and why it can be linked to polarization is essential to act upon its causes. For 
example, whether increasing local autonomy helps to alleviate local inequalities (Stiglitz, 1999), 
or is an obstacle for their solution (Wood, 1958) is conditional upon the role these localities 
have in generating these differences. Also, the geographical distribution of polarization 
becomes further relevant within a decentralized democracy. Evidence from the U.S. shows a 
strong correlation between high income levels and active political participation (Mollenkopf, 
1989; Alford and Friedland, 1975; Verba and Nie, 1972; Alford and Scoble, 1968). Therefore, the 
coincidence of decentralization with new land uses (i.e. gated communities) could become a 
cause for increased social exclusion, as affluent groups might disproportionately influence 
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policy designs.  
Likewise, as we shall see later, the national institutions engineered many of the policies 
directly affecting the City of Buenos Aires, hence bypassing the metropolitan unity and 
furthering the differences between the development of the City of Buenos Aires and the 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires
1
. This portrait of the interaction between traditional 
national elites and newly decentralized suburban governments provides a nuanced explanation 
of urban growth that does not respond only to the urban core. In addition, this link between 
the nation and the suburbs encompasses historical questions of national development, most 
noticeably the Peronist and anti-Peronist confrontation, which continue to exert an influence 
on urban peripheries even as they transform due to the large economic and spatial changes of 
Argentina. Therefore, solely addressing income or local representation would not alleviate 
social polarization when it is rooted in historical, institutional4 structures and pre-existing 
socioeconomic geography.  
Lastly, this dissertation’s emphasis on decentralization, municipal units, and economic 
dynamics agrees with the following words of Nicolas Poulantzas:  
 “In whichever way we approach the problem of the space, we become 
aware that space matrices vary with the mode of production and that they are 
                                                          
4
 
 
In this view, the term ‘institution’ combines Max Weber’s and Douglas North’s perspectives. Following the latter, it defines 
them as ruled social practices capable of incremental changes, while still bounded to their previous configurations (North, 
1990). An institution does not necessarily present the most optimum set of regulations for any of the participants (since it has a 
time lag in adapting to contextual changes), but it allows for social and economic development by stabilizing, or increasing, the 
predictability of social behavior. Therefore, this research emphasizes the historical continuity of the urban periphery’s 
regulatory framework. Max Weber’s perspective adds another dimension to the study of state –institutions, defining them as 
simultaneously bureaucratic systems (Weber, 1925), and fields of competition and coercion (Weber, 1896; Tilly, 1990). This 
double nature of ‘institutions’ results in the study of two variables in the generation of an uneven social development: 
structures and actors, or institutional structures and political actors. Institutional structures are the sum of norms and 
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themselves presupposed by the forms of historical-social approaches and 
consumption of space. However, in order to unravel the secrets of these matrices, 
it is not enough to recapitulate the historical sequence of the forms of 
appropriation of social space. From the growth of towns through 
communications, transport and military apparatuses and strategies, to the 
emergence of borders, limits and territory, we are dealing with so many 
mechanisms of organizing social space. Now, to attempt to track the history and 
transformations of these mechanisms always runs up against the same problem: 
the historical changes that they undergo are not variations on an intrinsic nature, 
for these mechanisms have no such nature.”5
 
In the case of Buenos Aires, this means that the 1990s expansion of wealth along the 
northern highway that followed the integration of the City of Buenos Aires into an international 
market economy, did not override the 1960s contrasts between the urban core and the 
periphery that supported an inward-looking industrial development. Thus, we should 
distinguish between the historicity of the institutions that inform the use of space (e.g. the 
Peronist State or private real estate investments), and the space that the superimposition of 
past and present institutional practices creates. That is, contrasting land uses along the 
metropolis, such as old slums next to gated communities, and low-density residential 
neighborhoods next to industrial wastelands, reveal the unresolved contradictions of these two 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
hierarchical relations that regulate the standard procedures of governance in a given area.  
5
 Nicolas Poultantzas. In State/Space. A Reader. Ed. Neil Brenner, Bob Jessop, Martin Jones, and Gordon McLead. Blackwell 
Publishing, 2003.  
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modes of urban organization. The physical proximity of these distinct spaces not only produces 
social contrasts, but also promotes an uneven distribution of resources among locals that 
furthers these initial contrasts.  
Structure of this Dissertation  
 
While this research draws on history to understand current social inequality in Greater 
Buenos Aires, its structure of presentation does not simply take a chronological approach. 
Rather, each of the sections revolves around the actions of one of the institutions behind the 
pulling and pushing forces that created the current uneven landscape of urban periphery. Each 
of these institutions displayed its actions on a different scale. Therefore, there is a spatial 
correlation between the vantage point of each of the sections and the scale in which we portray 
urban growth. In addition, each section reveals a different part of the larger ‘inequality and 
democracy’ puzzle. Lastly, the interaction of these pieces casts light on the substantive role of 
institutional organizations in steering development.  
The first of the three sections considers how decentralized local governments pulled for 
metropolitan growth in ways that contributed to the rise in social contrast within their 
boundaries. This section’s approach does not suppose that local governments’ practices were 
independent from national policies. Rather, it explores how decentralized municipal planners 
perform after the decadence of a national development project centered in Buenos Aires – the 
Argentine version of the import substitution industrialization. In this scenario, the municipal 
governments of the 1990s increasingly turned to private real estate investments to activate 
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their local economy. The larger the number of substandard households in the municipality6,
 
the 
more likely it was to depend on these new investments. Hence, as a new highway infrastructure 
allowed for the suburbanization of upper-middle class urban households, the poorest 
municipalities eased building permits in their localities, thus increasing social polarization within 
their jurisdictional boundaries. Likewise, given these social contrasts it is not surprising that the 
city grew to be a collection of gated enclaves. All of these events point out that even before 
new gated compounds (i.e. gated communities and shopping malls) mushroomed, all along the 
periphery, there were deep social differences within municipal societies. For instance, local 
impoverished entrepreneurs shared no communal spaces with the migrant poor who came to 
work in the City of Buenos Aires, but lived in these peripheral municipalities. Eventually, the 
segregation of suburban society fostered a local model of growth that furthered social 
differences.  
The second section present the how national development policies triggered pushed for 
metropolitan suburbanization. Presenting the growth of Buenos Aires from the vantage point of 
the State, it links urban growth –or decay – back to the ideologies of the three national 
governments ruling Argentina from 1977, the year when the Province of Buenos Aires dictated 
its first urban planning code; until 1999, when Argentina entered its worst economic crisis ever. 
Accordingly, it presents how the policies of the anti-Peronist ‘Proceso de Reorganización 
Nacional’ dictatorship regime of 1976-1982, of the ‘Union Cívica Radical’ democratic 
government of 1983-1989, and of the two presidencies of the Peronist Menem spanning from 
                                                          
6
 
 
Substandard households according to the Census that is, NBI households.  
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1989 until 1999, influenced Buenos Aires’s growth. Briefly, it explains the double effect of 
national policies. Firstly, these policies changed the relevance of the municipalities of GBA in 
the national economy from being the industrial engine of the nation to being the repository of 
the failed national industrialization model of Peronism. Secondly, and as a consequence of the 
decay of the majority of Argentine industries, these municipalities then became the location of 
the impoverished waged workers and the poor rural immigrants. Hence, suburban populations 
accounted for the largest –yet poorest – mass of voters in the nation. As we shall see, this 
prompted the State to bypass the municipal governments of Greater Buenos Aires in the 
management of social aid to the poor. Hence, Greater Buenos Aires dependency on state aid 
began with industrial protection and ended with social aid for the local poor.  
The third section complements the other two by focusing on the role of Greater Buenos 
Aires in pulling for metropolitan growth. It casts light on the transformation of suburban society 
that followed the end of the Argentine production model that centered industrial production in 
Greater Buenos Aires and consumption in the City of Buenos Aires. The spatial reorganization of 
the industry and labor that began during the dictatorship of the 1970s eased the progression of 
social inequality in the municipalities of the GBA during the democratic 1990s. Accordingly, this 
section, instead of focusing on the nation-suburb link, and the ‘top-down’ view of urban 
growth, outlines suburban transformations from the perspective of the metropolitan society. In 
order to continue with the narrative of the second section, this section still characterizes 
suburban society as defined by Argentine’s national model of industrialization. Accordingly, the 
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trajectories of large and small industrial entrepreneurs, industrial workers and union leaders 
structure the narrative. Nonetheless, in order to capture the extent of suburban transformation 
by the 1990s, this section emphasizes that as suburban industries decayed; the validity of this 
classification became questionable. Further, it links these social transformations with the 
specific geography of the suburbs. Thus, this segment portrays the geography of stagnating 
industries and booming real estate investments in the suburbs as the corollary of the end of the 
working alliance among State, entrepreneurs, and labor in sustaining national industries in GBA, 
and the absence of adequate representation of the needs of the population of Greater Buenos 
Aires after the end of the protectionist industrialization policies.  
By way of conclusion, the last section returns to the originating question of this 
research. Namely, why decentralized suburban governments and suburban residents fostered 
further uneven development within their locality? Regarding decentralization and inequality, it 
points out the unevenness of national development as one of the main factors prompting the 
decentralized management of the suburbs. In addition, it highlights the relevant role of 
societies’ acceptance of inequality all along the city. Faced with economic decline, suburban 
middle-income households did not attempt to change the model of social exclusion, but 
embrace it as a way to distance themselves from the suburban poor. Significant for this 
outcome was the legacy of Peronist and anti-Peronist policies, as well as the institutional 
circuits of social aid, which have disempowered the suburban poor.  
In essence, two causes of inequality are active in the suburbs: inherited poverty and a 
lack of a development project at the national scale. The built landscape perpetuated the 
inherited poverty, for instance, in the obsolete industrial buildings of the southern 
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municipalities of GBA and in the settlements without piped water of the northern municipalities 
of GBA. The latter is the result of a short-term vision of growth that avoided considering the 
social costs of inequality. Because of the limitations that the preexisting geography of 
development imposes on local participants, local governments cannot prevent social 
polarization when only the highest income sectors have the resources that can activate local 
economies. Nor can they stop the poor from migrating to the metropolis when they have no 
chance for growth in their own localities. Thus, local participation is not sufficient to transcend 
social inequality. Social inequality in the metropolis will diminish only after a development 
project on the national scale is developed. 
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SECTION I  
MUNICIPAL PLANNING AND METROPOLITAN GROWTH  
How Did Municipalities Shape Social Polarization in Greater Buenos Aires?  
 
 
“Creating the institutions that will alter the benefit /cost ratios in favor of 
cooperation in impersonal exchange is a complex process, because it not only 
entails the creation of economic institutions, but requires that they be 
undergrided by appropriate political institutions.”  
Douglass North, “Economic Performance through Time.” The American 
Economic Review 84, no. 3. (June 1994): 365.  
 
“Everybody says how much this municipality is growing, and that is a 
mixed blessing. All the unemployed people of the region come here looking for 
jobs. They are looking to work in construction, gardening, as house cleaners, 
whatever. But we do not have infrastructure for that, and now we have new 
shantytowns all over: in Villa Rosa, in Derqui, in Alberti. There is little we can do; 
we are not going to stop gated communities from coming as long as they bring 
their own infrastructure. And we cannot provide housing or piped water for all 
these new shantytowns. And because of all that social inequality here is high.”  
 Planning officer of one municipality of Greater Buenos Aires. Interview by 
author. August 25
th
, 2004.  
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Let’s acknowledge from the outset that in order to understand social polarization in the 
metropolis, we should study the changes in the society that preceded the municipal planning 
practices of the 1990s. To be sure, the factors that led to the construction of more than 500 
new gated communities in the poorest northern municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires in the 
last decade encompass more than the planning practices of local municipalities. In addition, a 
history of weak local governance and strong centralized political powers, unstable democratic 
regimes, and chronically indebted public institutions furthered diminished the resources that 
these peripheral municipalities could have used to affect the growth of the largest metropolis in 
the country, Buenos Aires. Yet, just after the Province of Buenos Aires decentralized urban 
planning capacities, the geography of poverty and wealth in Greater Buenos Aires presented 
dramatic changes. Unlike the classic concentric distribution of wealth, according to which the 
people living in the core of the city account for most of the wealth and infrastructure while the 
peripheral jurisdictions tend to lack both, a novel pattern of growth and poverty became 
evident. At the sides of the northern highway on some of the most impoverished municipalities 
of the periphery, exclusive gated communities, shopping malls, and office parks mushroomed. 
Did the way that municipal governments handled their new planning autonomy influence this 
outcome?  
Whether or not the planning practices of these municipalities influenced the decision of 
developers to build on those lands, one thing is certain: The social contrasts within their 
boundaries created an unprecedented challenge. Not only was the gap between the affluent 
and the poor living in the metropolis enormous, but also, the new spatial configuration of social 
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polarization -with gated communities and shantytowns side by side-triggered a distinct social 
dynamic. In fact, some of the long-term consequences of these changes are yet to be seen, but 
even at these early stages, some distinct features are noticeable. While in some municipalities, 
informal settlements grew after upscale developments were established – thus increasing the 
number of both poor and wealthy people living within its boundaries – in other municipalities, 
the number of poor people has decreased ever since. What accounts for these differences at 
the municipal scale? To which extent were municipalities responsible for increasing the social 
polarization that was taking place within their jurisdictions?  
The following pages propose a way to link the piecemeal pattern of social contrast 
within the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires with the population movements taking place 
at the metropolitan, national and international scales. At the center of this analysis, are the 
planning practices of the northern municipalities. By carefully studying how municipalities 
managed, and even fostered, these new investments within their jurisdictions, we will trace the 
pulling forces of urban growth. Moreover, as these municipal governments counted on the 
support of local residents, we acknowledge that more often than not, social polarization has 
been accepted – if not preferred – by these residents.  
 
THE SPATIAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF BUENOS AIRES 
 
Buenos Aires, which includes the City of Buenos Aires as well as the municipalities of the 
periphery, or Greater Buenos Aires, accounts for more than a third of Argentina’s 36 million 
residents and less than 2% of its land (307,571 square kilometers). Although the country’s 
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geographical development has been uneven since its Hispanic times, Buenos Aires only became 
the economic and population node it is today after the industrialization of 20th century (see 
Map 2). During the 1950s and 1960s, when the Peronist State became the main sponsor of 
national industries, Greater Buenos Aires became the primary location of economic migrants 
that the new industries attracted. The metropolis was ill-prepared to shelter all of these 
newcomers, and slums, informal housing, and substandard housing accommodations spread 
throughout the city (Torres, 2001). By the end of the 1970s, the dictatorship that took over the 
Peronist government had rejected the presence of poor workers in the nation’s capital. 
Accordingly, it evicted residents of the slums and informal housing, and relocated more than 
200,000 slum dwellers into the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires (Ozlack, 1984). Ironically, 
two decades later, affluent city residents would move to these regions in search of a pleasant 
suburban life in a gated community. Because of these two consecutive migrations out of the 
city’s core, the concentric model of urbanization that peaked in the 1960s faded by the end of 
the 20th century, and gave rise to a more subtle, and more extreme, geographical distribution 
of poverty and prosperity along the metropolis.  
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MAP 2 City Of Buenos Aires and Municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grey Area: Urbanized Area  
 
Source: Horacio Torres. "Cambios socio territoriales en Buenos Aires durante la década de 1990." EURE XXVII 
(2001): 80.  
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Assessing the role of local planning practices in the growth of the metropolis is reveals a 
great deal in the case of the City of Buenos Aires, the main locus of political and economical 
power in Argentina, where the practices of the surrounding local governments are often 
regarded as inconsequential. This is not surprising, as both the agro-export model of the 19th 
century, and the national industrialization of the mid-20
th 
century favored the development of 
the urban core over that of the periphery. At the times when the export of agricultural and 
cattle products to European markets was the main economic activity of Argentina (Diaz 
Alejandro, 1970; Tella, 1989), local elites modeled the national capital on the architectural and 
urban forms of European cities, like Paris, and Madrid (Liernur and Silvestri, 1993). Likewise, the 
transportation network of Argentina concluded in the port of the City of Buenos Aires (see Map 
3) where the urban downtown boasted impeccable fin-de-siècle architecture and the periphery 
remained largely undeveloped7.
 
This core-periphery organization outlived the collapse of the 
international terms of trade that supported it. Moreover, the national industrialization project 
of the mid-twentieth
 
century furthered the contrasts between the CBA and the GBA. In effect, 
the City of Buenos Aires remained the center of upscale housing and commerce, while most of 
the industrial land uses and waged workers settled in Greater Buenos Aires.  
                                                          
7
 Even today, the distribution of transportation infrastructure in the country follows this logic: Up-to-date highways 
centered in the City of Buenos Aires cross over peripheral jurisdictions that lack pavement in most of their local 
streets (Torres, 2001). This transportation network favored the flow in and out of the city, but made navigation 
within jurisdictional boundaries difficult.  
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MAP 3 Train tracks And Highway In Buenos Aires, 2000  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grey Area: Urbanized Area  
Red Line: Main Highway  
Blue Line: Traintracks (with thickness indicating frequency of service)  
 
Sources: Horacio Torres. "Cambios socio territoriales en Buenos Aires durante la década de 1990." EURE XXVII 
(2001): 80; Argelia Combetto Bariffi. “La Gran Industria,”in Atlas de Buenos Aires, ed. Horacio Diffieri 
(Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Secretaria de Cultura, 1981).  
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So why should we insist on focusing on the role of peripheral municipalities in the 
development of the metropolis? The basic answer is that the urban layout of today can no 
longer be attributed to the City of Buenos Aires alone. While little has changed in the 
distribution of poor households in the metropolis, new enclaves of wealth are flourishing 
throughout the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. In the 1990s, the northern 
municipalities of GBA presented the most paradigmatic case of social polarization, as those land 
uses typically associated with globalization, i.e. MercoSur industries and gated communities, 
appeared next to informal housing settlements. But, as we shall soon see, these stark contrasts 
in local development were not just the consequence of the success of financial and service 
enterprises over urban manufacturing industries, but also of the specific planning policies that 
the local municipalities enacted. In effect, these geographical changes have run parallel to a 
shift in the allocation of responsibility over local development, from the national to the 
municipal government and from the public to the private sectors. The decentralization of land 
use management allowed some local municipalities to take advantage of the large-scale 
changes in the geography of the metropolitan population and investments, thus becoming one 
of the pulling forces of metropolitan growth.  
 
Population Flows  
Tracing and linking the changing locations of population and economic activities during 
the last decade reveals the extent of the transformation of the urban periphery. As in most 
large Latin American metropolises, maximum population growth took place at the boundaries 
of these extensive conurbations (Portes, 2005). On average, between 1991 and 2001, the 
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capital city and the ten suburbs next to it8
 
lost about half a million people, or 5% of its 
population, while the farther urban municipalities9
 
added more than 660,000, a population 
increase of 25% (see Table 4 and Map 4). However, this does not imply that depopulation of the 
City of Buenos Aires caused the growth of the suburbs, nor that the CBA lost economic primacy. 
Data on building permits granted by the CBA Municipality shows a steady increase of real estate 
activity during the 1990s with the majority of new buildings located in the neighborhoods 
where real estate values were higher (INDEC, 2001). Conversely, the GBA municipalities that 
experienced population growth also experienced an increase in the number of poor households 
(see Map 5). Therefore, there were simultaneous and distinct population movements along the 
metropolis. As we shall see, the engagement of these different populations in the city emerged 
out of the distinct scales –or networks-in which Buenos Aires participated.  
                                                          
8
 
 
Avellaneda, Lanus, Lomas de Zamora, La Matanza, Morón, Tres de Febrero, Genera San Martín, Vicente López, 
San Isidro, and San Fernando.  
 
9
 Almirante Brown, Berazategui, Escobar, Esteban Echeverría, Florencio Varela, General Sarmiento, Merlo, Moreno, 
Quilmes, Pilar, and Tigre.  
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TABLE 4 
Variations in Total Population and Percentage of Poor Residents per GBA Municipality 
between 1980, 1991, and 2001 
 
 
Municipal  
Population 
 1980  
  (% NBI) 
1991  
(% NBI) 
2001   
(% NBI) 
 Var. 91-80 
(N(NBI) 
    Var. 01-91 
(NBI) 
    Var. 01-80 
(NBI) 
Almirante Brown 329,216  (33) 447,805 (20) 512,517 (19) 36 (-16) 14 (11) 56 (-7) 
Avellaneda 331,763 (17) 342,226 (14)  327,618 (11) 3 (-16) -4 (-25) -1 (-37) 
Berazategui 198,930 (32) 244,405 (21)  287,207 (19)  23 (-17) 18 (7) 44 (-11) 
Escobar 80,597 (40) 127,775 (27)  177,579 (23)  59 (6) 39 (21) 120 (28) 
Esteban Echeverria 186,331 (36) 273,740 (25)  243,485 (20)  47 (2) -11 (-27) 31 (-26) 
Florencio Varela 173,029 (45) 254,514 (31)  346,223 (30)  46 (1) 36 (33) 100 (34) 
General San Martin 381,336 (21) 404,072 (14) 400,718 (13)  6 (-27) -1 (-10) 5 (-34) 
General Sarmiento* 496,717 (36) 648,268 (24) 990,426 (21)  31 (-13) 53 (31) 99 (15) 
La Matanza 945,669 (30) 1,117,319 (22) 1,251,595 (20)  18 (-14) 12 (4) 32 (-11) 
Lanus 465,179 (22) 466,393 (15)  451,067 (12)  0 (-34) -3 (-22) -3 (-48) 
Lomas de Zamora 505,509 (28) 570,457 (19)  587,795 (17)  13 (-23) 3 (-7) 16 (-29) 
Merlo  291,603 (37) 390,194 (24)  468,452 (23)  34 (-14) 20 (20) 61 (3) 
Moreno 194,355 (43) 286,922 (26)  379,370 (26)  48 (-9) 32 (30) 95 (18) 
Moron 591,471 (17) 637,307 (12)  305,687 (8)  8 (-22) -52 (-70) -48 (-77) 
Pilar 83,418 (40) 129,680 (31)  231,139 (25)  55(18) 78 (45) 177 (71) 
Quilmes 446,337 (29) 508,114 (21)  516,404 (18)  14 (18) 2 (-15) 16 (-29) 
San Fernando 132,096 (29) 143,450 (23)  150,008 (16)  9 (-17) 5 (-27) 14 (-36) 
San Isidro 290,750 (15) 297,392 (10)  289,889 (8)  2 (-13) -3 (-20) 0 (-45) 
Tigre 204,915 (33) 256,349 (23)  300,411 (20)  25 (-31) 17 (4) 47 (-11) 
Tres de Febrero 344,178 (16) 348,343 (11)  334,889 (9)  1 (-14) -4 (-22) -3 (-46) 
Vicente Lopez 288,307 (8) 287,154 (5)  272,072 (5)  0 (-31) -5 (-4) -6 (-46) 
AVERAGE 331,510 (29)  389,613 (20)  263,751 (17)  23 (-16) 12 (-2) 41 (-53) 
 
 
* In 1994 the Municipality of General Sarmiento was divided into Jose C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and San 
Miguel  
NBI: Unsatisfied Basic Needs  
 
Source: INDEC, 2002, Estimaciones  de la población por departamento. Análisis Demográfico.  
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MAP 4 Variation Of Municipal Population 1980-2001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Red Areas: Population Growth between 1980 and 2001 higher than 25%. 
Light Grey Areas: Population Growth between 1980 and 2001 higher than 5% and less than 25%. 
Dark Grey Areas: Population Growth between 1980 and 2001 less than 5%. 
 
Source: Own extrapolation based on INDEC, 2002, Estimaciones de la población por departamento. Análisis 
Demográfico.  
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MAP 5 Variation Of Households With Nbi In Municipal Population 1990-2001  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Light Red Areas: NBI Population Loss between 1990 and 2001 more than 15%. 
Dark Red Areas: NBI Population Loss between 1990 and 2001 between 0 and 15%. 
Dark Grey Areas: NBI Population Growth between 1990 and 2001 higher than 15%. 
Light Grey Areas: NBI Population Growth between 1990 and 2001 between 0 and 15%. 
 
Source: Own extrapolation based on INDEC, 2002, Estimaciones de la población por departamento. Análisis 
Demográfico.  
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At the scale of the metropolis, the appearance of new real estate developments for the 
most affluent groups was most noticeable. In a movement that resembles the description of 
United States mid-century suburbs (Lang, LeFurgy, and Nelson, 2006); more than 20,000 
residents left the City of Buenos Aires to reside in suburban gated communities (Thuillier, 
2001). Their relocation coincided with the upgrade of the northern highway, as most of these 
residents became daily commuters to the city (Torres, 2001). However, unlike that of many US 
cities, the suburbanization in Buenos Aires of the higher income groups did not imply the 
abandonment of the urban core as a desirable residential location. Neither had it brought the 
displacement of poor residents already living in the municipalities to which new real estate 
investments were relocating, which were large and empty enough to accommodate the new 
and the old residents. It is noteworthy that this juxtaposition did not decrease the real estate 
value of the new residential complexes (Goytia, 2005), provided these were gated and privately 
policed. Accordingly, the territory in which affluent groups resided stretched through a 
potholed fabric that spanned from the urban core to the far suburban belt of the metropolis, 
about 50 kilometers from the center. This compound-like urbanism was correlated to real 
estate prices, which remained unchanged or increased in the traditional urban neighborhoods 
(i.e. Palermo, Recoleta, Belgrano), but had no significant spillover effects on the old 
neighborhoods next to new gated communities, still dependent on public transport. On the 
contrary, new gated communities became a magnet for poor residents who were eager to 
provide the construction and low paid service jobs that these new development demanded (i.e. 
gardeners, house cleaners, guards). In Pilar, for example, the municipality with about a third of 
all of Buenos Aires’ gated communities, census data shows that between 1991 and 2001 people 
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living in poor conditions grew by 50%, adding more than 17,000 new substandard households 
to the jurisdictions (see Map 5).  
In spite of its relevance, the northern expansion of the upper income groups was not 
the only demographic change in the metropolis. Because Buenos Aires is a key node of the 
national productive structure, variations in the national development have direct consequences 
on the urban geography. After the Argentine government halted the subsidies for relocating 
and developing industries in the suburbs, there was a renewed inflow of industries to the 
metropolis, and once more Greater Buenos Aires became the main recipient of industrial 
investments (Fritzche and Vio, 2000). In effect, once the subsidies halted, the advantage of 
being located in Greater Buenos Aires became evident: a better transportation network, 
abundant labor, and proximity to the airports and other industrial traders. Between 1984 and 
1994, and in spite of losing about a quarter of its industrial jobs, the Province of Buenos Aires 
increased its share of industries. As a result, amidst the national deindustrialization trend of the 
1990s, the metropolis consolidated its importance as an industrial center. This was not only the 
product of comparing the metropolitan economy with those of the decaying provincial 
economies, but also of new investments in the GBA. These new establishments were larger and 
more efficient than those located closer to the city were; hence, they produced more with 
fewer workers. Accordingly, even when less than one in three industrial jobs was located in the 
more distant municipalities, these municipalities accounted for 40% of the metropolis’ 
industrial value (Estadística Bonaerense, 1999). That is, growing localities also presented 
significant employment losses. Even so, as local economies became even more depressed, new 
residents came from the provinces looking for jobs in the city, once more continuing the 
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urbanization without the growth trend that began in the 1970s.  
Finally, the establishment of the MercoSur and the strength of the Argentine peso vis-
àvis the currency of the neighboring countries fostered an inflow of immigrant workers. As 
could be expected, the majority of the newcomers located next to the main employment 
centers, hence close to the City of Buenos Aires. This was not a new trend, as immigration to 
Buenos Aires had existed for decades; during the 1990s, however, the city consolidated its role 
as a net recipient of South American immigration (as opposed to being a net recipient of 
European immigration). Actually, during the last years of the 1990s, the number of Bolivians, 
Brazilians, Chileans, Paraguayans, and Uruguayans migrating to the city increased by 40% 
(INDEC, 2004; see Table 5). The majority relocated in the municipalities of Greater Buenos 
Aires, where access to land was somewhat easier and there were consolidated immigrant 
communities, such as Bolivians in the Escobar municipality and Paraguayans in the Jose C Paz 
municipality. These localities were along the northern highway linking to the MercoSur 
markets, and therefore easier to access for northern immigrants. Ironically, this was the region 
with the largest inflow of gated communities’ residents due, in part, to this same highway.  
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TABLE 5 
IMMIGRANTS FROM BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, PARAGUAY, AND URUGUAY IN BUENOS AIRES 
1970-2003 
 
 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-2003 
City of Buenos Aires 88,871 (75%) 69,265 (66%) 77,942 (64%) 
Greater Buenos Aires * 28,913 (25%) 36,160 (34%) 43,169 (36%) 
Total  117,784 (100%) 105,425(100%) 121,111(100%) 
 
Reference: * Greater Buenos Aires includes these 26 municipalities: 
Avellaneda, Berazategui, Esteban Echeverria, Ezeiza, Florencio Varela, Escobar, General San Martin, Hurlingham, 
Ituzaingo, Jose C Paz, La Matanza, Lanus, Lomas de Zamora, Malvinas Argentinas, Merlo, Moreno, Moron, 
Quilmes, San Fernando, San Isidro, Pilar, Tigre, Tres de Febrero, Vicente Lopez 
 
Source: INDEC, 2004. Censo Nacional Económico 2001.  
 
 
These three scales of movement – namely, the metropolitan from the core to the 
suburbs, the national from the provinces to the national capital, and the international from 
neighboring countries to the urban fringe – were present in the suburbs in which both poverty 
and affluence grew during the 1990s. Therefore, municipalities interacted with all three levels. 
However, since the institutional circuit did not recognize the metropolis as a legal unit, 
municipalities lacked the legal tools to do so (Pirez, 2002). In addition, the Province of Buenos 
Aires was reluctant to lose its grip over the suburban municipalities in favor of a metropolitan 
autonomy, and even less so in the 1990s when the national government gave the provincial 
government more than 650 millions dollars in funding for social aid programs targeted to the 
urban poor (LaNacion, 1998). Also, on a larger scale, municipalities had little capacity to 
regulate the flow of migrants into their territory – the outcome of the historical regional 
imbalance which has given way to a transportation infrastructure centered in Buenos Aires and 
controlled by the state (Manzanal and Rofman, 1989).  
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Investments Flows  
In addition to these population flows, the metropolitan space also had shifts in the 
location of both poor and affluent residents. Late studies on the urban sociology of the most 
advanced economies had consistently shown a growth of population at the top and bottom 
classes at the expense of those in the middle (Fainstein, 2001; Marcuse and Van Kempen, 2000; 
Castells, 1996; Sassen, 1994). This is also true in Buenos Aires, where both the top and the 
bottom quintiles showed more dynamism than the middle, both in quantity of people and in 
their place in the metropolitan geography. As we have seen, the territoriality of the affluent 
residents of the City of Buenos Aires expanded along the northern municipalities of Greater 
Buenos Aires. In addition, poor households increased in number in these GBA municipalities, as 
well as those in the south, where the highest numbers of housing projects and the worst socio-
economic indicators of the city were located (Pirez, 1999).  
The slow but steady impoverishment of middle-income households was also evident in 
their static spatial patterns. The presence of the poorest and wealthiest people expanded and 
scattered throughout the metropolis, while those jurisdictions with medium real estate prices 
remained on the periphery of these movements. Since the 1990s, municipalities typically 
associated with middle-income households have maintained or slightly decreased their 
population10. This was consistent with the lack of the construction activity in these localities 
(Estadística Bonaerense, 1999), as well as with the sluggishness of the real estate market (sees 
Map 5). Even if these municipalities experienced only slight losses in their contribution to the 
                                                          
10
 
Avellaneda, Lanus, Vicente Lopez, Tres de Febrero, San Martin, and Quilmas.  
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metropolis’ industrial value, and they retained or even enlarged their share of industrial 
employment, their economy had shown a steady decay since the 1990s (see Table 6, Map 6, 
and Map 7). And yet, it was to the municipalities where the real estate market was most active 
that poor immigrants flew, and thus stagnated regions tended to have less social contrast as 
well.  
 
TABLE 6 
NUMBER OF JOBS IN MANUFACTURING PER GBA MUNICIPALITY, 1984-1994 
 
 
 
1991 NBI (%) 1984 (% of total) 1994 (% of total) Variation (%) 
Almirante Brown 20 5,514 (1) 5,450 (2)  -1 
Avellaneda 14  36,386 (8) 23,486 (7)  -35 
Berazategui 21  10,426 (2) 8,191 (2)  -21 
Escobar 27  6028 (1)  4,410 (1)  -27 
Esteban Echeverria 25  9,833 (2)  8,191 (2)  -17 
Florencio Varela 31  7,188 (2)  6,006 (2)  -16 
General San Martin 14 54,897 (12)  42,474 (13)  -23 
General Sarmiento* 24 9,386 (2) 10,526 (3)  12 
La Matanza   22 5,8847 (13)  42,020 (13)  -29 
Lanus 15  37,303 (8)  23,094 (7)  -38 
Lomas de Zamora 19  18,572 (4)  13,526 (4)  -27 
Merlo  24  6,766 (2)  6,013 (2)  -11 
Moreno 26  4,773 (1)  3,708 (1)  -22 
Moron 12  26,066 (6)  18,034 (5)  -31 
Pilar 31  8,320 (2)  6,300 (2)  -24 
Quilmes 21  25,465 (6)  15,538 (5)  -39 
San Fernando 23  8,322 (2)  6,300 (2)  -24 
San Isidro 10  20,419 (5)  13,025 (4)  -36 
Tigre** 23  23,382 (5)  20,342 (6)  -13 
Tres de Febrero 11  32,687 (7)  28,071 (8)  -14 
Vicente Lopez 5  38,443 (9)  27,332 (8)  -29 
AVERAGE 20   -22 
 
References: 
*Jose C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and San Miguel. 
 
Source: Estadistica Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 
1999). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
58 
 
 
MAP 6 Industrial Concentration In 1980  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Darkest Grey: Industrial Concentration higher than 15% of BA industry  
Dark Grey: Industrial Concentration between 6% and 15% of BA industry  
Light Grey: Industrial Concentration between 2% and 6% of BA industry  
Lightest Grey: Industrial Concentration between less than 2% of BA industry  
Red Line: Train tracks (with thickness indicating frequency of service)  
 
Sources: Source: Estadística Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La 
Plata, 1999). ; Argelia Combetto Bariffi. “La Gran Industria,” in Atlas de Buenos Aires, ed. Horacio Diffieri 
(Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Secretaria de Cultura, 1981).  
59 
 
MAP 7 Industrial Concentration In 1990  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Darkest Grey: Industrial Concentration higher than 15% of BA industry  
Dark Grey: Industrial Concentration between 6% and 15% of BA industry  
Light Grey: Industrial Concentration between 2% and 6% of BA industry  
Lightest Grey: Industrial Concentration between less than 2% of BA industry  
Red Line: Main Highways Light Red Line: Train tracks (with thickness indicating frequency of service)  
 
Sources: Estadística Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 
1999). ; Argelia Combetto Bariffi. “La Gran Industria,” in Atlas de Buenos Aires, ed. Horacio Diffieri (Municipalidad 
de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Secretaria de Cultura, 1981).  
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At the same pace as that of the decline in industrial wages (Azpiazu, 2004), prosperity in 
the city followed real estate activities rather than industrial employment. Most dynamic regions 
of the metropolis became magnets for both growth and poverty: those jurisdictions boasting 
the most active real estate markets have also shown increases in the number of poor 
households. Conversely, middle-income jurisdictions declined at the same time that the social 
differences within them were ameliorating (see Table 7 and Map 8). Hence, this progress in 
equality has been mostly the consequence of loosing the economic dynamism that had 
diminished the attraction of the poor migrant to this location. The poorest residents, who have 
severe limitations on mobility, settle as close as possible to employment opportunities. In the 
early days of industrialization, this rationale caused them to cluster along the train tracks going 
towards the city (Germani, 1980); today, however, it leads them to consumption centers.  
By the end of the 20th century, Buenos Aires had consolidated a new socio-economic 
landscape. The decline of urban industries did not diminish the relevance of the metropolis in 
the country’s economic activity, and as other areas of the nation remained undeveloped, the 
metropolis became an even stronger population magnet. Yet, unlike during the heyday of 
industrialization, internal migration was not the only source of suburban expansion: migrants 
from neighboring countries and from the City of Buenos Aires were also populating Greater 
Buenos Aires. Three distinct phenomenons have drawn these three distinct population shifts; 
namely, the imbalance of national development, the strength of Argentine economy in the 
region; and the suburbanization of metropolitan affluence. Using these to classify municipalities 
according to changes in socio-economic indicators during the last decades, the municipalities 
with most striking social contrasts were those that exhibited all of these flows, thus 
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demonstrating the limitations of municipal planning, as these trends were not originated in the 
suburbs. Yet, these trends were not operating on empty land, but on one with specific needs 
and autonomous planning power. How did the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires 
participate in this urban expansion? Or, in other words, which were the pulling factors of 
suburbanization?  
 
TABLE 7 
NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS PER GBA MUNICIPALITY, 1990-1997 
 
 
 
1991 NBI (%) 1990 1997 Variation (%) 
Almirante Brown 20 327 635 94 
Avellaneda 14  199 399 101 
Berazategui 21  533 859 61 
Escobar 27  250 1629 552 
Esteban Echeverria 25  314 1085 246 
Florencio Varela 31  157 423 169 
General San Martin 14 602 966 60 
General Sarmiento* 24 966 1747 81 
La Matanza   22 537 1634 204 
Lanus 15  529 969 83 
Lomas de Zamora 19  614 1401 128 
Merlo  24  254 905 256 
Moreno 26  229 579 153 
Moron 12  1474 901 -39 
Pilar 31  193 421 118 
Quilmes 21  376 904 140 
San Fernando 23  59 117 98 
San Isidro 10  872 1421 63 
Tigre** 23  210 479 128 
Tres de Febrero 11  517 499 -3 
Vicente Lopez 5  483 763 58 
AVERAGE 20 536 946 124 
 
Reference: 
*Jose C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and San Miguel 
**Data for 1994 taken from 1995 
 
Source: Estadística Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 
1999).  
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MAP 8 Variation in Construction Permits In GBA Municipalities in the 1990  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Darkest Grey: Decline in Construction permits 1990-1997 by 50% or more.  
Dark Grey: Decline in Construction permits 1990-1997 between 5 and 49%.  
Light Grey: Variation in Construction permits 1990-1997 between -5 and 5%.  
Darkest Red: Variation in Construction permits 1990-1997 between 6 and 50%.  
Lightest Red: Variation in Construction permits 1990-1997 by 50% or more.  
 
Source: Estadística Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 
1999).  
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Decentralization, Polarization, and Privatization of Urban Growth  
The weakness of the suburban government is evident in its limited economic autonomy. 
Paradoxically, further legal autonomy did not bring economic independence but it worsened 
municipal dependency on money transferences from the provincial government. Moreover, 
since the provision of services falls to municipal governments, these governments have 
escalating levels of debt. They do not have enough resources to fulfill the needs of their 
residents. On average, municipal jurisdictions’ annual budget is about 25% less than their actual 
expenditures, and per capita expenditure is almost five times lower than in the City of Buenos 
Aires. (Pirez, 1994). As one can expect, the situation is worst in those municipalities with the 
highest percentage of poor households. But, not so predictably, municipal budgets have shown 
little correlation with the dynamism of the local economy. Because of the way fiscal circuits 
work in the Province of Buenos Aires, municipal governments only receive between 10% and 
15% of collected real estate taxes (Sanguinetti and Tomassi; 2000). But for the ‘development 
right fee’ and the possibility of collecting payment for urban services such as street cleaning 
and lighting (the ‘alumbrado, barrido, y limpieza,’ or ABD tax), municipalities did not see much 
of the fiscal benefit from the new projects. Therefore, there is a disconnection between local 
economic activities and municipal wealth.  
In more than one way the scarcity of municipal resources fostered the widening social 
polarization of the periphery. Although statistical indicators of income polarization in urban 
centers have been worsening since the 1960s, it was between 1991 and 2002 that these 
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indicators mark a noteworthy income gap11
 
(Filgueira and Filgueira, 2002). In the municipalities 
of Greater Buenos Aires, the income of the wealthiest quintile of the population grew faster 
than that of any other segment12
 
(INDEC, 2004). However, with the Province of Buenos Aires 
controlling both the bulk of local real estate taxes and the monies for social aid in the urban 
periphery, municipal governments lacked the institutional tools to apply meaningful 
distribution policies. It was in this context that the decentralization of planning capacities 
contributed to increased social contrasts within these municipalities.  
Once again we should trace the structure of Argentine institutions back to the days of 
the anti-Peronist dictatorship regime of the late 1970s. It was then that decentralized municipal 
planning first was regulated. Provisions for social participation were absent and the goal of the 
reform was to ameliorate central expenditures, rather than improving local revenue. Twenty 
years later, when ‘decentralizing the state’ became one of the mottos of international 
development funding agencies (Williamson, 1990; Cavallo and Cottani, 1997; Williamson, 1999; 
Naim, 2000), decentralization policies were constructed on top of the legal scaffolding that the 
dictatorship left behind. In spite of their top-down approach, and in contrast with the social 
turmoil that surrounded the state privatization, there was almost no contestation over 
decentralization. The extreme unevenness of Argentine geographical development assured a 
wide support for any reform that suggested diffusing the power of the capital city into other 
                                                          
11
 
 
In comparison with the 1991-1994 urban employment growth rates of the following countries: Argentina (0.2%); 
Chile (0.7%); Costa Rica (0.9%); Colombia (1%); Brazil (0.4%); Peru (0.4%) and Mexico (1.6%), Argentina had the 
steepest rise in informal employment, the lowest growth in urban employment and was the only country that 
worsened its GINI coefficients in the 1960-1995 period (Filgueira and Filgueira). 
12
 
 
By 2001, the wealthiest quintile accounted for 52.5% of all income. (INDEC, 2004) 
65 
 
regional entities (Keeling, 1997).
 
 
But the non-conflictive nature of decentralization policies was largely deceiving. Beyond 
the impact that the specifics of a policy’s implementation have on its success (Smoke, 2001; 
Bird and Smart, 2002; Bird and Vaillancourt, 1997), the social and economic conditions of the 
society in which it takes place shape its content and consequences. By conferring further 
autonomy and access to financial resources to the provincial government and to municipal 
governments without established mechanisms to strengthen local instances of public 
participation, it has promoted a close circuit of power in which central and local government 
exchange favors without an adequate system of checks and balances. The decentralization of 
planning capacities that began in 1977 did not affect the essence of the fiscal circuits. In other 
words, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Province of Buenos Aires continued collecting taxes 
centrally (Cetrangolo and Jimenez, 2004) and distributing these monies among municipal 
governments13 according to population and initial contribution (Sanguinetti et al, 2000)14. 
However, it distributed the benefits of the “Fondo de Reparación Histórica del Conurbano 
Bonaerense,’ the millionaire social aid program, at will. Eventually, the combination of limited 
economic autonomy along with decentralized land use decisions incited municipalities to rely 
                                                          
13
 
 
Municipalities spend half of their budget on their operational expenditures (i.e. wages), a proportion that is 
about twice of what the provincial government spends on the same item (Cetrangolo and Jimenez, 2004). 
14
 “Ese centralismo fue succionando desde las migraciones interiores hasta los contenidos económicos pasando por 
un verdadero arrasamiento cultural del interior y llevando a la constante deformación de la vida nacional. Esa 
tendencia debe ser revertida a través de una sincera lealtad para con las distintas regiones del país. Las provincias 
volverán a asumir su histórico papel fundador de la nacionalidad, despolarizando el desarrollo hasta convertirlo en 
razonablemente homogéneo, de acuerdo a las necesidades y características de cada zona geográfica de la 
República pero siempre en forma tal que no existan más beneficiados por los avances de la civilización en una zona 
y olvidados del destino en la otra.” Raul Alfonsín. Discurso Inaugural Congreso, 1983. 
66 
 
on their planning codes to lure investors, as these changes did not depend on central 
government control and would yield the immediate benefits of new development fees.  
To understand the practice of municipal planning in Greater Buenos Aires we should 
examine the geographic development of the metropolis in the context of this institutional 
framework. The extreme unevenness of resources between the peripheral municipalities of the 
GBA and the central CBA has significant consequences for the municipal management of land 
uses. Even after the original economic causes of the core-periphery model were superseded, 
traces of its physical form perpetuated much of the originating dynamics. When the MercoSur 
highway put far northern municipalities of the GBA within less than an hour from the CBA core, 
the municipalities of this region that were less engaged in the national industrialization project 
of the 1960s were the most receptive to the new growth dynamics of the 1990s.
 
Paradoxically, 
the policy of open economy increased their dependency on the wealth coming from the CBA. 
After national industrialization policies faded, these GBA municipalities became proactive in 
capturing urban investors, thus new investments come on top of an inherited, yet expanding, 
poverty. Eventually, these municipalities, which suffered from disinvestment up until the 1980s, 
but grew rapidly in the 1990s, presented the highest social contrast in Buenos Aires, if not the 
nation15.  
This contrast refers not only to the income gap between the top and bottom quintiles of 
the population, but also to the spatial outlay of the new growth, which was characterized by 
                                                          
15
 When the national government launched a project to upgrade the northern highway, the only opposition came 
from municipalities next to the city. See Pirez, 1994.  
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gated communities, enclosed consumption centers, and inaccessible shantytowns. Private 
investors seized the real estate opportunity of cheap land close to the highway, and 
internalized the cost of weak municipal governments through privately policed boundaries. In 
less than ten years, municipalities within sixty and thirty kilometers of the City of Buenos Aires 
experienced a population increase of more than 25%, with most growth taking place among the 
top and bottom quintiles in gated communities and informal housing arrangements. The scale 
of the growth of gated communities is impressive; during the 1990s, 44% of all private 
investments in the region went towards the development of gated communities (Coy and 
Pholer, 2002) and the number of suburban gated communities along the upgraded highway 
that were within 45 minutes of downtown CBA more than tripled (see Table 8). By the year 
2000, there were about 500 new gated communities and their combined area was 1.6 times 
that of the City of Buenos Aires itself (Pirez, 2002). Yet, even within these circumstances, not all 
municipalities developed the same growth strategies, nor did polarization evolve in the same 
way. What role did municipal governments play in the combination of new wealth with 
inherited poverty and expanding slums?  
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TABLE 8 
POPULATION, POOR HOUSEHOLDS, AND GATED COMMUNITIES IN NORTHERN GBA, 1981-
2001  
 
MUNICIPALITY    1981  1991  2001 
CAMPANA  PHH  3142 (21%) 2,995 (16%) 3,170 (14%) 
Area: 982 sq km  HH  14,819  18,498  22,773 
   GC  3  3  7 
E-CRUZ   PHH  652 (18%) 630 (13%) 882 (13%)  
Area: 662 sq km  HH  3,580  4,775  6,796 
   GC  5  5  17 
ESCOBAR   PHH  6514 (33%) 6,789 (22%) 8,818 (19%) 
Area: 277 sq km  HH  19,681  30,893  45,347 
GC  19  19  43 
JOSE C PAZ   PHH  *  *  12,928 (23%) 
Area: 51 sq km  HH  *  *  56,007 
GC  *  *  2 
MALVINAS   PHH  *  *  14,413 (20%) 
Area: 63 sq km  HH  *  *  72,956 
 GC  *  *  7 
PILAR    PHH  6,692 (33%) 7,806 (25%) 12,154 (21%) 
Area: 352 sq km  HH  20,340  31,259  58,313 
GC  20  30  115 
SAN FERNANDO  PHH  8,489 (25%) 7,676 (20%) 5,69 2 (14%) 
Area: 23 sq km  HH  34,509  38,668  42,059 
GC  1  3  15 
SAN ISIDRO  PHH  9,130 (12%) 7,370 (9%) 6,190 (7%) 
Area: 48 sq km  HH  76,721  82,960  88,054 
GC  2  2  29 
SAN MIGUEL  PHH  *  *  9,902 (15%) 
Area: 82 sq km  HH  *  *  65,694 
GC  *  *  14 
TIGRE   PHH  14,292 (28%) 14,828 (23%) 14,018 (18%) 
Area: 360 sq km  HH  50,502  64,370  79,807 
GC  4  4  60 
 
 
PHH: Number of households in precarious conditions (source: National Census) 
HH:  Total number of households (source: National Census) 
GC:  Gated community developments (source: real estate listings) 
*  Data unavailable, as the municipality was created in 1994. 
 
Sources: INDEC, 2001. Censo Nacional de Población de la Republica Argentina; Suplemento Casas Country. Clarín 
Newspaper, Edición Especial, 2002.  
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THE PULL OF THE PERIPHERAL MUNICIPALITIES  
During the 1980s and 1990s, northern municipalities short on local funds (Colman, 
1987)lost the illusion of embracing development through industrialization, and, left with a vast 
non-serviced territory, they saw in the private development of gated communities a unique 
opportunity. When developers approached these municipalities, they found them willing to use 
their recently acquired land-use powers to facilitate the approval process of these 
developments. On top of the economic rationale, municipal governments embraced the 
developments as a way to deter (or displace) the growth of local poverty. Locals were eager to 
see gated communities being built on lands where informal neighborhoods were most likely to 
spread – that is, those lands lacking urban infrastructure that would have demanded high levels 
of municipal investments and political power for their upgrading.  
But the local movement toward gated communities had its social roots in the 1970s. 
When the military dictatorship relocated the urban poor from the City of Buenos Aires to the 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires, local residents who regarded themselves as members of 
the ‘middle-class’ felt affronted. Disgusted at their exclusion from the new fashionable 
developments, these suburban residents regardless allied their interests with the suburbanizing 
urban upper-income households rather than with the local poor. In the eyes of the 
impoverished middle-income suburban residents, gated communities represented both an 
economic push –even if short term – as well as a removal of the stigma of being a poor suburb. 
As one officer at one of these North municipalities confessed,  
“Local neighborhoods are all middle class, and for years we tried to 
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evict those shantytowns and were accused of being fascists. So even if gated-
communities are a bad thing, for us they were a solution. Actually, they were 
the only solution. If we had not allowed for gated-communities to come, 
today we would be as bad as Mataderos [one of the poor southern 
jurisdictions] or even worse. Before, it was a shame to say that you lived here; 
and now, because so many gated communities have come, it sounds fine”16.  
By the year 2000, not only were gated communities overwhelmingly located in the 
northern suburbs that had presented lower levels of industrial development in the 1970s, but 
even within them this region they were tightly clustered in the municipalities that presented 
the highest percentage of poor households in the previous decades (this hold true even when 
considering available area, commuting times, and access to upgraded highway facilities). While 
these jurisdictions accounted for only 35% of the northern area, they accommodated 65% of all 
the area dedicated to gated communities. Moreover, with each decentralization reform 
increasing the autonomy of municipal jurisdictions, celebrated as a way for increasing local 
participation and democracy, the number of special permits for allowing gated communities 
raised (see Table 9 and Figure 1).  
                                                          
16
 Municipal officer from one of the northern municipalities with a higher-than-average percentage of poor 
residents and a high number of gated –communities. Interview by author on August 24
th
, 2004, in Tigre, Province 
of Buenos Aires. .  
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TABLE 9 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF URBAN PLANNING DECENTRALIZATION AFFECTING THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF GC IN THE PROVINCE OF BUENOS AIRES 
 
 
Year  Law or Regulation Ruling Institution Content 
 
1949 
 
Law 13512 of 
Horizontal Property 
 
 
National Governments 
 
Regulations about residential 
multifamily buildings 
1963 
 
 
Decree 2489 PBA Regulations about residential 
multifamily buildings 
1977 
 
 
 
 
Law 8912 of 
Territorial Order  
and Land Use 
PBA •Land Use regulation 
•Stated that municipalities should plan 
their territory land use 
•First mention of “gated community” 
1986 
 
 
 
Decree 9404 of 
“Country Clubs” 
Buenos Aires Province •Offered legal alternative to decree 
2489/63  in terms of registry of 
ownership of GC properties 
 
1997 
 
 
Resolution 74 PBA Secretary of  
Land and Urbanism 
•Defined “gated communities”.  
•Legal requirement and procedures for 
approving GC developments. 
 
1998 Decree 27 on 
Gated Communities 
 
PBA •Legal permits requirements. 
2002 Disposition 6011 PBA Catastral Office •Land Use regulation and fiscal 
valuation of the land of gated 
communities  
 
2002 Decree 1727 
Administrative 
decentralization of   
Gated Communities 
 
PBA •Stated that municipalities are 
responsible for the approval of gated 
communities•(Override 1998 decree 
procedure)  
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FIG. 1 GC Developed Per Year In The Northern Municipalities Of The GBA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 1960                                       1977                                                    1986                        1998  2000  
Sources: Author’s extrapolation based on Suplemento Casas Country. Clarín Newspaper. Edición Especial, 2002; 
real estate listings.  
 
 
The appearance of a new dynamic of suburban growth became correlated with the 
formation of a distinct type of polity, and hence with another form of social inequality. After 
the dictatorship’s urban slum-removal program, the differences between the urban core and 
the periphery expanded. While the urban core was ready for an economy in which real estate, 
finance, and banking were the fastest growing sectors, the industrial suburbs --populated by an 
obsolete industrial fabric --suffered deeper impoverishment. In a sense, the social cost of 
deindustrialization fell to the urban fringe, where the poor of the city had been relocated and 
the immigrants from neighboring countries or poorer provinces settled. As the newcomers 
relocated to municipal lands lacking basic infrastructure, i.e. piped water and street lighting, 
they increased the census count of poor households.  
Also, it was in this context that municipalities essentially used their planning powers as a 
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tool for social engineering. Although decentralization did not increase the economic self-
sufficiency of municipal governments, it allowed them substantially more autonomy in land-use 
management. While wealthier municipalities used this power to enforce tighter controls so as 
to preserve the value of existing assets, the less affluent ones relied on their capacity to modify 
planning codes to lure real estate developers. Those municipalities that lacked urban services in 
most of their territory saw gated communities as a fast and inexpensive way of increasing local 
economic activities in less productive lands. Consequently, after decentralization of planning 
capacities, the development of gated communities clustered in less affluent municipalities, 
hence deepening the social polarization within these jurisdictions. A comparison of the ten 
municipalities within a 45-minute commuting time from the City of Buenos Aires shows that the 
higher the percentage of poor households in the municipality, the more likely it was to grant 
exceptions in favor of developers’ special zoning requirements (see Figure 2).  
 
FIG. 2 ZONING CHANGES TO ACCOMMODATE GC, PER MUNICIPALITY, PER 
DECENTRALIZATION PERIOD 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dark Grey: Changes in Pilar, Tigre, Escobar (Municipalities with NBI higher than average) 
Light  Grey: Changes in Vicente Lopez, San Isidro, San Fernando, Jose C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, San Miguel 
Sources: Author’s extrapolation based on Province of Buenos Aires Cadastre records 
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These peripheral municipalities, which until the 1990s were outside of the metropolis, 
did not have a continuous infrastructure or urban grid but only patches of development. Their 
spatial organization followed the Spanish ‘Ley de Indias’, which began with an orthogonal grid 
containing a well-developed core from which urban growth was expected to radiate. When the 
government of the Province of Buenos Aires articulated this logic into formal zoning codes, 
planners – both in the City of Buenos Aires and in each of the municipalities of the Province of 
Buenos Aires – took for granted that less habitable uses for land, such as sites for industry and 
large transportation infrastructure, should be located as far as possible from urban centers.  
However, while urbanization in the City of Buenos Aires grew until it reached – or surpassed – 
its jurisdictional boundaries, many of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires stagnated. 
Therefore, their spatial organization remained fragmented into three areas: two or three small 
towns with a concentration of nearly all urban services, such as paved streets, lighting, gas, 
sewerage, and running water; a peripheral large-scale road that might be bordered by some 
industrial buildings; and a vast, undeveloped middle characterized by relatively large estate 
holders and informal housing squatters. This vast area proved to be the ideal location for the 
inflow of gated communities: cheap, unexploited, large plots that were easily accessible by 
highway and either under-populated or without a powerful local constituency to lay claim to 
them (see Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6).  
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FIG. 3 Center Of Town In Escobar Municipality, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenes of social contrast are not limited to the boundaries of GC, but are also present in the small towns of the 
periphery 
  
 
 
FIG. 4 Industrial Building In Escobar, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The decay of the national industry impacted on the quality of urban space.  
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FIG. 5 Informal Settlement In Pilar, 2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The infrastructure of the informal settlements is uneven. Some of these have paved roads; some of them have 
access to electricity. Rarely do they count with sewerage or running water.  
 
FIG. 6 Gated Community In Pilar, 2005  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A wall materializes and signals the boundaries of GC  
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Municipal Planning and Gated Communities 
  
Most of the gated communities in Greater Buenos Aires are within a 45-minute car ride 
from the capital city, where most potential residents of that gated communities are likely to 
work. However, the location of the gated communities cannot be explained simply by their 
proximity to the city. Out of the more than 500 gated communities in the province, about 75% 
are in the ten municipalities of the northern and northeastern regions17
 
and of those, 70% are 
distributed among three municipalities: Pilar, Tigre, and Escobar. This concentration pattern 
holds true even after adjusting for municipal area and considering only those municipalities 
with direct connection to the highway. These three municipalities, which in the 1980, 1990, and 
2001 censuses had the highest proportion of poor households in the region, account for about 
65% of all land encompassed by gated communities, though they extended over only 35% of 
the total area of all ten municipalities in the region.  
If the demand for gated communities was one of the main causes of metropolitan 
growth, the local land use policies of each municipality were the determining factors of its 
actual geography. After the state provided major pieces of infrastructure and the province 
decentralized its planning codes, it was up to each municipality to steer the course of its own 
land use development. The development of gated communities was regulated at the same time 
planning was decentralized, hence placing the interest of metropolitan elites at the core of 
regional planning. Time-wise, the formalization of the changes to the planning codes happened 
after new gated communities had materialized. Thus, the regulation did not create the initial 
                                                          
17
  
The ten municipalities are: Campana, Escobar, Exaltación de la Cruz, José C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, Pilar, San 
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impulse, but made explicit the official position in favor of the development of gated 
communities. The provision of a legal structure facilitated the further growth of this preexisting 
trend. There is a correlation between planning decentralization and the relative variation in the 
number of new gated communities funded per year. Consistently, a revision of the planning 
documents followed each sharp rise in the number of gated communities. In turn, the new legal 
framework augmented land availability, minimized area and location requirements, and 
increased municipal autonomy. Also characteristic of this pattern, the number of gated 
communities developed in the region increased in the months following each of these reforms.  
After 1977, the year when the Province of Buenos Aires enacted the municipal planning 
law, with the exception of the three largest crises in the country’s recent history (the war of 
1982, the hyperinflation of 1989, and the default of 2002), the increase in the number of gated 
communities ran parallel with the economy until the beginning of the 1990s, when the number 
of gated communities grew rapidly even though the economy was not doing as well. Before the 
last decade, the greater the economic crisis, the fewer the number of gated communities 
developed. Conversely, during the 1990s, the growth rate of gated communities became 
increasingly detached from the country’s deteriorating economic condition. Even when the 
unemployment rate rose above 13%, the area comprised of gated communities and the total 
number of households was still growing. One can hypothesize that the rise in unemployment 
generated an overall rise in crime, or at least an increased fear of it, hence the increased desire 
to live in safer areas, such as those gated communities claim to be. Only when the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Fernando, San Isidro, San Miguel, and Tigre.  
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transportation infrastructure was in place was this demand satisfied.  
FIG. 7 DEVELOPMENT RATE OF GATED COMMUNITIES AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN GBA 
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It is likely that the upgrading of the highway connecting the City of Buenos Aires and 
these northern municipalities was a decisive factor in the spread of gated communities in this 
region. The first transportation infrastructure upgrade in 1993 coincided with the beginning of 
the increase in gated communities and the second one in 1996 preceded the 1998 construction 
peak (see Graph 1). As expected, the construction of the new highway increased population 
numbers in the whole region (see Table 10 and Fig. 8). Yet, the most dramatic impact was the 
growth of gated communities, the number of which nearly doubled in less than five years. Once 
the new artery was functioning, these municipalities were within a 45-minutes car ride from the 
city, thus allowing these developments to be sold not only as weekend escapes, but also as 
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permanent residences. A new type of gated community flourished, this time targeted at the 
urban middle-income household, who were receptive to the amenities gated communities 
claimed to provide.  
 
TABLE 10 
VARIATION IN POPULATION 1991-2001 IN %, CORRELATED WITH HIGHWAY UPGRADE  
 
 
1991-1980 2001-1991*** 
First ring* 
(Municipalities within approx. 20 km from 
the CBA 4 -1 
 North 3 -3 
West 5  3 
South 5 -2 
Second ring** 
(Municipalities within approx. 40 km and 20 km from the CBA; Their 
access was significantly improved after hwy upgrade) 22 27 
 North  20 26 
West 27 23 
South 20 32 
 
 
 
*First ring is composed of the following municipalities: 
In the north: Vicente Lopez, San Isidro, and San Martin. 
In the west: Hurlingham, Ituzaingo, Moron, La Matanza, and Tres de Febrero. 
In the south: Avellaneda, Lanus, and Lomas de Zamora. 
 
** Second ring is composed of the following municipalities: 
In the north: San Fernando, Tigre, Escobar, San Miguel, Jose C. Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and Pilar. 
In the west: Merlo, Moreno, and Lujan. 
In the south: Almirante Brown, Berazategui, Esteban Echeverria, Presidente Peron, Florencio Varela, and Ezeiza. 
 
*** In 1993-1996 the northern highway, Panamericana, was upgraded. 
In 1999, the upgrade of the western highway, Acceso Oeste, began. 
In 1993-1996, the southern highway, Acceso La Plata, was upgraded.  
 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on INDEC Census National series 1980, 1991, and 2001. 
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FIG. 8 Areal View Of The Northern Highway  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These new developments were much more affordable, with their price per square meter 
as much as four times cheaper than that of consolidated developments. They were also 
developed with fewer facilities. If the existence of a golf course had been the selling point of 
the development previously, it was now the assurance of a 24/7 private police service and 
affordable monthly fees. Another difference in these newer gated communities was their size. 
In the 1977 planning law, ten hectares was the minimum area required by the code. About 90% 
of all development funded at that time was larger than the minimum, and by 1990, this number 
had dropped slightly to 85%. It was only after 1993 – when the highway upgrade began – that 
small gated communities became common. By 1998, when the minimum area requisite was 
legally dropped, 40% of gated communities developed in the region were already smaller than 
10 hectares. Both factors, the smaller number of amenities and the reduced size of these new 
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developments minimized the initial investment required to launch them in the market, making 
their commercialization faster and cheaper. In all subsequent amendments to the planning 
code, municipalities have acquired further rights over the designation and monitoring of their 
land uses. With regard to the development of gated communities, the code gradually dropped 
formal requirements, such as the ten-hectare minimum area requirement (1998) and the 
requirement to leave at least seven kilometers between any two developments (1986). 
Eventually, a provincial decree required an informational public forum to be held ten days 
before the granting of the municipal permit. However, the decree clearly stated that the 
municipal government or developers had no binding obligations to attend these meetings.  
The 2001 census also indicates that the new gated communities were used as 
permanent residences. By that time, the City of Buenos Aires had lost 8% of its population 
(196,631 people) since 1991. About two thirds of the total population loss was from wealthier 
neighborhoods. Outside of the CBA, in the northern and northeastern municipalities of the 
GBA, population increased. Pilar – a municipality in which about 40% of the region’s gated 
communities is located – added 130,000 new residents, doubling its population in less than a 
decade. Although more affordable than before, the cost of buying (or building) a property 
inside a gated community was significantly higher than in the non-gated areas of these same 
municipalities. Taking into account that the population already residing there had a significantly 
lower income than the population in the capital city, it is unlikely that residents of neighboring 
localities were the people moving into these new properties.  
By 1998, when the work on the highway had been completed, municipalities along this 
corridor accounted for more than 70% of all suburban gated communities. However, even 
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within this region, the new gated communities were not evenly distributed, but 
disproportionately clustered in the three municipalities with a higher-than-average percentage 
of poor households. This distribution pattern cannot be explained as a direct consequence of 
municipal size, as the other municipalities also had tracts of undeveloped land and gated 
communities can be created by gating existing developments. In addition, though land prices in 
these three localities were slightly lower than in neighboring municipalities during the 1980s, 
their land value registered record-high increases after the highway upgrade, jumping from $50 
per square meter to between $70 and $100 in less than year. In some municipalities, such as 
Pilar, land became even more expensive than in neighboring localities (LaNacion, 1997). 
Therefore, real estate prices do not suffice as an explanation either, as clusters of gated 
communities had grown steadily regardless of the price of land.  
 
Luring Developers  
Dependency does not imply passivity, and peripheral municipalities did play an active 
role in shaping the geography of suburbanization. Following the decentralization of planning 
controls, poor municipalities enforced these controls weakly, allowing private developers to 
solicit the re-categorization of land use in order to accommodate their projects. Because these 
municipalities had a high percentage of poor households and lands lacking services, they had 
very little economic autonomy18, and hence they were more likely to be less selective in the 
type of investment they favored. This is evident in the correlation between a municipality’s 
                                                          
18
 
 
See chart of municipal expenses/municipal budget and NBI.  
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history of industrial development and gated communities. Those municipalities that had urban 
services and a concentration of industrial establishments in the 1970s had few gated 
communities developed. Conversely, those municipalities that were behind in the 
industrialization in the 1970s had the highest concentration of gated communities in the 1990s 
(see Table 11 and Map 9).  
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TABLE 11 
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION IN 1970 AND GC CONCENTRATION IN 2000 IN THE GBA 
 
 
 Industrial Concentration in 1970 
 
 Most    Least 
GC  
Concentration  
in 2000 
 Most       
 
Pilar 
 
   
Tigre 
 
Escobar 
 
E. Echeverria 
Ezeiza**   
 
  
San Isidro 
 
Moreno 
 
San Miguel 
Malvinas Arg. 
 
 
  
Lanus 
Quilmes 
 
Alm. Brown 
Merlo  
 
 
Jose C Paz 
S. Fernando 
 
Least 
 
 
Vte Lopez 
Gral S.Martin 
La Matanza 
Avellaneda  
L de Zamora 
 
Morón 
Tres de  Feb. 
   
 
*Jose C Paz, Malvinas Argentinas, and San Miguel 
**Formerly Florencio Varela 
 
Sources: INDEC, 2001. Censo Nacional de Población de la Republica Argentina; Suplemento Casas Country. Clarín 
Newspaper. Edición Especial, 2002.; Source: Estadistica Bonaerense. Direccion Provincial de Estadistica 
Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 1999). 
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MAP 9 Industrial Concentration In 1970 And GC Concentration In 2000 In The GBA  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Darkest Grey: Industrial Concentration higher than 15% of BA industry in 1970. 
Dark Grey: Industrial Concentration between 6% and 15% of BA industry in 1970. 
Light Grey: Industrial Concentration between 2% and 6% of BA industry in 1970. 
Lightest Grey: Industrial Concentration between less than 2% of BA industry in 1970. 
Red Dots: Gated Community development in 2000. 
 
Sources: INDEC, 2001. Censo Nacional de Población de la Republica Argentina; Suplemento Casas Country. Clarín 
Newspaper. Edición Especial, 2002.; Source: Estadística Bonaerense. Dirección Provincial de Estadística 
Bonaerense. Tomo 2. (Buenos Aires: La Plata, 1999).  
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According to sources in these jurisdictions, gated communities are perceived as a 
chance to increase local income (by bringing permit fees and new jobs) without having 
to invest in infrastructure (which is provided by the developer), and with a minimal 
short-term cost of changing municipal regulations. A series of interviews with municipal 
officers from five municipalities – San Isidro, San Fernando, Escobar, Tigre and Pilar – all 
of which are within a 45-minute commute of the CBA via a toll-highway, further explain 
the way these jurisdictions dealt with the expansion of the metropolis. They are all part 
of the Province of Buenos Aires and share the same legal basis for their planning 
practices. They represent three levels of socio-economic composition in the region. San 
Isidro has the lowest percentage of poor households (9% in 1991 census), San Fernando 
is average (20%), and Pilar has the highest percentage (25%). To research further the 
planning practices of low-income municipalities, I also conducted interviews with 
officials from Escobar and Tigre, two other municipalities with a higher-than-average 
percentage of poor households (22% and 23%, respectively).  
In richer municipalities, planning officers felt empowered to maintain the existing 
regulations for three main reasons. First, their land was almost fully serviced, which made the 
development of new gated communities less appealing because these communities could 
diminish the municipality’s fiscal base if they cut themselves off from existing municipal 
services. Second, they had a large enough number of taxpayers to cover their current expenses, 
which made them less vulnerable to external pressures. Third, and connected to the last point, 
current property-owners perceived compliance with existing land-zoning as a way of protecting 
their own investments and were thus likely to oppose any regulatory changes that favor 
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opportunistic behaviors. As one of the heads of the cadastre offices said:  
“We treat gated communities as any other investment. Why should 
we give them any special advantage? They have to fit in the law that we 
have. Here, we care a lot about our community and the neighbors will not 
accept anyone ruining the quality of our homes. We, at the municipality, will 
not approve any investment that challenges our codes if the local residents do 
not approve it. Any change will require a formal meeting with them.”19
 
 
Overall, this statement seems to agree with the development trend of this municipality, 
where most houses are part of the public urban fabric. Officers working at poor municipalities, 
however, perceive gated communities as job-creators with the added benefit of being self-
sufficient. In addition, most locals are either indifferent or in need of the jobs these new 
developments might bring. As one of the planners at one of the poorest municipalities 
confessed:  
“We are the ‘anti-planners,’ we always come after. If someone has a 
parcel and wants to invest there, he just comes here and asks us to change 
the zoning code. If it is a big investment and he wants everything quick, he 
might offer to pave some blocks for the mayor. We all know that we could 
not afford that with our budget. Therefore, we change the code and 
everybody is happy, there are more construction jobs, ten more blocks are 
paved, and he has done his business. But in the end we are going nowhere. 
                                                          
19
 San Isidro Planning Office, August 25, 2004.  
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There is no plan and we have no project.”20
 
 
Planners’ perceptions that investors dictate zoning decisions correspond with the trends 
shown by municipal planning reforms. Chronologically, the number of changes in land-use 
regulations that favored gated communities were directly related to their development rate; 
the more new gated communities that were developed, the more municipal ordinances were 
changed. Furthermore, in the poorest municipalities – which contained 70% of all gated 
communities, but only accounted for one-third of the ten municipalities’ total area – the 
frequency of these zoning amendments increased dramatically after each decentralization 
measure. Taking the main reforms in the Province of Buenos Aires’s planning codes as 
keystones (1977, 1986, and 1999); we can compare three stages of decentralization. In the first 
stage, 20% of re-zoning changes took place in the three poorest municipalities of the region; in 
the second, the proportion was 37%; and from the last decree until 2000, 95% of those zoning 
changes were located in this area.  
 
Staging Inequality  
According to the Argentine Census Office, about a fifth of all people living in these 
municipalities had some irregularity in their housing condition. That is, they had at least one of 
the following characteristics: a) More than three people per room; b) unsound building 
structure; c) no water-closet; d) at least one child aged between 6 and 12 who did not attend 
school; e) four or more people dependant on a single breadwinner who has no schooling 
                                                          
20
 A director at the Municipal Planning Department. Interview by author. 
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beyond third grade (INDEC, 2001). The high number of informal households in these 
municipalities suggests a fracture between formal institutions and actual social practices. Yet, 
the success that municipal governments have had election after election testifies that they 
receive significant local support for their actions. Newcomers account for a small percentage of 
local population, foreigners do not vote and many residents of gated communities have not 
changed their legal address and still vote in the City of Buenos Aires (Svampa, 2001). Since 
voting in municipal elections is compulsory, municipal governments could not have kept their 
power without the support of older residents. Election results show that voters are more loyal 
to municipal governments than to any other form of political representation. While changes in 
the support of elected congressmen are frequent, about 75% of the thirty municipal 
governments21
 
in the urban fringe have been reelected in all elections since 1983. But why 
then, did local residents approve governments that fostered – or at least did not oppose – the 
inflow of exclusionary developments built for the suburbanizing elites the City of Buenos Aires 
into their municipality (Torres, 2001)?  
A quick look at the economic characteristics of the population living in the northern 
periphery shows that, even before the rapid population growth of the last twenty years, there 
was a wide diversity of economic conditions. Different material needs led to diverse aspirations; 
however, this does not imply that individual preferences cannot converge into collective 
                                                          
21
 Almirante Brown, Avellaneda, Berazategui, Escobar, Esteban Eheverria, Ezeiza (created in 1994), Florencio 
Varela, General Rodriguez, General San Martin, General Sarmiento (dissolved in 1994), Huringham, Ituzaingo, Jose 
C Paz (created in 1994), La Matanza, Lanus, Lomas de Zamora Lujan, Malvinas Argentinas (created in 1994), Marcos 
Paz, Merlo, Moreno, Moron, Pilar, Presidente Peron, Quilmes, San Fernando, San Isidro, San Miguel (created in 
1994), San Vicente, Tigre, Tres de Febrero, Vicente Lopez.  
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choices. Thus, local residents looked beyond the municipal government policies and there was 
an acceptance of a privatized mode of urbanization. A short-term pragmatism gave each 
economic stratum something to gain in the execution of the private development. Year after 
year, surveys of population concerns show that unemployment and crime safety were at the 
top of the list. The poorer the household was, the higher it valued job security; conversely, the 
wealthier the household was, the more it prioritized crime as a concern (Clemente, 2001)22.
 
In 
this scenario, municipal governments of impoverished localities saw in gated communities a 
socially accepted development strategy.  
There was simple rationale behind the poorer households’ acceptance of gated 
development: their need for jobs. From their perspective, exclusionary developments could 
become an improvement –at least in the short term– in the daily life of the poorest. Similar to 
the view of many low-income residents, one woman working as a cleaner inside a gated 
community said:  
“I used to take the bus for one hour to get to the city to clean one 
apartment. Now I do the same job without having to do the travel. I do not earn 
more money now, it is still not enough; but at least I do not have to pay the bus 
ticket and waste so much time.”23
 
 
In addition, many of the informal houses near gated communities received in-kind 
benefits from the gated communities, such as free building materials, street lighting and paving, 
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sobre el desarrollo um en la Provincia de Buenos Aires”. Quoted in Clemente, Adriana. 2000. “Descentralización y 
gestión de capacidades para la gestión de gobierno democrática”. IIED America Latina. Noviembre. Buenos Aires. 
2 
 
92 
 
donations to local daycares, and even increased neighborhood safety. As another local resident 
who still commutes from the GBA to work in the CBA said:  
“I always take the bus here, in front of the entrance to this private 
neighborhood. There they have guards; I feel that I am safer now. I mean, you 
never know, but at least there is better lighting.”24
 
 
This dynamic seems to be typical of gated communities in Latin America, as the gated 
communities further the propinquity of rich and poor25.
 
However, more puzzling than people 
residing or working in gated communities supporting this type of urbanization was middle-
income households’ espousal of these private investments. Even if their proportion was 
shrinking, the vast majority of suburban households lived neither in shantytowns nor in gated 
communities. Unlike the affluent urbanites who enjoyed or profited from gated communities 
and the low-skilled workers employed at these developments, mid-income households received 
no evident benefits from the inflow of gated communities. Their taxes were not diminished, 
and after the initial impact of the new highway, their land prices did not register any significant 
value increases (Goytia, 2005), and if anything, they have suffered increasing crime rates in 
their surroundings (LaNacion, 2005, 1998).  
But mid-income suburban dwellers seem to have found in gated communities a way to 
reconstruct a positive image of their own locality. Nouveau riche affluence – even if foreign – 
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 Female resident of Escobar municipality, 42 years. Interview by author, November 2005. 
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 Male resident of Pilar municipality, 33 years old. Interview by author, November 2005 
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Improvements to the living conditions of poor residents living next to these developments have been also 
detected in Santiago de Chile (Salcedo and Torres, 2004). 
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was a way to revert the stigma of poverty that was imposed on suburbanites in the late 1970s, 
when society began its path towards its current economic and social fragmentation. As we have 
seen elsewhere, the military government in office removed all shantytowns from the CBA and 
dispersed them throughout the municipalities of the GBA (Bermudez, 1985). During the 
dictatorial regime, local mayors could have done little to stop this and later, in the early years of 
democracy, any attempt to remove a shantytown was taken as an example of fascism. 
Decentralization and market-driven planning allowed municipal governments to have direct 
links with developers, who were very efficient in changing the public image of the locality. 
Phrases like the following began to cast the social polarization of the region as a token of its 
positive transformation:  
“The beggar, the fisher, and the millionaire live now on the same 
block. There are small settlements and migrant workers in the same region as 
the mansion of, for example, the [wealthy] Constantini family.26”  
Tigre municipality, the only municipality governed by a vicinal, self-defined ‘middle class’ 
party was the most open advocate of gated communities. In the words of one local resident 
active in the Tigre party:  
“We have these shantytowns that made us look like a slum. For years, 
you could not say that you lived in Tigre. You would rather say that you live in 
San Fernando [the neighboring municipality]. But now, there are so many 
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gated communities that people don’t think that you are poor if you live 
here.”27
 
 
Furthermore, local residents’ notion of belonging to a middle class was strengthened by 
the difference of the newcomers:  
“To tell the truth, we do not like gated communities, they gate 
themselves as if they were living in the wilderness. But let it be. We are all 
middle class here, and we have our neighborhood life that we cherish. If 
gated communities can help us maintain it, let it be. Who knows, maybe in 
the future they will decide to demolish their walls and join us.”28
 
 
Unlike the majority of municipalities, Tigre’s government was a vicinal party who 
claimed that it had no interest other than the municipality’s wellbeing. It aligned itself with the 
small entrepreneur, shop owner, or local professional who had a material and emotional 
attachment to the long-term wellbeing of the municipality and – after the changes in the 
national industrialization policies – had lost its faith in the national government. As one local 
resident explained:  
“What shall we do? Wait until the President decides to provide water and 
jobs for the shantytowns? We have to take this [problem] in our hands, and if 
that means giving these lands to private developers, I think it is OK. We have no 
other option. Either this or we end up as the other municipalities, with no jobs 
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and no investments.”29
 
 
 
The capacity of localities to generate a long–term development plan has relevant 
consequences for the dynamics of social polarization. In Tigre, the 5% reduction of poor 
households from 14,828 in 1991 to 14,018 in 2001 was due to a two-pronged strategy of first 
facilitating the development of gated communities where slums were more likely to grow (i.e. 
large pieces of land lacking infrastructure), and then using gated communities as a way of 
bringing infrastructure and economic activity to the whole municipality. Conversely, in Pilar, the 
municipality which accounts for almost a third of all gated communities in the suburbs, the 
growth of poor households from 7,806 to 12,154 between 1991 and 2001 is connected to the 
inflow of poor residents after the rise of gated communities. The municipality had no plan for 
dealing with the growth of the jurisdiction in an integrated way. When the provincial 
government launched a project for affordable housing in the municipalities of Greater Buenos 
Aires, the municipality could not implement it because it had no public lands available, as it had 
allowed the private sector to develop all of them.  
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MUNICIPAL PLANNING PRACTICES  
 
A comparison of the planning practices among municipalities located within the “easy 
commute zone,” shows that municipalities with fewer resources were more likely to modify 
urban codes so as to allow for the development of gated communities. Since the 1980s, 70% of 
all new developments were located in the municipalities with higher-than-average percentages 
of poor households. In these peripheral, metropolitan areas, the building and maintenance of 
gated communities became a way to increase local employment. After the optimization and 
relocation of large industrial establishments and the decline of smaller firms shrank the 
demand for low-skilled industrial labor, gated communities became one of the most dynamic 
investments of the region (Coy and Pholer, 2002).  
The decentralization of land use management enabled municipal governments to use 
their zoning codes as a way to encourage the development of gated communities. However, in 
spite of presenting similar needs and possibilities, municipal governments adjusted these 
developments to fit the different visions of their local constituencies and each of them 
managed differently the inflow of gated communities. After more than ten years of rapid 
suburbanization, not all municipalities had experienced the same rise in gated communities, 
nor had they affected local society in the same way. In Pilar the number of poor and affluent 
gated households increased, while in Escobar poor households augmented and its share of 
gated communities diminished, and in Tigre there was a rapid rise in the number of gated 
households though its number of poor households decreased. Time wise, these changes 
coincided with the implementation of those decrees that increased planning autonomy of these 
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municipalities. Although these three municipalities seem quite similar in terms of area, 
infrastructure, resources, population, development history, and overall institutional structure, 
they present three very different approaches to the development of gated communities: 1) an 
ad-hoc passive and legalistic planning system, in which codes are changed after developers 
make decisions; 2) an à-la-carte model which takes a case-by-case approach; and 3) an alliance 
mode, which regulates beforehand how to include these developments.  
 
Planning Ad Hoc in Escobar  
Escobar uses the first model of municipal planning, ad-hoc. The municipality consults 
with a local cadastre office, which also regulates land usage, but it has no personnel allocated 
for developing any planning. A few years ago, Escobar sub-contracted a thorough study and 
proposed municipal plan from a private consultant, but due to changes in leadership, it has 
never been published or implemented and now lies dormant in the municipal archives. At 
present, the railroad and highway, which are Escobar’s only connections to other localities, 
structure the development of this municipality. With an area of 277 square kilometres, it has no 
more than four small towns. The rest of its land is occupied either by industrial establishments, 
which are usually surrounded by workers’ informal housing settlements, or by private estates 
(see Fig 8).  
During the 1980s, many of these owners saw an economic opportunity to subdivide 
their land and convert it into gated communities. In order to do so, they had to solicit a change 
of land use from the municipality, who would then evaluate the case. The municipal approval 
procedure has at least five stages (none of which include public consultation) and requires at 
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least 23 official documents to begin. In general, the process lasts about two years, provided 
there is no change in the governing party. As planners said, there is no plan guiding the growth 
of the jurisdiction, just adherence to the existing regulations and the avoidance of locating 
industries too close to urban centers. In this ad-hoc model of planning, codes are changed 
retroactively, so developers build what they wish, but the law –at least as a formality—are still 
somehow preserved. The process is bureaucratic and lengthy. For those who already own land 
in the jurisdiction, developing a gated community is still a good option, but for those who can 
choose their location, other jurisdictions seem to be more attractive. In this case, planners 
perceive themselves as a bureaucratic organism with little power to impose conditions on large 
developers, or even offer locals incentives to promote a different course of development. As 
one of the planners said:  
“People say they don’t like gated communities, but that is all. Once, we 
put a lot of effort into organizing a public audience about whether or not to have 
a new shopping centre and a gated community. No one showed up, so now, when 
developers ask us for something, we just do it. As long as it keeps the basic forms, 
we just approve it.”
 30 
 
Furthermore, their sense of powerlessness does not stem from failed public audiences. 
Rather, it is based on a belief that local economy depends on those investments and therefore  
planning officers cannot impose any controls on them. Another municipal officer explained this 
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viewpoint:  
“What can we do? It is all about the money. The Province does not give us 
enough money; people here do not have money. We have more expertise but we 
cannot impose our criteria. As I see it, today we are better than tomorrow. At this 
pace, we will have a million problems of infrastructure in the future, and we know 
it. But this is not something to worry about now. Now, we want a little more 
paving here, and people want their little job there.”31
 
 
This municipality’s submissive approach has meant that it was not able to attract new 
developments, nor was it able to improve the economic conditions of its poor households. 
From 1991 to 2001, population grew by 40% and poor households by 20%. Yet, their 
development rate does not seem to have any level of autonomy, as their phases of growth and 
decline seem to follow those of the City of Buenos Aires’s investors. However – and indicative 
of the limitations of this approach – in , recent years the interest of real estate investors has 
shifted from this location to Pilar and Tigre, where local municipalities are proactively seeking 
and attaining new investments  
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FIG. 9 Escobar Municipality in 2006  
 
A town, a GC, a couple of industrial establishments, and an informal settlement sit next to each other in Escobar.  
 
 
Planning À La Carte in Pilar  
The second model is called planning à-la-carte because of its case-by-case approach to 
pleasing the needs of each interested developer. Pilar, whose spatial structure is very similar to 
that of Escobar, is the municipality with the highest concentration of both gated communities 
and poor households. Slightly larger than Escobar (352,000 hectares), it has been the chosen 
location for most of the new investments during the last few years. Although the same party 
has governed Pilar for the last twenty years, each of the mayors in office has accused their 
predecessors of corruption and granting building permits illegally. Although Pilar has been 
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successful in securing new investments, it does not seem able to expand its budget. This is due 
in part to the inefficiency of the fiscal system that governs the province of Buenos Aires, 
requiring the collection be performed by provincial authorities who then grant the municipality 
a share of the taxes (Goytia, 2005). It is also due to the lack of transparency that this model 
fosters. As per one of the former mayors who was later forced out:  
“While it is true that the building of the Bingo [a gambling centre] was a 
corruption scandal during the previous administration, today, under our 
government, they are paving fifty blocks of [the town of] Del Viso at their own 
expense. [Why?] Because they came to talk to me and I told them that any 
investment in Pilar has the moral obligation of giving something back to the 
community. Of course, we did not ask them for a bribe, but we did ask them to 
collaborate with the people. They put 130,000 USD without giving a single coin to 
the municipal government. We just supervised the works. In the same sense, Pilar 
del Este [a new gated community] is paving 1.5 kilometers on a street that used 
to be in terrible shape. That is the mother idea: If the municipality cannot, let the 
private sector give us a hand.”32
 
 
Beyond the specifics of this case, this interview portrays the public sector’s relationship 
with investors to be an exchange of reciprocal favors that are not governed by formal 
regulations and in which residents have no say, since they are presented as the outcome of the 
good will of developers and local politicians. The lack of clear procedures is also an incentive for 
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corruption. One of Pilar’s former mayors said:  
“We organized a one-week seminar, where more than 300 people 
(architects, real estate developers, and local residents) attended, and we decided 
that we have to have a new, more transparent and comprehensive zoning code. 
This is basic, because that was always the source of corruption for all 
jurisdictions. Because our current code is so outdated, everything is subject to 
negotiation.”33
 
 
Still, little has been done to change this situation. When asked about criteria for local 
land uses, local planners’ answers were either too general or unable to identify any specific 
principles. When asked about formal procedures, such as length of time for changing land uses, 
planners said each case was different. When questioned about how they have dealt with 
development so far, a planning officer answered:  
“Growth is a messy thing. In less than twenty years, we passed from 80 to 
more than 230 thousand people. Some messiness will take place. It is impossible 
to manage such an impressive amount of new development in a neat way, and 
we were doing everything case by case. But now we are beginning to change 
things, and we are moving forward with new development guidelines.”34
 
 
Finally, when questioned about why they have managed to secure the majority of the 
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regions’ new developments, a chief municipal officer by-passed an opportunity to praise his 
administration and said:  
“We do not know about that. It all depends on the value of the 
construction, in the value of the dollar, in the new highway. And that people want 
to live in these developments because they are afraid of crime in the city. Why do 
they come here? Who knows? Because we have empty land, maybe because we 
have some good supermarkets and some older gated communities.”35
 
 
One problem resulting from this myopic approach to growth is that neither material, 
nor institutional infrastructure, are well-prepared to respond to the demands of this larger 
population. According to municipal planners, the municipality has no way of serving population 
growth with appropriate infrastructure. As of November 2005, 80% of local residents still lacked 
piped water and sewerage. Only gated communities and the four original towns of the 
municipality—Derqui, the town of Pilar, Del Viso, and Alberti—had adequate urban services (i.e. 
water, sewerage, gas, electricity, and paving). Even worse, there was no layout for water and 
sewerage, and investment in these services has been halted since 1996. In addition, as the 
population doubles, crime rates increase faster than in any other municipality, yet the number 
of police officers remains steady. More dramatic yet, as gated communities have actually raised 
the demand for low skilled jobs, Pilar has become a magnet for low-skilled workers. As there is 
no provision for this and basic services are still lacking, informal housing is on the rise. Over the 
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course of the 1990s, new shantytowns have formed in inadequate, sometimes floodable, plots 
of land.  
These events are even more striking when we take into account that Pilar had the 
largest share of direct investment in the Province of Buenos Aires in the decade between 1991 
to 2001 (Sica, 2001). In addition to the impressive growth of gated communities (more than a 
hundred in less than twenty years), it has also been successful in creating new industrial 
establishments, to which it grants special tax benefits in exchange for the employment of local 
residents. However, because there is no enforcement of this prevision, and because local firms 
argue that they cannot find the skills they need among Pilar’s residents, many of these jobs 
went to non-locals (Goytia, 2005). Even if Pilar managed to slightly increase its share of the 
suburban industrial value from 8% to 10%, it had lost about a quarter of its industrial labour 
force.  
Today, Pilar’s growth is as impressive as it is chaotic. It boasts one of the largest 
industrial parks of the MercoSur (Sica, 2001), the largest concentration of gated communities in 
Argentina, and a population that doubled in less than decade. On the other hand, it has no 
comprehensive plan for development, no provision for upgrading slums, and a growing number 
of households living in substandard conditions. In a sense, its pockets of wealth have not been 
the consequence of institutional strength, but the opposite. Its spatial changes responded to 
piecemeal arrangements with investors and did not correspond to a development of local 
government institutions, nor to a municipal plan on how to harness local growth as an 
opportunity for a more even distribution of development (see Figure 10). Today, this 
municipality presents one of the most extreme cases of social polarization, as both poor and 
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affluent newcomers live in a municipality that has not defined a vision for its future. As one of 
the planners commented:  
“Everybody says how much this municipality is growing, and that is a 
mixed blessing. All the unemployed people of the region come here looking for 
jobs. They are looking to work in construction, gardening, as house cleaners, 
whatever. But we do not have infrastructure for that, and now we have new 
shantytowns all over: in Villa Rosa, in Derqui, in Alberti. There is little we can do; 
we are not going to stop gated communities from coming as long as they bring 
their own infrastructure. And we cannot provide housing or piped water for all 
these new shantytowns. And because of all that social inequality here is high.”36
 
 
 
                                                          
36
 Interview by author. Pilar, August 25
th
, 2004.  
 
106 
 
FIG. 10 Pilar Municipality in 2006  
 
GC, empty lots, informal settlements and some industrial establishments spread all over Pilar.  
 
 
 
Alliance Planning in Tigre  
The third, and perhaps most unusual, example is Tigre, which employs the alliance 
approach. Unlike ad-hoc or à-la-carte planning, the alliance approach purposefully and openly 
designed a flexible document as an incentive to gated communities. One of the particulars of 
this jurisdiction is that it is bordered by the Tigre River, which gives it a beautiful landscape, but 
which also means that about half of its 360,000 hectares require an expensive structure to 
prevent buildings from sinking into the muddy soil. Because of this, Tigre hardly received any 
investments in these areas, which laced basic services such as piped water and sewerage and 
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where most shantytowns were located.  
Another characteristic of the Tigre municipality is that the same mayor, who comes 
from a local municipal party, has been in office since 1987.
1 
The results of the 2005 elections 
indicated the local support that this mayor still enjoys: while in the Tigre Municipality the 
national governing party won the majority of the votes for the Provincial Congress, the mayor 
captured almost 45% of the votes for the municipal positions. During the early 1990s, the 
mayor tried to evict shantytowns but failed due to political resistance and the economic 
difficulties of the project. Because many of these informal settlements had been in place for 
more than twenty years, and because they were located on floodable and under-serviced lands, 
which did not attract the private sector, there was no economic prospect for these properties. 
In these conditions, the local government came to believe that these investments offered the 
only viable option to bring infrastructure to unused lands. Accordingly, it became proactive in 
procuring these investments. As accountant Ricardo Ubieto,37 the mayor of Tigre described:  
“We invested a lot of public monies to attract people [to Tigre], a lot of 
money to enhance our image so real estate developers would improve the 
commercialization of their developments here. It is easier to attract people in that  
way, and we were concerned about that, because we needed all the unused land 
be converted into useful land.”38
 
 
In 1995, the upgrading of the highway drastically changed the commercial advantages of 
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the region, suddenly making it attractive to real estate developers. Tigre’s mayor saw in this an 
opportunity to change the development course of his municipality, and launched an aggressive 
plan to capture these new investors. In order to attract real estate investment in the 
municipality, the mayor’s office reformulated the planning code and re-zoned all vacant land as 
“special use” (which allowed the municipality to consider any proposed use). As he said:  
“We wanted to stop with the burden of bureaucratic permits. It opened 
the door for corruption and delayed investments. It is not simply that we changed 
this or that law and we had a project. We live here and we want this place to be 
good today and tomorrow”39
 
 
In addition, it dictated a set of basic requirements to be fulfilled by anyone who wanted 
to develop a gated community: a minimum area of seven hectares, the provision of 
infrastructure (water, sewerage, electricity and roads) to sustain the density proposed, and a 
street grid aligned with the municipal plan (see Figure 11). Significantly, it put the municipal 
planning office under the direct authority of the local Ministry of Economy. After the 
municipality implemented these reforms, developers had no need to ask for any special permits 
and the whole approval process was greatly accelerated. In that regard, the reform was 
successful, because in less than five years, the percentage of new gated communities in the 
region that were developed by Tigre went from 5% to 20%.  
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FIG. 11 Tigre Municipality in 2006  
 
 
In Tigre, a more consistent planning practice has derived in a more organized –even if uneven-land use pattern  
 
 
Finally, yet importantly, the municipality aggressively promoted itself and its new policy. 
This discourse appealed to developers, as well as to local residents. Accordingly, the municipal 
planning officers proclaimed:  
“We do not manage with exceptions, but with egalitarian procedures 
applicable to all. This offers security to people, as regards their investments in the 
industrial or urbanization segment. Nowadays there are private neighborhoods 
flourishing all over. We almost have no room for the location of industries. We 
have made an effort to provide clear and precise norms –through judicial 
security– so that those who invest in the district will not find unpleasant surprises 
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in the future. All this has made investing in Tigre very easy, and contributed to 
large amounts of capital coming to the area. This has been supported with the 
recovery of land not able to be urbanized without capital investment.”40
 
 
Additionally, these developments were presented as a positive way of improving local 
economy for the local residents:  
“The most important thing is generating employment, and we are very 
satisfied with that. Many new developments solved the problems of older 
neighborhoods. We feel pleased when we see lines of workers waiting to get into 
a gated community [where they work]. Construction is moving the economy. And 
also services. Today, there are [gated] developments, which employ between 600 
and 1000 workers. This is very important, because those jobs were not there 
before. *…+ In addition, gated communities have to generate their own 
commercial centers, because they are built on previously vacant land.”
1 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION  
Embracing Polarization  
 
The particulars of these three cases reveal that peripheral municipalities have been key 
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players in shaping social polarization in their jurisdictions. The rapid spread of gated 
communities in poor jurisdictions of Greater Buenos Aires cannot be explained only through the 
pushing forces of the city’s core,’ i.e. the suburbanizing elites of the City of Buenos Aires, and 
Argentine economic policies. Fundamentally, as social inequality is evident at smaller scales, 
local government management is even more consequential to the evolution of this inequality. 
How each municipal government identified its own constituency and development strategy 
defined how it interacted with the demand for suburban gated communities. In turn, this 
perception had consequences for the social and economic dynamics of their locality. While the 
number of poor households in Escobar grew about 30% (from 6,789 to 8,818) from 1991 to 
2001, it increased by 55% (from 7,806 to 12,154) in Pilar, and it diminished 5% (from 14,828 to 
14,018) in Tigre.  
But to what extent do municipal planning procedures reflect residents’ wishes? 
According to census data on social polarization in the 1990s on Greater Buenos Aires, the 
income of the wealthiest grew at the expense of the middle, and not of the bottom, quintile 
(INDEC, 2004). Certainly, the stagnation of middle-income households was one of the factors 
easing social polarization in the suburbs. The expanding needs of the City of Buenos Aires elites 
converged with the funding needs of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. After the 
national government stopped protecting the industrial ring surrounding the city, the 
unemployment in the urban periphery increased, and suburban residents had fewer institutions 
to represent their claims in the national scenario. At this point, the middle-income households 
of the periphery—the most invested in the fate of their municipality and the least mobile of all 
the actors of the urban geography – supported municipal planning practices that relied on the 
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private sector to improve local conditions.  
The changes in the industrialization policies made obsolete the mid-20th century 
strategies for suburban economic prosperity, while the changes in political organization 
increased municipalities’ control over the uses of suburban land. While the already heavily 
industrialized southern and western suburbs cannot help having the majority of their land tied 
to the small establishments, the less industrialized northern municipalities actively promoted 
alternative urbanization patterns. On one hand, capitalizing on its strategic location vis-à-vis 
MercoSur markets, fewer, but larger, industrial establishments located along the northern road 
connecting the City of Buenos Aires with the Brazilian City of Săo Paulo; on the other, aiming for 
increased employment for local residents and development fees for the municipality without 
municipal investments, the municipality made available land for the development of gated 
communities. By changing land uses and negotiating with real estate developers, both in 
private and through a visible exchange of favors, municipal governments were active players in 
the polarized suburban growth of the late 20th century. Even more germane, democratic 
governments implemented these policies with the accord of the local residents. This was due in 
part to the lack of either state subsidies or alternative investment projects in these lands 
lacking basic infrastructure, i.e. water, sewerage, paving and electricity. This was also due to the 
lack of a vision of a municipality as a single polity. This is also evident in the different urban 
grids of the municipalities within the metropolis, and those on the periphery. Town residents 
were accustomed to a jurisdiction of fragments, as slum settlements –just as affluent gated 
enclaves – were also not integrated into the town grid (see Figure 12).  
However, these extreme social contrasts should not be confused with a lack of social 
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exchanges among different groups. On the contrary, polarized societies do not lack interaction 
between their extremes, but promote a social dynamic dependent on the furthering of these 
differences (Castells and Mollenkopf, 1991). Within this dynamic, the existence of mid-income 
population adds another wrinkle to the social interaction of polarized societies. While poor 
residents welcomed gated communities as sources of employment, mid-income households 
appreciated an inflow of affluent residents that would somehow allow them to prevent the 
further stagnation of the municipality. Therefore, in this case, the bottom-up social forces that 
followed the democratization and decentralization of the metropolis can hardly be associated 
with revolutionary movements. All across the different income levels, there was a pragmatic 
acceptance of social polarization.  
 
FIG. 12 Northern GBA in 2006  
 
The differences on local planning practices have left their landmark at the scale of the whole metropolis.  
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Suburbs with economic contrasts and enclosed spaces, such as the new gated 
communities and shantytowns, materialize after an existing fracture among those already living 
in the suburbs. In the eyes of the middle-income households of the urban periphery, 
developments of gated communities raised the status of their locality: instead of being the 
home of those who cannot afford to live in the City of Buenos Aires, it became the place to 
which urban families chose to relocate. Taking into account the history of poor and middle-
income households in the Province of Buenos Aires, it should come as no surprise how little 
inclination the middle-income residents of the GBA had to view their municipality as a single 
community. Because many of the local poor came from another province, a neighborhood 
country, or one of the City of Buenos Aires’s slums that the dictatorship regime had displaced in 
the late 1970s, suburban middle-income residents regarded local poor as foreigners. Moreover, 
as economic decay was affecting a larger proportion of the GBA middle-income residents, they 
were anxious to distinguish themselves from the local poor and the image of poverty that had 
haunted Greater Buenos Aires since the mid-20th century, when the massive internal migration 
to the metropolis began.  
At the beginning of this chapter, I wondered if there was a correlation between planning 
autonomy and increased social polarization. After researching the development patterns of the 
periphery in general and the management of gated communities in particular, I conclude that 
municipal practices have been active in the polarization of the suburbs. The question why the 
city has not grown in a more equitable way following its democratization and decentralization 
rests on two untrue assumptions. First, that given the option, local residents would prefer even 
to uneven development. In the case of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires all economic 
115 
 
levels embraced social polarization when they perceived it as a way to improve their own 
material and symbolic status, regardless of what it implied about their relative position in the 
larger society. The second untrue assumption was that political units are, or tend to be, social 
units. In other words, because they share the same territory, political institutions, and converge 
in their support of the same local government, political units would move towards further 
social integration. To the contrary, their support of new gated communities developed into a 
compound-like urbanism that does not foster the kind of spontaneous social interaction 
associated with the resilient fabric of community life (Sennett, 1971).  
Now, placing these municipal practices within the larger context of the metropolis, it is 
evident that population movements towards the suburbs were unfolding at scales far larger 
than those of the municipality. In addition, historical limitations on the municipal autonomy vis-
à-vis the national and the provincial governments allowed them little influence on some 
fundamental planning decisions. The relocation of slums in the 1970s, the changes in the 
national industrialization policies throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, and the persistent 
identification of national elites with those of the City of Buenos Aires curtailed the autonomy of 
peripheral governments. As we shall see next, the municipal planning practices of the 
democratic 1990s were still conditioned by the unfolding of the national development project 
of the dictatorship regime of the 1970s.  
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SECTION II  
INTERTWINING NATIONAL AND URBAN POLICIES  
How Did Changes in National Development Policies Transform Greater Buenos Aires?  
 
‘Each social class makes rules that are in its own interest, a democracy 
democratic laws, a tyranny tyrannical ones and so on; and in taking these laws 
they define as ‘right’ for their subjects what is the interest of themselves, the 
rulers, and if anyone breaks their laws he is punished as a ‘wrong doer’. That is 
what I mean when I say that ‘right’ is the same in all states, namely the interest 
of the established ruling class’.  
Plato, The Republic. Quoted by David Harvey. 1992. “Social Justice, 
Postmodernism, and the City.”International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 16-
4, 588-601 
 
 
“Not anyone can live in the City of Buenos Aires. An effective effort should  
be made to improve the health and hygienic conditions. In fact, living in Buenos  
Aires is not for everybody, but only for those who deserve it, for those who accept  
the regulations of a pleasant and efficient community life. We have to have a 
better city for the better people”  
Guillermo del Cioppo, Minister of Housing of the City of Buenos Aires, 
1980.  
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This section links urban prosperity –and decay – back to the national development 
policies of the three governments ruling Argentina from 1977, the year when the Province of 
Buenos Aires got its first urban planning code, until 1999, when Argentina entered its worst 
economic crisis ever. Accordingly, it presents how the policies of the anti-Peronist ‘Proceso de 
Reorganización Nacional” (PRN) dictatorship regime (1976-1983), the Union Cívica Radical 
(UCR) democratic government (1983-1989), and the two presidencies of the Peronist Carlos 
Menem (1989-1999) shaped Greater Buenos Aires. How did the sharp discontinuities in their 
policies impact the metropolis?  
To be fair, many of the problems that are evident in the development policies – or the 
lack thereof – the late twentieth
 
century were the outcome of the embedded contradictions of 
the national development of the mid-century. As early as 1940s, some local leaders were 
pointing out such contradictions in Argentine development:  
“What are these contradictions? The principal contradictions are these: 
The contradiction of the development of capitalist modes of production and the 
semi-feudal modes of ownership and social relation in the rural sector. The 
contradiction of the strong development of the Argentine light industry –fabric, 
chemicals, metals, and shoes --and the lack of a national heavy industry that can 
provide it with machinery. […]The contradiction of the need for national industry 
and agriculture to expand to other national and international markets and the 
limitations created by the existing monopolies on transportation and basic 
industries. The contradiction of the great cities such as Buenos Aires, Rosario, and 
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Mendoza, where the quality of life and consumption are high, and the rest of the 
population whose quality of life is disproportionately low”41
 
 
Aligned with this early diagnosis, the economic crisis that followed the 
deindustrialization of Argentina in the late 20th century caused three paradoxical situations in 
Greater Buenos Aires. First, as the effects of economic decline were felt all over the country, 
the periphery of Buenos Aires had to absorb a higher number of economic immigrants at a time 
when most of its industrial establishments were stagnating. Similarly, the more the population 
of these municipalities grew, the more relevant they became to the national politics even if it 
diminished their economic relevance. Lastly, the higher the percentage of poor people in a 
municipality, the more likely it was to offer land to private, upscale developers.  
As a result, the population inflow increased the political relevance of Greater Buenos 
Aires even though it might have been harmful for its economic development. About a fourth of 
all Argentine voters were living in these peripheral municipalities, thus making these districts 
central for national elections42.
 
Accordingly, national governments of all parties were keen on 
directly managing social aid for the poor of Greater Buenos Aires. Thus, the relevance of the 
peripheral jurisdiction of the GBA in the national elections harmed the actual political and 
economic autonomy of their municipal governments. As we have seen in the preceding section, 
the lack of national investment in the municipal infrastructure led many decentralized 
municipalities to look for those private investments that might want to invest in land lacking 
                                                          
41
 Victorio Codovilla, 1943. Quoted in Godio, 2000, p.866. 
42
 In the Argentine electoral system, voting is both “a right and and a civic obligation,” making it compulsory for all 
citizens, from the age of 18. 
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basic services. This practice furthered social polarization in Greater Buenos Aires, as the poorer 
municipalities ended up with the highest concentration of gated communities in the GBA.  
Looking at the national policies for the causes of the current patterns of social 
polarization in the metropolis is not intended to underestimate the influence of transnational 
flows in current societies (Sassen, 1991; Castells, 1996). Nor does it deny that a vast number of 
Latin American cities are characterized by increasing urban inequality (Portes and Bryan, 2005), 
which suggests that these causes may extend beyond national history, or that national histories 
may be converging. Rather, this study intends to understand the specific ways in which urban 
and national institutions intertwined. This approach aims to assess the role of national 
institutions in promoting urban inequality and, specifically, to ask why democratic practices 
have not curbed social polarization in the metropolis. The hypothesis presented here is that 
formal democracy, as essential as it is in re-shaping institutional dynamics, does not suffice to 
modify institutional practices that are entrenched in social structures and spatial 
configurations. At the very least, we should not assume that reforms are instantly diffused into 
pre-existing institutional practices or that such reforms would immediately overcome 
overarching spatial constraints, such as national infrastructure outlays. Moreover, the urban 
fabric perpetuates previous institutional forms even after the original impulse behind them has 
extinguished. Thus, as we shall see next, the “urban reengineering” of former dictatorships was 
one of the major obstacles in realizing a truly democratic urban governance.  
My emphasis on the relevance of spatial outlays in shaping society is not to question 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s (1962) appreciation for the synergy between institutional 
transformation and local social forces, which led us to believe that any tension between social, 
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spatial, and institutional forms should soon be subdued. Nor is it to disregard Douglass North’s 
(1990) cautionary words on the internal continuity of institutional dynamics, suggesting that 
institutional changes are also of a cumulative, gradual nature. Rather, this approach focuses on 
the role geographically-based social history plays in limiting institutional performances.  
The following pages explore each of the national governments of Argentina from 1977 
until 1999 in chronological order: the PRN dictator regime, the UCR government of Dr. Raul 
Alfonsín, and the two Peronist presidencies of Dr. Carlos Menem. Each of these depicts the 
industrial, social, and institutional circuits that affected the development of the municipalities 
of Greater Buenos Aires. Finally, there is a conclusion with a comprehensive assessment of 
these transformations.  
 
THE 1977-1983 DICTATORSHIP REGIME  
As with all regimes, the military coup that took over office from Mrs. Isabel Perón, the 
widow of the General Juan Domingo Perón, affected the metropolis in both intended and 
unintended ways. Aiming to reform the national socio-economic structure, it was no surprise 
that the military regime centered its action on the capital city. Buenos Aires –—which, by the 
mid-seventies, accounted for about a third of Argentina’s population, half of its industries, and 
more than two thirds of its production –—was the obvious hub from which the self-named 
‘Process of National Reorganization,’ or PRN, was to launch a program of national impact. 
Accordingly, in the eyes of the government, the reform of the city was an essential step in the 
realization of a new model nation, thus affecting the urban structure both purposefully and as a 
by-product of reconfiguring the national economy.  
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Likewise, the defiance of the new regime was most threatening when located in Buenos 
Aires. In that sense, at least two aims of the PRN led by General Jorge R. Videla (1987-81) had a 
direct effect on metropolitan growth. One was the increased participation of the national 
economy in international markets, which ended the majority of the state’s industrial subsidies 
and opened local markets to foreign products (see Table 12). The second was the elimination of 
any resistance that these economic changes might elicit from the population. As Buenos Aires 
was the largest site of production and consumption, the majority of governmental development 
policies directly impacted the urban growth. But to the dictatorship regime, the metropolis was 
also relevant symbolically, as since at least the 1930s, urban life had often been presented as 
the nation’s ideal (Davis, 2004).  
TABLE 12 
NATIONAL SUBSIDIES BY INDUSTRY GROUPS, 1969 
 
Industry Group Effective Subsidy to Value Added 
 
Primary Production Total -8 
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing   -11 
Mining and Energy    26 
 
Manufacturing Total 77 
Processed Food   16 
Beverage and Tobacco   69 
Construction Materials   25 
Intermediate Goods I   98 
Intermediate Goods II   90 
Non-durable Consumer Goods   42 
Durable Consumer Goods 110 
Machinery 105 
Transport Equipment 147 
 
ALL INDUSTRIES TOTAL 41 
 
Source: Daniel Schydlowsky. “Argentine Commercial Policy 1969: Structure and Consequences.” In The Political 
Economy of Argentina. Ed.Guido Di Tella and Robert Dornbusch. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd. 1989). 
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National Development Policies and the Urban Industries  
Argentine industry was born and raised in Buenos Aires in the early decades of the 20th  
century, when the development of the train –—which met the exportation needs of local agro – 
swiftly crushed the incipient industrial initiatives of the northern and western provinces 
(Scobie, 1964). Buenos Aires accounted for the bulk of industrial development due to the 
combined effects of the following factors: 1) the control of Argentina’s main trading port, along 
with the more extended transport infrastructure; 2) abundant labor, brought first by 
international and then by internal migration; 3) large centers of consumption (Dorfman, 1983); 
and 4) the favor of those political leaders whose constituency was the mass of urban workers 
(Davis, 2004; Mora y Araujo, 1983). By 1947, when the first national industrial census was 
published, the metropolis contained more than half of Argentina’s industrial establishments 
and almost 70% of its labor. In 1976, when General Videla’s coup took over, these figures had 
barely changed, although the number of workers in the metropolis continued to grow while its 
establishments added up to a slightly smaller fraction of Argentina’s industrial buildings.  
“The situation that exploded in Argentina in the first trimester of 1976 
can be explained by the economic policy followed in our country during the 
previous thirty years. … The increasing state-engineering of the economic life not 
only reduced the action-field of the private enterprise, but it also led to a 
centralization of the national government at the expense of the provincial 
capacity of decision. …The State, by its nature, does not base its decision in the 
search for the highest economic result for each operation. The larger the part of 
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the economy under the influence of the State’s characteristics, the smaller the 
field for the private enterprise and competition, and the smaller the economic 
growth will be. Recognition of these facts led the economic program to foster – 
during these last five years – a privatization process on one hand and state 
decentralization on the other.”43   
With these words – of which the advocacy for privatization and decentralization 
uncannily resembles those of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (Williamson, 1990, 2000; 
Naim, 1999), the head of the Ministry of Economy, Jose Martinez de Hoz (1976-81), outlined his 
evaluation of Argentina’s development during Perón’s years. In the belief that the economic 
policies of the developmentalist state wasted funds on industries in which Argentina lacked 
natural advantages and that unions’ pressure blocked the growth of the economy, subsidies 
were re-targeted, unions dissolved, and salaries frozen. The dictatorship regime believed that if 
social unrest was kept at bay, the play of free-market forces would lead Argentina to reach its 
‘full potential.” This ended, once and for all, the endemic devaluation of local currency and the 
rising levels of inflation that had afflicted the country since the mid-50s, if not the late 1930s, 
when the agrarian economic model showed its first signs of exhaustion. Besides internal 
political and technical conflicts over the management of resources, the international scenario 
was no longer favorable to the Argentine economic model (Diaz Alejandro, 1970). As typically 
accompanies such overarching reforms, the de facto government perceived itself as morally 
and intellectually superior, and assumed that all previous failures, even those that attempted 
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 Jose Martinez de Hoz, Argentine Minister of Economy, 1981 
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similar policies, were due to the incapacity of its implementers, rather than the inadequacy of 
the model itself. Also, control of social protest and social surveillance became central to 
economic reform due to the perception that a malfunction of society caused the shortcomings 
of the economic model  
Briefly, the main pillars of the new economic program were: 1) a controlled exchange 
rate, which aimed to reduce inflationary processes; 2) the privatization and decentralization of 
state enterprises; 3) the reduction and retargeting of the state’s industrial subsidies; 4) 
cutbacks on labor costs; 5) the support of private investments regardless of an investor’s 
nationality; and 6) the termination of tariffs on international transactions (Azpiazu, 2004). A 
number of contradictions marred the implementation of these policies. For instance, stopping 
industrial subsidies without the provision of compensation measures furthered the state’s 
expenditure, as the government had to take over large, bankrupted industries (Galiani et al, 
2005; Gonzalez andFraga, 1991; Ugalde, 1984). In addition, the control of currency exchange 
rates raised financial speculation, black-market activities, and inflation (Sjaastad, 1989; 
Modigliani, 1989). Nevertheless, these policies did succeed in favoring those economic groups 
included among its supporters. While industrial employment declined sharply and thousands of 
establishments closed their doors, a few large corporations profitably expanded their 
businesses (Kulfas and Schorr, 2000).  
Shrinking state intervention while fostering larger private industrial investments and 
limiting the rights of unions had significant consequences for the metropolitan geography. As 
General Videla’s government associated the success of economic reform with the suppression 
of dissenting groups, the new economic model and the repressive measures were integral in 
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the residential areas of the city as well. Under this regime, the state regarded the small, private 
industries that multiplied all over the city as a result of inefficient, protectionist policies, and, 
moreover, as potential nodes of subversive labor. Therefore, industrial suburbs suffered the 
double impact of a macroeconomic project favoring industrial concentration, as well as the 
state’s animosity against the physical concentration of workers. Because urban labor was the 
traditional stronghold of left-wing, Peronist movements, the anti-Peronist dictatorship regime 
mandated the dispersion of the industry out of the overpopulated urban realm.  
However, it was the combination of economic and industrial policies that determined 
the economic decline of the municipalities that had the largest number of industries. These 
small industrial establishments, which grew in Greater Buenos Aires, as well as in some core 
neighborhoods, usually had a low rate of production and all of their goods fed the consumption 
needs of the urban dwellers. Once the national government eased the restrictions on imported 
industrial products, foreign products flooded urban markets, and local firms could not find 
alternative markets for their products. Moreover, there was no banking system in place 
providing credit to smaller firms that looked to upgrade their production. Since these economic 
activities were at the heart of the local economy of the southern and western municipalities, 
these localities suffered overall disinvestment and the subsequent migration of the most 
affluent households. Conversely, larger industrial compounds had access to preferential 
government credits (Azpiazu, 1984) and were able to cater to the consumption of other 
markets as well focus their production on those products that did not face strong international 
competition (see Table 13).  
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TABLE 13 
VARIATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTION IN INDUSTRIES OF DISPERSED AND 
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 1975-1980 (1975=100%) 
 
 Dispersed Ownership Industries* Concentrated Ownership Industries ** 
 Production  Employment Production  Employment 
1975 100 100 100 100 
1976 93 96 97 98 
1977 93 89 109 94 
1978 89 82 96 85 
1979 95 79 110 85 
1980 90 75 106 73 
Variation -10 -25 6 -27 
 
*Dispersed Ownership Industries: Food, beverage and tobacco; Textile, clothing, and leather; Wood and 
furniture; Paper and printing; Glass and non-ferrous metals 
** Concentrated Ownership Industries: Chemicals, rubber, and plastics; Basic metals; Machinery 
 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on William C. Smith. Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Argentine Political 
Economy. (California: Stanford University Press, 1989).  
 
 
In addition, a policy of industrial incentives rewarded those industries able to relocate 
outside of the metropolitan area (Ferruci, 1986; see Table 14). Clearly, this policy rewarded 
large capital investments, as those were the only ones that could afford the cost of moving and 
of providing the extra infrastructure that living outside of the urban sphere demanded (i.e. 
higher transportation and infrastructure costs). While smaller enterprises could hardly pay for 
the cost of relocation, the largest industries moved their operations just outside the boundaries 
of the city, where they could enjoy favorable tax incentives. The differences between small and 
large establishments thus became patent, which led to the decline of the suburbs in which the 
later were located. Unable to compete with the imported products that now inundated local 
markets and lacking the technology or credit to upgrade their own production, many of the 
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small establishments that populated the suburbs were trapped in a subsistence economy and 
the industrial fabric that crowded GBA became obsolete. Entire jurisdictions on the west and 
south of city –—like those tied to textiles (General San Martin and Moron), food processing 
(Merlo and Moreno), furniture (La Matanza), and light machinery (Avellaneda) – began their 
path towards what is still referred to as the “the industrial cemetery of Buenos Aires.” 
Concurrently, Greater Buenos Aires – rather than the City of Buenos Aires – began to show the 
deeper implications of a novel model of wealth accumulation and social dynamic.  
 
TABLE 14 
Allocation of National Industrial Subsidies per Industrial Centers 
 Buenos Aires Santa Fe & Cordoba Rest of Argentina 
1958-Law 14780 60 21 19 
1963- Decree 5339 71 19 10 
1964- Decree 3113 22 27 51 
1973- Law 20560 10 17 74 
1977-Law 21608 20 5 74 
 
Source: Ricardo Ferrucci,. La Promoción Industrial en la Argentina. (Buenos Aires: Eudeba, 1986). 
 
 
State Repression and Urban Form  
If the financial aspect of the new PRN economic plan was its biased credit decisions, its 
social project was deeply tied to its industrial incentive policies. Customarily, any national 
economic reform was based on the belief that it was not a good strategy to have roughly 80% 
of all establishments clustered in less than a tenth of the country’s territory (in the City of 
Buenos Aires, in the Provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba and Santa Fe). In Dr. Arturo Frondizi’s 
developmentalist government (1958-62), national industrial policy already aimed for the 
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diffusion of manufacturing activities beyond the traditional urban centers (Ferrucci, 1986). 
However, it was only when the concentration of urban workers began to be perceived as a 
menace to the government’s agenda that the dispersion of industry became a priority. 
Certainly, ‘The Cordobazo,’ a violent uprising led by industrial workers that took place in 1969 in 
the city of Cordoba, the second largest industrial concentration of the country, was still fresh in 
the memory of the regime. As described by one witness of those events:  
“From the start I noticed a difference in the students' protest and the 
workers ' protest . . . we lived in the downtown neighborhoods, the downtown 
was ours, to destroy it was to destroy our own. The worker, on the other hand, 
had merely occupied the downtown neighborhoods, it wasn't his, so he didn't 
hesitate; if he had to set fire or destroy, he would do it, since it was occupied 
territory. That wasn't the case for us.”44
 
 
In 1977, the dictatorship signed Law #21,608, which prohibited the establishment of 
new industries in the City of Buenos Aires, as well as denied industrial incentives to 
establishments located within sixty kilometers of any large city (i.e. the City of Buenos Aires, the 
City of Córdoba, and Rosario). Significantly, in 1979, the appointed mayor of the CBA, Osvaldo 
Cacciatore, launched a plan to relocate industrial establishments away from the metropolis, 
well beyond the major national industrial urban ring. The regulation mandated the eviction of 
fifteen types of industrial establishments from City of Buenos Aires, as well as from the eleven 
                                                          
44
 Luis Rubio, university engineering student. Interview. Cordoba, May 22, 1990. Quoted in Brennan and Gordillo, 
1994.  
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municipalities bordering it, within the next ten years (sees Map 10). Although this ordinance 
was advocated under an environmental criterion, its parameters were related to the number of 
workers per establishment and designed to prevent the concentration of workers in the city 
(Schvarzer, 1987).  
 
 
MAP 10 National Government Project For Relocating Industries In Greater Buenos Aires 1981  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Numbered Municipalities: Municipalities from which industries were to be relocated  
Grey Municipalities: Proposed locations for the removed industries.  
 
Source: Horacio Diffieri, ed. Atlas de Buenos Aires. (Municipalidad de la Ciudad de Buenos Aires: Secretaria de 
Cultura, 1981).  
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Subtly, but effectively, the economic and social goals of the dictatorship developed a 
specific urban form. If European fascism used architecture as a tool to construct and reify “the 
national ideal” (Notaro, 2002; Ladd, 1997), the Argentine dictatorship relied on urbanism to 
create and enforce its vision of “the right society.” In order to execute this vision, they had to 
deal with the fact that about 7% of urban inhabitants were slum dwellers for whom they had no 
place in their urban plan. As Guillermo Cioppo, the then Minister of Housing of the City of 
Buenos Aires, said in 1980:  
“Not anyone can live in the City of Buenos Aires. An effective effort should 
be made to improve the health and hygienic conditions. In fact, living in Buenos 
Aires is not for everybody, but only for those who deserves it, for those who 
accepts the regulations of a pleasant and efficient community life. We have to 
have a better city for the better people”  
In agreement with this notion of the exclusivity of the capital city, the municipal 
government, which was headed by an appointee of the national government, launched a series 
of legal reforms. These new regulations aimed to transform the City of Buenos Aires from a 
disorganized and menacing industrial hub, where less affluent workers and slum-dwellers 
crowded in the low neighborhoods (Germani, 1980), into a site where a “hygienic, pleasant 
community life” would prosper. In this vision of the city, three views converged. The first one 
was that of a macro-economic project that the Ministry of the Economy and the large 
industrialists, who were unlikely to locate within the metropolis, supported. The second was 
that of the national government and the anti-Peronist groups, who wanted to disband the 
urban working crowds from whom Perón had gathered much of his popular support. Lastly, 
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there was the government of the City of Buenos Aires and the local affluent residents, who 
were eager to get rid of the slums that diminished the real estate value of much of the land. In 
contrast, the alignment of interests was to be much more complex in the city’s suburbs, which 
suffered the effects of deindustrialization, received the displaced urban poor, and lacked the 
political access to the national government necessary to successfully advance their local 
concerns.  
Both national and municipal government officials looked upon the poor in the city as a 
dangerous and undeserving crowd. When the FIFA committee selected the City of Buenos Aires 
as one of the venues for the 1978 FIFA World Cup, the regime saw this occasion as an 
opportunity to broadcast the right image of Argentina to the world. Accordingly, the 
government launched a massive slum removal program that would prevent foreign crowds 
from seeing any sign of poverty in the city (Ozlack, 1984). The strategy was to create new urban 
infrastructure, such as highways, parks, and entertainment centers, on land on which informal 
houses had settled (Domselaar, 1981). Although the national government relocated a small 
fraction of these slum-dwellers to government housing projects (i.e. Lugano I and II, and the 
Villa Soldati apartments), it expelled the majority from the city. Thus, the regime forced 
foreigners to return to their countries of origin (mostly Paraguay and Bolivia), and moved 
nationals back to their native provinces or, in the case of the great majority, accommodated 
them in urbanizations dispersed throughout the more rural urban fringe (Bermudez, 1985). By 
the end of the regime, the geography of poverty in the metropolis had been radically modified, 
with the displacement of more than 100,000 slum residents out of the city core and into 
suburban municipalities (Pirez, 1994). Thus, slums in the suburbs swelled while the conditions 
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of households in the city improved (see Table 15).  
TABLE 15 
POPULATION LIVING IN SLUMS IN BUENOS AIRES 1975-2005 
 City of Buenos Aires* Great Buenos Aires** 
1960 34,430 78,430 
1970 101,000  
1976 213,823  
1978 103,839  
1979 41,234  
1980 37,040 290,920 
1983 12,593  
1991 50,945 868,495 
2001 110,387  
2005 120,000  
 
Municipalities in Great Buenos Aires: Avellaneda, Berazategui, Estean Echeverria, Ezeiza, Florencio Varela, 
General San Martin, Hurlingham, Ituzaingo, Jose C Paz, La Matanza, Lanus, Lomas de Zamora, Malvinas 
Argentinas, Merlo, Moreno, Moron, Quilmes, San Fernardo, San Isidro, Tigre, Tres de Febrero, Vicente Lopez. 
 
Source:  
INDEC, 2005. Incidencia de la Pobreza y la Indigencia en 28 Aglomerados Urbanos. Buenos Aires; *Centro del 
Derecho a la Vivienda y Contra los Desalojos. 2004. “Desafíos para la Promoción del Derecho a la Vivienda en 
Argentina”. Programa de las Ameritas. Ginebra, Switzerland.  
**Pirez, Pedro. 1994. Buenos Aires Metropolitana. Politica y Gestion de Ciudad. Centro Editor de America Latina. 
Buenos Aires. Page 22. Data for 1960 is taken from 1956, and for year 1980 from 1981. 
 
 
Institutional Reforms and Urban Planning  
At the level of the metropolis, the institutional structure perpetuated the regime’s bias 
against the social project of the Peronism. As the same regime managed all levels of 
government and a division of powers was virtually non-existent, it was not uncommon for the 
provincial government to increase the legal requirements for residential land acquisition while 
simultaneously expelling poor residents into the Province of Buenos Aires. Concurrently, while 
the CBA ended rent control programs, the government of the PBA prohibited the subdivision of 
land for housing when it lacked urban services (Herzer and Pirez, 1988). Furthermore, in 1979 
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the national government mandated that the responsibility for the provision of these urban 
services should fall on municipal jurisdictions. However, these local governments were hardly 
capable of financing any land improvement (Ley de Municipalización de Servicios 9347). 
Consequently, housing built on land lacking infrastructure, which was voided as housing land, 
multiplied.  
It was also in 1977 that the first formal land use planning code of the Province of Buenos 
Aires was legislated (Urban Code 8912/77). Notoriously, amidst an absolute suspension of 
constitutional rights and repression of civic participation, this code called for principles of 
municipal self-governance and decentralization (Badia, 2004). However, the delegation of 
powers was limited to the designation of land usage, (residential, commercial, industrial or 
rural) and, as would be expected in this context, contained no provision for an increase in 
residents’ participation. Also, as the provision of “affordable housing” disappeared, “gated 
communities” were, for the first time, explicitly addressed in the urban code.  
This top-down approach to the reform of the state left a lasting impact on 
decentralization reforms. Legislated almost twenty years before the “Washington Consensus,’ 
put decentralization in the international policy tool box (Naim, 2000), this model of 
decentralized management was already shaping municipal urban governance. Even after thirty 
years of democratic regime, the legislation that the dictatorship regime of 1977 enacted still 
constitutes the master document for urban planning in the PBA. This law gave municipal 
authorities two capabilities that would prove to be fundamental in forming spatial patterns of 
suburban development, both at that time and even more so in the late 1990s: the designation 
of land uses and the approval of new private developments. Without exception, the municipal 
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government was to designate all land, either rural or urban, to reflect the character of its 
current usage. When land was undeveloped, the government was to designate it according to 
its desired future use. The code also established minimum and maximum population densities 
for three main categories: rural settlements, urban settlements, and gated communities. The 
population in rural areas ranged from five to thirty people per hectare, compared to 150 to 
1000 people in urban areas, depending on the level of infrastructure available. In the case of 
gated communities, instead of referring to population variables to regulate density, the law 
referred to the number of houses: seven to eight per hectare, with an absolute minimum of ten 
hectares per gated community development. In terms of location, they were restricted to rural 
areas.  
Once more, the unevenness of metropolitan social and geographical development 
behind this legislation was evident. Clearly, the development of gated communities received a 
disproportionate amount of attention in this foundational planning document. While the 1977 
law explains gated communities with great care and detail, neither industrial and commercial 
buildings, nor affordable housing units receive such careful thought. In a provincial regulation 
affecting the territory of over 120 municipalities, in which gated communities affect less than a 
tenth of their total area, there is an entire chapter dedicated exclusively to the specific 
regulations of the development of these communities. Even in terms of population, this 
attention seems unjustified; residents of gated communities represent less than a hundredth of 
the province’s population, and at the time that the law was passed, most of these residents 
were only weekend visitors who did not vote or participate in local politics. This 
disproportionate dedication reveals the government’s prioritization of the expansion of the City 
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of Buenos Aires’s affluence over the needs of the peripheral municipalities (Keeling, 1997).  
This biased concern may be due to a number of factors. First, in alignment with the 
industrialization policies of the national government, the provincial government shifted the 
focus of its land usage from industries to private housing. As this document did not result from 
a participatory project, and not even provincial mayors contributed to its creation, its text did 
not refer to their needs. The dictatorship that reorganized the legal systems of the nation, the 
PRN, allowed no room for local mayors’ participation, which were appointed by the State and 
not elected through local votes. Secondly, even if gated communities were insignificant in 
terms of overall numbers, they represented a unique phenomenon with regard to their growth 
rate and new use in the metropolis. Firstly, in 1970, long before the dictatorship took over, 
there were approximately twenty gated communities in the region and five years later, this 
number had doubled. Secondly, the location of the gated communities near the main 
connection arteries to the capital city made them highly visible. Finally, the population that 
inhabited gated communities — as well as many of the previous landowners — belonged to the 
City of Buenos Aires’s economic elite, a fact that increased the attention paid to their presence. 
The contrast in the region was striking: developers took a large lot of under-serviced land 
adjacent to low-income houses, subdivided it, enclosed it with a short wall or wire fence, put a 
guard at its entrance, and suddenly luxurious houses were being built inside. The appearance of 
the gated communities demonstrated the obsolescence of the previous planning regulations 
and the facilities made possible by the new regulations (Libertun de Duren, 2007).  
By the end of the 1970s, the tendency of gated communities to cluster in the 
municipalities that had higher-than-average percentages of poor households consolidated. 
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About two-thirds of the region’s new gated communities located in the two municipalities with 
the highest percentage of poverty where, according to the national census data of 1980, one 
out of every three households was living in precarious conditions. The irony was that the 
central government designed the decentralization of planning capacities as a way to alleviate 
the national budget, far from the democratic character decentralization reforms acquired later. 
Additionally, this economic rationale created a social and land use project that affected 
metropolitan growth. As the government identified with the interests of the elite population of 
the City of Buenos Aires, it favored the expansion of city elites into the suburbs. However, even 
if successful, the long-term impact of this regulation was not what the dictatorship regime had 
imagined for the city. Originally, the majority of gated communities were used as weekend 
homes. Thus, this document served the elites’ vision of the suburbs as the providers of all kinds 
of services to the affluent residents of the CBA. Yet, in the 1990s, as gated communities became 
a widespread option for the relocation of upper middle-income households of the City of 
Buenos Aires, the suburbs became increasingly disconnected from the urban core. As we shall 
see later, the dictatorship’s design of the decentralization of land uses successfully made land 
available to meet the needs of the affluent residents of the City of Buenos Aires. By promoting 
housing instead of industries, the PRN triggered the ‘pull’ forces of the municipality that 
contributed to the suburbanization of the people of the City of Buenos Aires, thus transforming 
the face of suburban polity (Libertun de Duren, 2006).  
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THE 1983-1989 UCR PARTY GOVERNMENT  
 
The return of formal democracy to Argentina constitutes one of the most significant 
transformations of its institutional structure. After twenty years without an election, and more 
than forty without a democratically elected president finishing his term, democracy was a true 
revolution in the life of the country. Yet, as the 1980s and 1990s presented a stagnant economy 
and an even more uneven distribution of resources, one must wonder how the political and 
economic participation related – even more so if one considers that the government policies of 
the first years of democracy were more often than not focused on undoing those of the former 
dictatorship. If the dictatorship regime hardly ever distinguished its economic from its political 
goals, the democratic government had to deal with almost opposing goals on these two fronts. 
While the economic reform that the state sought to impose aimed for a wide, participatory 
society, it threatened the economic sustainability of the majority of Argentine households. In a 
sense, this paradox was typical of all the governments that followed Peron’s strategy of 
distributing national monies for social aid as a way to enlarge his constituency (Mora y Araujo, 
1989). In any case, there existed a contradiction between making necessary changes in 
economic policies and pleasing the majority of the voters trapped the UCR governments.  
In brief, after the national government took the lead in the industrialization of 
Argentina, a constant confrontation of two antagonistic projects for the nation characterized its 
political scene. One wanted to protect industry, to tightly regulate labor markets, and 
depended on an inefficient level of the state’s expenditure. This project agreed with the needs 
of small local industrialists, some large industrial owners, and most of the industrial unions. The 
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other model, which was beneficial to the interests of a few large industrial owners and the agro 
exporting industries, sought deregulated tariffs and labor markets, a fluid exchange with 
international investors, and implied high levels of social exclusion. Moreover, between the 
1970s dictatorship and the 1990s, the democratic regime was marked by the struggle between 
the national groups that supported each of these options. The epicenter of this confrontation, 
which spread throughout the nation, was the metropolis, where the great part of the labor, 
industrial establishments, and economic elites resided. In Buenos Aires, the confrontation of 
these two national projects was apparent in the divergent interests of the City of Buenos Aires, 
which could profit from the financial activities that would follow a growth of exportation 
activities, and of the industrial Greater Buenos Aires, which was the residence of most of the 
small and medium industries depending on state protection. This geographical distinction was 
even greater after the implementation of the 1977-1983 dictatorship’s industrial policies, which 
led to the consolidation of larger industrial compounds outside of the metropolis, while it 
allowed for the decay of the smaller urban industries of Greater Buenos Aires. As we shall in the 
next section, the further integration of the national economy into international trade increased 
this spatial tension, as the majority of the industries of Buenos Aires still depended on local 
consumption.  
 
Between Democratic Will and Economic Rationale  
Many of these tensions that appeared in the metropolitan space after the development 
policies of the late 1970s were evident only in the subsequent democratic years. After the initial 
joys of democracy, the problematic heritage of the previous regimes became evident. In 
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December of 1983, Raul Alfonsín, a center-leftist of the UCR Party, began his presidency with 
wide political support and troubling economic conditions. While the international community 
celebrated a presidency won with the majority of national votes, the country still had to deal 
with rampant inflation (above 150% annually), declining GDP (-5%), closed credit markets, debt 
services in excess of export earnings, and a population whose wages’ purchasing power had 
declined by a fourth since 1975 (World Bank, 1985). Clearly, the economic problems that 
precipitated the end of the dictatorship rule were still unsolved (see Table 16).  
 
TABLE 16 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON GROWTH AND INFLATION (AVERAGE  ANNUAL % CHANGE) 
 
 
 1950-9 1960-9 1970-9 1980-83 1984-92* 
Real GDP Growth 3.1 3.8 2.7 -2.1 1.6 
Inflation 27 22.5 135 178  
 
 
* William C. Smith and Carlos Acuna. “Future Politico-Economic Scenarios for Latin America.” In Democracy, 
Markets, and Structural Reform in Latin America. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Eds.William Smith, 
Carlos Acuna, and Eduardo Gamarra, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994). 
 
Source: Rudiger Dornbusch. “Argentine after Martinez de Hoz.” In The Political Economy of Argentina. Ed. Guido Di 
Tella and Robert Dornbusch. (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1989).  
 
If these problems appeared during the 1976-1983 period, they would have become the 
source of specific political claims during the early years of the democracy. The owners of small 
industries, the entrepreneurs who provided state enterprises, the waged workers, and the 
former industrial workers would voice their opposition to halting the State’s protection of local 
industries. Thus, almost from its inception, the democratic government faced a paradox: either 
shrink the expenditures of an unsustainable and indebted state in agreement with the 
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recommendations of the international agencies and the desires of local exporting elites or 
please the majority of voters and continue running state enterprises and protecting local 
industries. Moreover, in the context of the economic crisis, more and more of the political 
discourse revolved around the immediate distribution of wealth rather than around which 
policies would increase national resources. In Buenos Aires, (to which most of GBA grew 
parallel in terms of the national industrialization and the rising earning power of the waged 
households), the transition to a different state model would affect the vital sources of the local 
economy, which eventually changed the configuration of the whole metropolis and its polity 
(see Table 17 and Table 18).  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 17 
EVOLUTION OF ARGENTINE INDUSTRY 1950-1983 
 
Decade National GDP  
growth* 
Participation of Industrial 
Activities in GDP (%)** 
Employment in Industry as % 
of Total Employment* 
 
1950-1959 3 25 25   
1960-1969 4 28 20  
1970-1979 3 27 20 
1980-1983 -2 23 19 
 
 
Sources: * Guido DiTella and Robert  Dornbusch.“Introduction: The Political Economy of Argentina 1946-83.” In 
The Political Economy of Argentina. Eds. Guido Di Tella and Robert Dornbusch, (London:The Macmillan Prqqess 
Ltd., 1986). **  Bernardo Kosakoff. ”The Development of Argentine Industry” and “Business Strategies under 
Stabilization and Trade Openness in the 1990s.” In Corporate Strategies Under Structural Adjustment in 
Argentina. Responses by Industrial Firms to a New Set of Uncertainties. Ed. Bernardo Kossacoff (Saint Anthony’s 
College, Oxford: McMillan Press, 2000). 
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TABLE 18 
DISTRIBUTION OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND LABOR IN ARGENTINA 1954-1994 
 
  CBA PBA Cordoba Santa Fe 
Rest of 
Argentina 
1954 Establishments 26 31 11 10 22 
 Labor 32 33 9 6 20 
1964 Establishments 21 38 12 10 19 
 Labor 26 40 10 8 16 
1974 Establishments 20 37 12 11 20 
 Labor 24 44 9 8 15 
1994* Establishments 11 43 10 13 23 
 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on Ricardo Ferrucci. La Promoción Industrial en la Argentina. (Buenos 
Aires: Eudeba, 1986). *INDEC, 1997. “Productos Industriales Argentinos.”En Encuesta Industrial Anual. Vol. I. 
(Buenos Aires: Republica Argentina, 1997). 
 
 
 
In essence, the basic economic structure of the country was at odds with the demands 
posed by a democracy integrated into the world economy. As observed by a scholar of 
Argentine economy,  
“Argentina’s problem is very much her ‘semi-industrial’ status; the 
country is neither efficiently industrial like Brazil or the Asian NIC, nor does she 
exploit effectively the extraordinary opportunities of agriculture in the way 
Australia has done. The strength of her agricultural export base has meant that 
Argentina was ‘independently wealthy;’ she was thus able to squander resources 
on an inefficient industry, an even more inefficient public sector, and an 
unforgivably inefficient military.”45  
That is, because the national industry mostly targeted to the local market, only the 
                                                          
45
 Rudiger Dornbusch. “Argentina after Martinez de Hoz.” In The Political Economy of Argentina, p. 288 
142 
 
agricultural elites had the ability to participate in the international markets. For that reason, 
running the expensive state structure –on which most of the industries depended –—required 
taxing the gains of agricultural exports. Furthermore, as the country increased its debts to 
international lenders and access to international credit became more difficult to obtain, the 
internal pressures emerging from this management grew larger. While the national government 
had to deal with a debt six times larger than Argentina’s annual export earnings (World Bank, 
1985; Ferrer, 2004), international credit became scarce and interest rates swelled (Hanlon, 
2000). To make things worse, this liability resulted in few local benefits, as much of these 
obligations were the product of nationalizing private sector debts acquired during the former 
regime (Peralta Ramos, 1996).  
During his presidential campaign, Dr. Raul Alfonsín, emphasized the value of the 
democratic regime, and was eager to distinguish himself from the military dictatorship practice 
of imposing economic policies through social repression. For that reason, he began his mandate 
by proposing a participatory, conciliatory process in which all sectors would be included. Adding 
to the contrast, his economic program was keen on direct state intervention on economic 
matters, on restricting foreign investments, and on revitalizing local industries through 
strengthening internal consumption. Yet, he also sought to streamline the over-expanded 
Argentine state. As he stated in his inaugural, presidential discourse:  
“Private property fulfills an important role in the development of the 
nations, but the state cannot be the private property of the economically 
powerful. The oligarchies always tend to think that the owners of the enterprises 
or of the money are the owners of the state. We saw that more than once during 
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the last years. Others think that the state should be the owner of all enterprises. 
We believe the state should be independent: neither belonging to the wealthy, 
nor the sole owner of the mechanisms of production.”  
These policies agreed with the desires of the majority, and gave him the vote of most of 
Greater Buenos Aires’s households, who typically supported the Peronist candidate. However, 
once in office, he could not live up to this agenda, thus harming his government’s credibility 
and weakening his capacity to negotiate with the different sectors. In spite of needing the 
support of the waged workers, the national government could not maintain –let alone upgrade 
– the current structure of state enterprises and employment without increasing the already 
over-expanded national budget, and going against the advice of international lenders. Beyond 
these pressures, the national government had to deal with the contradictory requests of two 
antagonistic sectors within the country. State employees, union leaders, and smaller industrial 
establishments depending on urban consumption requested that the state protect local 
industry and labor markets because in their eyes:  
“High interest rates are lowering the level of production and of wages…so 
in the end the only ones who are suffering these policies are the producers and 
the workers”.46  
Conversely, larger industrial producers, exporting agro, and the financial sector pushed to 
deregulate tariffs and liberalize prices, so that the government would:  
“…effectively reduce state expenditures, open up the economy, decontrol 
                                                          
46
 Words from the head of the Union Industrial Argentina, Roberto Faveleic. Quoted in Acuña, 1995,p. 129 
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variables, and eliminate the system of reimbursements, payments, incentives, 
and tax exemptions established for the benefit of certain industrial sectors –the 
burden to be supported by the whole country-and balance accounts by this route. 
*…+ The Argentinean people may as well know that there are those who benefit 
from high rates of protection, with subsidies of all kinds –that there are 
corporations that live on official expenditures”47  
On one hand, the new president had inherited a heavily indebted country that could no 
longer afford to pay its debt at the expense of its own productive capacity (EI, 1984). On the 
other, he did not have the political capital to impose the cuts in state expenditure needed to 
stop the mounting international debt (Peralta Ramos, 1996; Lewis, 1990). Eventually, the 
impossibility of fulfilling both demands at the same time ended the government’s popularity, 
both inside and outside of the country. After a few months of tranquility, such as those 
following the launching of the “Plan Austral” in February 1985 (Acuña, 1995), the inflation rate 
grew in excess of 400% annually. As expected, this high level of uncertainty was deleterious to 
long-term investment and welcomed financial speculation (Cavallo, 1989). The new economic 
program, which aimed to cut the state’s deficit by shrinking state payroll and privatizing state 
companies, faced the fierce opposition of the unions, while inflation harmed the purchasing 
power of the waged workers (Dornsbush, 1991). The urban periphery, which had been growing 
at the rate of national industrialization, began to show the signs of a failed national project. 
Nonetheless, the population of the urban periphery grew regardless of the decline in industry 
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 Excerpt from the President of the Rural Society’s annual address, in Peralta Ramos, 1996, p. 106 
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and labor wages. Moreover, as the development of urban services was now decentralized, 
municipal land stagnated due to the lack of infrastructure. The percentage of substandard 
households grew, as informal housing developed on municipal lands lacking piped water or 
sewerage. Not surprisingly, Greater Buenos Aires was soon to reject the national government, 
and the UCR party lost all provincial elections following the victory of the 1983 presidential 
campaign.  
 
The New Urban Poverty  
By 1983, when the dictatorship regime ended, the municipalities of Greater Buenos 
Aires had a myriad of decaying small industries and more than 200,000 slum dwellers that the 
PRN displaced from the City of Buenos Aires. In addition, since the PBA decentralization laws of 
1977, these municipalities were responsible for the provision and administration of public 
urban services. As a consequence, when democratic procedures returned, these municipal 
governments found themselves with a large list of responsibilities and concerns, but very few 
resources (Pirez, 1999). Moreover, they could not afford to put in place the missing 
infrastructure that would allow for the improvements of substandard households and the 
better use of land. But, as the economic conditions in other Argentine provinces were also 
problematic, none of these factors deterred the flow of migrants from other provinces that 
came to Buenos Aires in search of employment. Most of these people located on the cheapest 
land available: the un-serviced lands of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires.  
In this way, the impoverishment of Argentina had a double impact on the periphery of 
the City of Buenos Aires. First, it hampered the economic sustainability of the small and 
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medium enterprises located there. Second, it strengthened the inflow of economic migrants to 
the metropolis. Overall, the combination of these two led to a vicious cycle of disinvestments. 
Small industrialists, municipalities, and newcomers did not have the resources –or 
commitment—to pursue the long-term projects needed to upgrade the infrastructure of these 
municipalities (i.e.: water, electricity, and sewerage pipes), thus population growth increasingly 
settled in subserviced lands.  
Not only were the economics of Greater Buenos Aires were troubling, also the political 
scenario was extremely complex for dealing with the growth of poor households. Given the 
notorious violations to human rights during the years of the PRN dictatorship, which included 
the violent eviction of the slum dwellers of the City of Buenos Aires, in the 1980s, no 
democratic government was to attempt the relocation of informal housing settlements, even 
less so when, after the decentralization laws of 1977, the responsibility over the provision of 
the services fell to the municipal governments of the Province of Buenos Aires. (Sbatella, 2001). 
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that Greater Buenos Aires accounted for the 
largest concentration of poor residents of Argentina, and by the end of the 1980s, about half of 
all its households lacked access to piped water and sewerage (INDEC, 2001).  
It was at this point that the people living in the municipalities of GBA experienced a 
novel kind of impoverishment. Unlike previous occasions, not only immigration, but also local 
residents’ poverty was behind the mounting number of poor households in the metropolis 
(INDEC, 2001). GBA, which had traditionally been the home of the migrant workforce who 
toiled in the city, but could not afford to live there, now faced the decline of the resident waged 
worker. Moreover, the sudden changes in the national currency value were favorable to those 
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who had financial assets, and especially disadvantageous for those dependant on monthly 
salaries. Thus, between 1980 and 1989, the income of the poorest tenth of the urban 
population declined by 15%, while that of the wealthiest tenth rose by 14% (Gasparini, 2000).  
Lastly, in addition to the difficulties of taking care of an impoverished population, the 
increasing inequality within the metropolitan population was challenging the governance of the 
urban periphery. Although much of the population was suffering the consequences of national 
deindustrialization, and currency instability, some groups could take advantage of these 
changes. The decline of productive activities ran parallel to rising financial speculation and 
inflation, which skewed the distribution of resources within the population even more (Azpiazu, 
2004; Di Tella, 1989). The overall instability of the national economy contributed to a widening 
the social gap –both in terms of people and geography – in the country in general and in 
Buenos Aires in particular. While the peripheral municipalities suffered the effects of 
disinvestment, financial and banking activities flourished in the City of Buenos Aires.  
In spite of its economic decline, the population of Greater Buenos Aires remained 
central to the power balance of Argentina. Taking into account Argentina’s demographic 
distribution, it was evident that no democratically elected government could afford to disregard 
the support of the majority of urban dwellers (Walter, 1984). Therefore, even though it was not 
conducive to a long-term diffusion of development (as it targeted the causes for the uneven 
distribution of population and resources, and as poverty was notorious in other regions of the 
country such as the northwestern provinces), it made political sense for the national state to 
privilege the funding of the welfare of the population of the GBA. The connection between 
national politics and the fate of Greater Buenos Aires came to the forefront of all national 
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politics. For example, it was typical that candidates for national presidency launched their 
campaign in Greater Buenos Aires. Also, the Peronist Governor of the Province of Buenos Aires 
declared that:  
“The Peronism of the Province of Buenos Aires is invincible because it 
works everyday to solve the problems of the poorest. […] Those who say that 
there is a confrontation between the National and the Provincial mandates are 
wrong.”48  
In effect, as noted by early studies of underdevelopment in Latin America (Castells, 
1977, Di Tella, 1962), the disproportion between a rapidly growing urban population and a 
declining industrial force was becoming one of the defining features of these societies (see 
Table 19). Increasingly, a higher percentage of the population depended directly on the 
metropolitan economy, even when this was being de-industrialized. During the 1970-80 period, 
the urban population swelled while industrial employment declined, and unemployment 
increased. Therefore, neither the government, nor the people were able to wait for the results 
of an economic reform that might re-activate –even if it were possible –—the productive 
engine of the formerly industrial city. In that scenario, government policies increasingly focused 
on interim actions that could lessen the impact of unemployment, rather than on creating the 
foundation for alternative models of development.  
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 La Nación, Oct 13, 1996 
149 
 
 
TABLE 19  
DISTRIBUTION OF WAGED WORKERS 1949-1980 
 
Waged Workers 1949 1960 1970 1980 
% Rural  22 14 11 9 
% Urban  78 86 89 91 
      
Urban Waged Workers      
% Manufacturing industry 34 36 30 28 
% Construction  6 8 10 10 
% Communication and Transportation 10 11 8 6 
% Commerce, Finance, and Services 50 45 52 56 
Total Number of Urban Waged Workers 4,600,000 5,689,000 6,671,000 7,147,000 
 
 
Sources: Julio Godio,. Historia del Movimiento Obrero Argentino 1870-2000. (Buenos Aires: Ediciones El 
Corregidor, 2000).  
  
 
In any case, the national government’s attempts to satisfy such disparate agendas— 
simultaneously claiming state austerity, while running an expansive state structure – resulted in 
rapidly deteriorating conditions of the urban periphery. The tension between the immediate 
demands of the impoverished workforce and the need for policies that promoted long-term 
growth took a heavy toll on the national project. For instance, in order to alleviate 
unemployment, the national government hired more bureaucratic personnel at the same time 
as it aimed to cut national deficit. However, this tactic was no solution for the economic decline 
of the suburbs. Taken as a whole, the shift towards quick-fix policies and financial speculation 
was particularly harmful for the economy of the urban periphery. In a scenario looking for 
short-term economic gains, the industrial establishments that populated the suburbs tended to 
suffer disinvestments. In addition, local people depending on wages were worse off in this 
rapidly changing economic scenario. More germane yet, no government level promoted the 
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much-needed investment in urban infrastructure to prevent the spread of housing without 
services.  
Despite the mounting social demands and the presidency’s need for the votes of the 
province’s residents, it could not reactivate the industrial structure or the wage values of the 
heyday of Peronism. The macroeconomic conditions in which Argentina was immersed 
gravitated negatively against the economic project that originated many of the industries of 
Greater Buenos Aires. Unlike Perón, who enjoyed a wealthy state budget thanks to the 
favorable terms of international trade, international conditions were adverse during the 
administration of the UCR government in the 1980s. Moreover, the market demands of the City 
of Buenos Aires were not sufficient to sustain national industries. The fusion of these two 
factors furthered the decay of the industrial establishments of the urban fringe. In addition, the 
UCR government had to face the escalating pressures of the largest national unions, the 
majority of which were unconditional supporters of the Peronist party (Mora y Araujo, 1989). 
After suffering censorship during the former dictatorship, the unions’ claims defending 
industrial labor had found a receptive public among the impoverished urban waged workers of 
the early democracy. Their support was instrumental in mobilizing society against the national 
government, and they had exercised great influence on the election in the Province of Buenos 
Aires, the hub of industrial labor (Acuña, 1995). By 1987, the Peronist candidate captured the 
majority of the votes in the province, and thus a deep political division between the city core 
and the periphery began with a belt of Peronist majorities surrounding the pro-UCR City of 
Buenos Aires.  
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Distorting Democracy  
Any non-Peronist government that intended to engage itself in an election had to 
develop an institutional strategy exclusively to deal with the Province of Buenos Aires. The 
challenge was to play down the importance of the municipalities of the GBA – from which 
Peronism typically attained the majority of its votes --on the national elections. As more than a 
fourth of the national workforce and production capacity was located in this area, virtually any 
system of political representation would allow the GBA voters to impose their will all along the 
nation. Beginning with the dictatorship of General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse, who seized 
power through a coup d’état in 1971 and called for elections one year later, all governments 
skewed the electoral rules against GBA. By assuring that all provinces had a minimum of five 
representatives at the national level –—regardless of their actual population— – Lanusse 
diminished the relative weight of each voter from the Province of Buenos Aires. Accordingly,  
“A deputy from [the province of] Tierra del Fuego could be elected with 
about a thousandth fraction of a vote needed for one in the Province of Buenos 
Aires. All this was done to eliminate that specter, that specter which was as the 
specter of Communism haunting Europe, the specter of Peronism.”49 
In addition to the manipulation of political representation, in 1972, the regime modified 
the distribution of fiscal resources so as to disfavor the PBA (Law 20221). The law stipulated 
that 48.5% of fiscal monies collected by the national government should be distributed among 
the provinces according to the following formula: 65% according to population, 25% according 
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to the average development gap from the most developed province of the nation, and 10% to 
provinces with below-average population density. Accordingly, the PBA, which was at the top of 
the development level and had a high population density, become a net giver of fiscal 
resources. At first glance, this distribution would appear to help alleviate regional inequalities in 
the nation. Yet, because social conditions within provinces were not homogeneous, this was 
hardly the case and it certainly harmed the unequal society of the Province of Buenos Aires. It is 
estimated that in 1991, the lowest quintile of residents of the PBA received almost five times 
less aid than the average amount given to the lowest quintile of any other province (Porto and 
Cont, 1998). More simply put, thanks to the new regulations, aid for the poor of Buenos Aires 
fell far behind the aid given to the poor in the rest of the country.  
It is obvious that the practices of the new democracy had to deal with the economic 
debts as well as with the institutional legacy of former dictatorship regimes. Eventually, the 
strategy of postponing the fulfillment of Buenos Aires’s demands backfired on the UCR 
mandate. As Peronism expanded into other regions, particularly into the impoverished 
northwestern Argentinean Provinces (i.e. Jujuy, Salta, Catamarca, Santiago del Estero, Chaco, 
Formosa, and La Rioja), the electoral balance was even more skewed in favor of the Peronist 
party. In the congressional elections of 1987, when the Peronists gained the majority in 
Congress and the UCR party began its decline, Buenos Aires had 36% of all registered voters but 
it elected only 27% of the congress. Conversely, these northwestern provinces represented 
10.5% of all voters, but elected 17% of the national congress. As a consequence, Peronism was 
more entrenched in the less populated provinces where local politicians could tip the electoral 
balance of the nation thanks to a small difference of votes in their home provinces. 
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Additionally, even if the Province of Buenos Aires’s residents did not have fair representation in 
Congress, these policies increased the negotiating power of local politicians, who often made 
ad-hoc arrangements with the national government.  
Parallel to this structural bias at the national level, suburban municipalities still had to 
deal with the issues specific to the practices within the PBA. This is particularly true in the case 
of urban planning, where avenues for participation were practically absent from the 1977 code, 
nor the addition in the 1980s, required public participation, or even the publicizing of planning 
decisions made by municipal authorities in their communities. This biased understanding of the 
role of planning reflected the institutional beliefs of the dictatorship regime. Given that a 
‘nondemocratic’ government generated this regulatory body, the absence of civic participation 
is not surprising. However, none of the successive legal reforms, which went into effect under 
the following democratic government, made civic participation a condition for investment or 
development approvals. The silence on the issue of social participation in municipal planning 
was also a consequence of the lack of a communal entity in many municipalities. During Peron’s 
government, political manipulation often dictated municipal boundaries. Later, the dictatorship 
regime relocated people throughout the metropolis, hence threatening the consolidation of a 
municipal sense of community. Finally, during the democratic era, the widening social gap 
between local residents contributed to the absence of a cohesive vision within the municipality. 
In the end, the juxtaposition of a skewed distribution at the national level and little 
participation at the local level increased the access to land for private development. The 
structure of democratic representation left municipal mayors with little monies, relatively few 
avenues for contestation, but ample power over land management in their jurisdictions. Once 
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pressed for funds, these mayors turned to the private sector to develop land lacking urban 
services. Eventually, the top-down approach embedded in the planning code inherited from 
dictatorship days was a basic institutional feature for the expansion of private investors in the 
democratic era.  
 
 
THE 1989-1999 PERONIST PARTY GOVERNMENT  
 
Many of the features that marked the 1990s consolidated the institutional and social 
transformations that began in the previous decades. To begin with, several of the government’s 
measures resembled the economic ideology of the 1976-1983 dictatorship, during which the 
country halted much of its support to local industrialization and attempted to privatize the 
state’s enterprises. In addition, there was a commitment to continuing with the democratic 
regime consolidated during the UCR administration of 1983-1989. Yet, because this was an 
unedited combination of liberalization of the economy, democracy, and Peronist social appeal, 
the presidency of the Peronist Dr. Carlos Saul Menem constituted a radical change in 
Argentinean politics. Nevertheless, it could not have been as successful in imposing its new 
program of government had it not taken advantage of the ongoing national economic crisis. In 
1989, when Dr. Menem became Argentina’s president, Argentineans’ constant frustration with 
the instability of the national economy had made them receptive to a significant change in the 
whole management of the state. The massive social support for a change in the national 
economy does not mean that there were not entrenched interests opposed to the 
transformation of state-led enterprises. Unions, middle-income urban households, and the UCR 
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were some of the forces opposed to the privatization reforms that Menem advocated. None of 
the former experiences with deregulated economies had left the population with positive 
memories, as they had all ended in economic crisis and had often been imposed through the 
devices of a dictatorship.  
Eventually, the Argentinean paradox of attempting a deregulated economy through an 
authoritarian state had been solved by Menem’s two-pronged strategy. On one hand, he relied 
on his Peronist background to attenuate the social tensions caused by imposing this new state 
model, and thus catered his discourse to the working poor likely to feel threatened by the 
changes in the state. On the other hand, he allied himself with the interests of the largest 
corporate holdings and thus the international connections, to take advantage of the sweeping 
state reform proposed. But the true extent of the state and economic reform that Dr. Menem 
sought became evident only in 1991, when the government launched the ambitious economic 
plan entitled “Plan de Convertibilidad.” Although the minister of the economy, Dr. Domigo 
Cavallo, led the project, it was more than a financial reform. Briefly put, its main objectives 
were to minimize state deficit, to stabilize the economy and curb the inflation, and to further 
integrate the country into the international investment circuits (Acuña, 1994). In terms of 
actual policies, these goals translated into: 1) the privatization of State companies; 2) the 
opening of trade and the deregulation of tariffs; 3) the simplification of the tax structure; 4) 
instating labor reforms that increased hiring flexibility; 5) autonomous management of the 
Central Bank; and 6) to valuate 1 Peso equal to 1 US dollar (Powell, 1998). All of these reforms 
worked well with the development principles pushed by international lenders and policy 
makers of the moment (Williamson, 1990). Yet, as Dr. Cavallo emphasized, this economic 
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reform was born out of a genuinely Argentinean project, which had been in the public eye since 
at least the 1970s (Cavallo and Cottani, 1997; Cavallo, 1984). The influence of external factors 
was thus minimized, which suggests the international community facilitated the successful 
implementation of a national project that had deep roots in Argentinean society.  
 
International Trade and the New Urban Geography  
Briefly, the predominance of Buenos Aires industries over the rest of the country was 
more the consequence of national development policies than of the geographical conditions of 
the country. Since the industrialization of the country began, national governments of all 
ideologies had been aiming to manipulate Argentina’s spatial outlay. In each of Perón’s 
presidencies (1946-1952, 1952-1955, 1974-1975) his political force grew at the pace of the 
national industrial labor force, which was located in Greater Buenos Aires (Germani, 1974). As a 
result, from its outset, the national geography of industry and labor was one of the key 
variables in the disclosure of the economic and political goals of each regime. (Ferrucci, 1986). 
Accordingly, the last dictatorship regime (1976-1983) targeted its industrial policies towards the 
dispersion of industry and labor outside of the urban centers, a practice that Raul Alfonsín 
(19831989) continued by granting subsidies and tax benefits to industries located in targeted, 
non-urbanized areas, such as far Patagonia.  
Finally, during the presidency of Carlos Menem (1989-2000), another Peronist, the 
government relinquished its direct control over the national industrial geography. Why? Firstly, 
because the Province of Buenos Aires was a Peronist stronghold; and secondly, because the 
overall policy of Carlos Menem’s government was to liberalize markets and diminish state 
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controls on private investments (Kosacoff, 2000). After decades of fighting the tendency of 
investments to cluster in an overly-expanded Buenos Aires, the state halted national programs 
benefiting non-urban locations. Consequently, in the second half of the 1990s, the tendency 
towards the diffusion of the industry out of the metropolis was reverted. While the national 
figures showed shrinking industrialization, Buenos Aires managed to conserve or even increase 
its industrial capacity, hence augmenting its share of the national industrial production from 
51% in 1984, to 60% in 1994 (Fritzsche and Vio, 2000). However, the beneficiaries of this new 
concentration were not the working households of the urban periphery.  
Declining industrialization following a policy of trade and industry deregulation was 
most pronounced during the 1977-1983 economic policies, when the industrial ring that 
surrounded the city began to show its first signs of distress. At that time, the PRN government 
allowed for the sudden inflow of imported products to local markets, which destroyed the 
smaller producers of the industrial belt. Although the democratic regime restricted imports in 
the 1980s, so as not to alienate the urban workers and small producers, it could only briefly 
stop the decay in the production value of the myriad of establishments surrounding the City of 
Buenos Aires. By the time the import of finished goods once more flooded the urban markets, 
the foundation for the division between large and small producers was already in place. While 
many of the larger establishments had already left the urban periphery so as to take advantage 
of the numerous incentives for relocating industries, the smaller establishments remained in 
the stagnating urban periphery. The higher concentration of industries in Buenos Aires in the 
1990s was due to changes at the top and bottom of the industrial production structure. The 
smallest establishments of the least production value were trapped in a subsistence economy 
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throughout the urban core (Kulfas, 2000). The newer and larger establishments of higher 
production value relocated along the northern side of the conurbation so as to take advantage 
of the recently established MercoSur market (Kosacoff, 2000). In the middle, the older 
industrial jurisdictions (Avellaneda, General San Martin, and Tres de Febrero) the number of 
establishments barely changed, yet the income of the working households and of many of the 
establishments plummeted (Azpiazu, 2004). In addition, the MercoSur moved the industrial axis 
of the conurbation from the south to the north. For the first time, local industries found a 
market larger than the City of Buenos Aires, further diminishing the strategic value of the older 
industrial suburbs, in the southwest of Greater Buenos Aires.  
Besides the changes in the geography after the new industrial policies, there was a new 
pattern of land occupation. The growth of the metropolis relied on the highway and did not 
expand the traditional urban fabric based on blocks and streets, but rather added large, 
isolated industrial compounds in the less-urbanized municipalities at the far boundaries of the 
metropolis. The gated communities were also located within these borders. The highway 
upgrade that fostered MercoSur commerce also enabled urban dwellers to live in the far 
suburbs while still working in the city. Real estate developers took advantage of this unique 
opportunity and in less than ten years the number of gated communities along the road more 
than tripled, reaching 500 by the year 2001. During the 1990s, 44% of all private investments in 
the region went towards the development of gated communities (Coy and Pholer, 2002). This 
growth also took the form of isolated compounds that did not expand the urban grid, as gated 
communities did not rely on the municipality for the provision of their services, and land-use 
policies were quite flexible. Accordingly, the industrial relocation following the MercoSur was 
159 
 
correlated to changes at the municipal level of land usage. Gated communities mushroomed in 
the empty land of the northern municipalities, in the jurisdictions located in the frontier space 
between the new industrial growth and the traditional urban fabric, where for years there had 
been informal housing and no urban infrastructure.  
At the close of the 20th century, the suburban ring that surrounded the city presented a 
different dynamic than that of the 1970s, when the deindustrialization of the nation and the 
decentralization of planning powers began. While the south and the west became 
impoverished parallel to the survival struggle of the old developmentalist model – in which a 
sizeable amount of the population was still depending – the northern suburbs were casting the 
new urban growth: self-sufficient private compounds linked to international markets amidst 
undeveloped territories. This landscape of social polarization at a smaller scale characterized 
the growth of the city during the 1990s.  
 
Argentina’s Imbalanced Development and the Urban Poor  
Eventually, the centrality of Buenos Aires to the national economy impinged on the City 
of Buenos Aires’s development. As the rest of the country became impoverished, a continuous 
flow of migrants moved to the metropolis. Even in the mid-20th century, during the most 
successful stages of the Peronist project, when industries bloomed in Greater Buenos Aires, the 
consequences of an imbalanced national development were evident in the new informal 
settlements along the train tracks converging towards the urban core (Torres, 2001). Once the 
state changed its industrial policies and urban industry began to decline, most of the 
newcomers stayed in the suburbs regardless of the rapidly deteriorating working conditions. In 
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the long run, the urban scheme in which industrial establishments and labor were located in 
the periphery and fed the consumption needs of the more affluent urban core showed evident 
signs of exhaustion. By the 1960s, about 5% of the metropolitan population (460,000 city 
dwellers) was living in shantytowns spread both in the city and in Greater Buenos Aires (Pirez, 
1994). But fifteen years later, the dictatorship regime removed shantytowns from the City of 
Buenos Aires, forcing the relocation of more than 200,000 people into the municipalities of 
Greater Buenos Aires. Therefore, the unevenness of national development and the failure of 
Argentinean industry were more prejudicial to the municipalities of the periphery than to the 
urban core. Moreover, while the CBA managed to profit from services and financial activities in 
the 1990s, the GBA was still engaged in a failed national project.  
The 1990s reform of Menem’s government intensified the trend of impoverishment that 
began in the 1980s. As we have seen, the deepening of the local poverty was one of the 
preconditions to the posterior raise in inequality in these municipalities. That is, as local 
economic activities were in decline, the state was not likely to provide urban infrastructure, and 
therefore the population and area of slums was likely to grow, decentralized municipalities 
allowed for the development of gated communities and the consequent raise in inequality. But 
why did municipalities encourage these developments in the 1990s, if all these trends had been 
evident since the 1980s?  
The answer to this question is twofold. On one hand, as we have seen in the previous 
section, the upgrade of the highway and the decentralization of planning capacities allowed the 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires to facilitate the growth of gated communities. On the 
other hand, and as we will explore further in the following section, the growth of poor 
161 
 
households in the suburbs was not only due to migration but also to the impoverishment of 
established residents, which generated a local constituency willing to accommodate these new 
land uses as a way to upgrade local finances.  
At this time, three causes were behind the growth of suburban poverty. The first was 
the continuity of the national migratory patterns. As the economic crisis hit all over the country, 
internal migration to the metropolis kept its pace (INDEC, 2001). Although the labor market in 
the metropolis was quite unsteady, it was larger and more dynamic there than in the rest of 
Argentina. Therefore, continuing with the practice that began in the 1950s when the industries 
of Buenos Aires demanded more workers, people who lost their jobs in the provinces relocated 
to GBA in the hopes of finding employment. However, since municipal governments still lacked 
the resources to provide the necessary infrastructure to take care of the inflow of newcomers, 
migrants built new houses in un-serviced land and thus increased the number of people living in 
irregular settlements (GCBA, 2002). Even worse, according to the urban labor statistics from the 
1990s, for every ten people seeking employment in the city, there was only one new job. Thus, 
newcomers often found no job upon relocating to the metropolis (LaNacion, 1996).  
The lack of employment growth was the second cause behind the fact that in the urban 
periphery, the earnings of one in four households was below the “statistical poverty line.” 
While unemployment hurt the country as a whole, the loss of jobs was much higher in the 
major industrial hubs. Unlike the unemployment of the 1980s, which related to decaying 
industrial production, this unemployment was in response to a structural change in the 
composition of industrial production and –as we will see more in the following section – capital 
ownership (see Table 20). The MercoSur and the import-export tariffs fostered the growth of 
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large holdings and industries exporting raw products (Kosacoff, 2000). These industry 
establishments were located far away from the metropolis, partly because the former industrial 
policies gave them incentives to move away from the city, and partly because their plants did 
not fit well in the urban grid. In addition, their production was not labor intensive and their 
expansion did greatly not alleviate national unemployment. Thus, regardless of the absence of 
new jobs in the urban periphery, the urban population was still growing faster than that of non-
urban centers. For instance, in 1995, the population living in Buenos Aires grew by 2.8% while 
employment declined by 2.9% (Oviedo, 1996). Eventually, chronic poverty and unemployment 
became distinctive features of most of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires.  
 
TABLE 20 
VARIATIONS IN THE ORIGIN OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITAL AT THE TOP 1000 INDUSTRIAL FIRMS 
1993-2003 (IN %) 
 
 
 
Origin of Capital 
Number of  Firms Added Value  Wages Jobs 
1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003 1993 2003 
National 67 48 50 20 55 33 64 42 
Up to 50% Foreign  9 8 24 5 19 7 15 7 
More than 50% Foreign  24 44 26 75 27 60 21 51 
 
Source: INDEC, Censo Nacional Económico 2004/5. Operativo Especial a Grandes Empresas, 1000 Grandes 
Empresas. 
 
 
In the 1990s, poverty was not only linked to unemployment, but also to the worsening 
conditions of the employed population (INDEC, 1993). 
1 
The combination of a large 
concentration of people looking for jobs in Buenos Aires and the new national labor legislations 
which eased short-term contracts deteriorated the labor market. Thus, a third cause of the 
rising urban poverty was the declining incomes of waged workers. During the 1990s, industrial 
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wages did not raise even when prices did, and the purchasing power of workers declined by 
almost 18%. Also, the loss of manufacturing jobs affected mostly male workers, who were 
usually paid at higher rates than female workers. Therefore, households that became 
dependent solely on women’s wages also experienced declining incomes (Frenkel and Rosada, 
2002).  
By the early 1990s, the massive and rapidly deteriorating living conditions among the 
industrial sector of Greater Buenos Aires were threatening the social stability of the Province of 
Buenos Aires, if not the entire country. The concern about the dissatisfaction of this sector was 
evident in the words of the President Carlos Menem in an official discourse in 1996 addressed 
to the industrial sector:  
"I will have you recall you the mess of a country we were in 1989, lootings, 
minimum wages, and maximum prices. […] We have to remember so that it does 
not happen again. I want all the entrepreneurs and the union leaders to recall 
that at that time you did not compete but against the state, which was the 
hyperinflation, the corruption, and the chaos.”50  
The consequences of national deindustrialization were threatening the basic 
constituency of the governing Peronist regime. Thus, when the then national vice-president, 
Eduardo Duhalde, became the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, he launched a new, 
ad-hoc measure for providing social aid to the poor living in Greater Buenos Aires. And once 
                                                          
50
 In the early 1990s, 53% of poor households were also waged working households. INDEC, 1993. “Evolución 
Reciente de la Pobreza 1988-1992.”  
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more, the centrality that the metropolis held in the nation curtailed the rights of its own 
population and diminished the economic autonomy of the municipalities of Greater Buenos 
Aires.  
 
Distorting Democracy, Again  
The legacy of previous anti-Peronist regimes was an institutional framework strongly 
biased against the Province of Buenos Aires. Less populated provinces were overrepresented in 
state legislature and the circuit of the nation’s fiscal resources made the province a net giver of 
monies (Porto, 1999). The majority of the poor residents of Argentina were living in Greater 
Buenos Aires, under the rule of the Province of Buenos Aires, where the infrastructure was 
insufficient to meet the demands of the growing metropolis. This situation raised concerns not 
only for the government of the PBA, but also for the nation’s executive power. Unlike the 
procedure for electing national congressmen, presidential elections were a fair representation 
of the population’s distribution, thus giving voters in GBA the capacity to tilt election results. 
Additionally, controlling social protests in these impoverished municipalities was instrumental 
in assuaging the cost of the new national policies and projecting the image of social progress to 
the rest of the country (Teubal, 1996; Powers, 1995).  
Reforms of the distribution of fiscal resources among the provinces, or the procedures 
for electing congressional representatives would be too difficult to impose, and would likely 
alienate the support of the Peronist provinces of the north. When the former vice-president 
became the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires’s government, he knew how to voice his 
worries about his province. In 1992, the economic minister approved a unique program to 
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provide social aid to the province, the “Fondo de Reparación Histórica del Bonaerense.” By 
virtue of this reform, the provincial government would get an additional 10% of the national 
fiscal monies. Thus, the PBA’s executive powers had control over a fabulous amount of 
resources that was not controlled by the congress.  
But why did the social indicators show hardly any improvement in the living conditions 
of the local poor? Because the funds that the province dispersed were not part of the 
democratic circuit and were used at the discretion of the executive powers. Neither the 
national and provincial legislatures, nor the municipal government had any legal say in how 
these monies were spent (see Table 21 and Table 22). Not surprisingly, accusations that these 
funds, which amounted to more than 650 million dollars per year, were “too much of a 
temptation for the administrators” were common (LaNacion, 1998). Typical of the Peronist 
management of social claims, these programs confused social needs with political favors 
(Phillips, 2004). Ironically, at the end of the day, the total amount that the Province of Buenos 
Aires received from the national government was as large as it would have been if the monies 
had been allocated in direct proportion to population size (LaNacion, 1998). Yet, by using an ad-
hoc procedure for obtaining national funds, the governor had full control over the distribution 
of the lion’s share of the money.  
TABLE 21 
DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL AID BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
 Level of Government (%) 
 National Provincial Municipal 
 
1993 50 42 8 
2001 53 42 5 
 
Source: Pablo Vinocur and , Leopoldo Halperin. “Pobreza y Políticas Sociales en la Argentina de los Noventa”. 
División de Desarrollo Social. Serie Políticas Sociales. 85. (Santiago de Chile: UN CEPAL., 2004). 
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TABLE 22: 
SOCIAL AID BY FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENTS  
 
 Level of Government (%) 
Function National Provincial Municipal 
Housing  X  
Food Programs X X  
Primary & Secondary Education   X  
Tertiary Education X   
Public Health X X  
Hospitals  X  
 
TOTAL 3 5 0 
 
Source: Fabian Repetto and Guillermo Alfonso. “La Economia Politica de la Politica Social Argentina: Una Mirada 
desde la Decentralization”. Division de Desarrollo Social. Serie Politicas Sociales. 85. ( Santiago de Chile: UN 
CEPAL ,2004).  
 
 
 
All in all, however, insufficient resources are not at the root of the deficiencies in the 
infrastructure and social services of Greater Buenos Aires. Regardless of the shifts in industrial 
geography, it has always been the epicenter of national production. Rather, institutional design 
perpetuated local poverty at the same time that it eased the manipulation of poor, urban 
households for the sake of national politics. In that sense, the distribution of monies in the 
1990s heightened the relevance of Buenos Aires in the nation, while it simultaneously 
undermined the voice of its local residents. That is, instead of making money for social aid a 
citizens’ right that could be monitored through democratic participation, social aid became an 
ad-hoc political measure in which locals had no say. In that sense, it replicates the dictatorship 
regime’s structure of the decentralization of planning capacities, which relied on modifying 
local regulations as a way to alleviate the national debt (Repetto and Alonso, 2004). 
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Accordingly, it was a top-down reform lacking correspondence with local grassroots 
organizations advancing local concerns. In addition, because the provincial administration 
received most of its monies for social programs, and the provincial government distributed 
these funds at their discretion, municipalities were more dependent on the central government 
after decentralization increased local responsibilities (Badía, 2004). Overall, municipal 
governments have found themselves with few economic resources, swelling poverty, and –
thanks to the 1977 planning law and its subsequent reforms-legal autonomy over the 
regulation of land usage. It was in this context that municipalities fostered the development of 
gated communities as a strategy for local development. Privatizations of land resources became 
one of the few ways that municipal governments could generate local income, and at the same 
time, generate local employment (see Table 23).  
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TABLE 23 
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENTS ACCUMULATED PER MUNICIPALITY 1995-2000  
 
 
 
 Private Investments  Public Investments 
Municipality  Accumulated Amount in $  Accumulated Amount in $  
Tigre  2,258,000,000 48,313,498 
Pilar  1,297,000,000  30,308,627  
Morón  405,000,000  31,218,299  
Berazategui  339,000,000 43,447,329  
Avellaneda  302,000,000  69,431,668  
Vte. López  298,500,000  7,615,993  
San Isidro  277,000,000  26,506,207  
Quilmes  270,000,000  57,053,212  
La Matanza  250,000,000  128,058,351  
Gral. Rodríguez  233,000,000 18,332,899 
San Fernando  212,500,000  37,034,571  
L. de Zamora  120,000,000  72,784,234  
Moreno  120,000,000  39,769,103  
E. Echeverría  110,000,000  138,538,454  
Almirante Brown  70,000,000  50,926,858  
Ensenada  61,300,000  76,014,298  
Gral. San Martín  30,000,000 19,529,626 
Merlo  30,000,000 71.637.067 
Gral. Sarmiento  26,500,000 8,706,024 
F. Várela  18,000,000  97,055,869  
Lanús  2,000,000 61,998,573  
Berisso  w/d  8,943,210  
Ezeiza  w/d 18,095,416 
Hurlingham  w/d  4,802,853  
Ituzaingo  w/d  10,430,831  
J. C. Paz  w/d  16,402,600  
Mal. Argentinas  w/d 21,294,711 
Marcos Paz  w/d  120,252,395  
Presidente. Perón  w/d  7,163,620  
San Miguel  w/d  14,079,277  
Tres de Febrero  w/d 38,938,947  
 
AVERAGE  
 
321,047,826 
 
47,055,643 
 
 
Source: Cynthia Goytia. “The Case of the Municipality of the Pilar”. Proceedings of the World Bank Urban 
Research Symposium. WB_IPEA. April 2-5, 2005, Brazil.  
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CONCLUSION  
The Metropolitan Paradox: Furthering the Relevance of the City and Diminishing 
Urban Rights  
 
I began this chapter by asking how national goals, both political and economical, 
modified the development of Buenos Aires, Argentina’s major city. In particular, I looked at the 
ways in which national governments since the last dictatorship regime have affected the urban 
industries, the urban poor, and the administrative structure of the urban periphery, where 
economic and social changes have been most dramatic. These three urban features were 
consequential for the national development policies, but the relevance of Buenos Aires in the 
nation had undermined the rights of its own citizens, preventing them from being active 
participants in their local development.  
The shifts in the urban industrial geography that followed the end of national 
industrialization have targeted the original engine of Buenos Aires’s growth. Greater Buenos 
Aires, which grew through Peronist industrialization programs, would bear this legacy for the 
rest of the 20th century. First, the dictatorship regime (1976-1983) opened the economy to 
foreign industrial products at the same time that it forbade the establishment of industries in 
the urban periphery. Therefore, most of the urban establishments lost their main market while 
new industrial investments relocated beyond the urban realm, thus beginning the decadence of 
the small industrial establishments of the GBA. Next, the democratic UCR government (1983-
1989) continued to foster the location of new industries beyond the GBA, but closed the 
internal market to imported industrial products. Overall, the national economy was highly 
unstable, which favored the consolidation of the larger industrial and financial holdings, able to 
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operate all along the country and hurt the smaller industrial establishments.  
Finally, the Peronist government that followed (1989-1999) stopped the promotion of 
national industrialization, re-opened the national market to imported industrial products, and 
consolidated the MercoSur trade. As a result, some new industrial investments returned to 
GBA, but did not refurbish old industrial infrastructures. Rather than centering in Buenos Aires’s 
market, it relocated where it could profit more from the MercoSur trade. As a consequence, the 
aged industrial establishments could hardly compete with the larger holdings, while the 
strategic value of the urban fringe declined once the City of Buenos Aires was no longer the 
primary market for national industrial production. By the end of the century, the municipalities 
of the GBA became one of the paradigmatic examples of the impact of the rapid change in 
national industrialization policies on Argentina, the most urbanized of the early industrializing 
countries of Latin America and became one of the worst examples of sustainable urban 
development (see Table 24 and Table 25). In this case, the succession of contradictory spatial 
projects pursued by the State, from the concentration of industries in Buenos Aires, to the 
deindustrialization of the metropolis, furthered the negative impacts of an economy adverse to 
the interests of the majority of the numerous small entrepreneurs.  
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TABLE 24 
EVOLUTION OF URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE 1991-2001 
 
 Argentina Brazil Chile 
Area (sq. km) 2,800,000 8,500,000 756,600 
Population (in millions in 2001) 37,478 172,564 15,397 
Urban Population as % of total 88.3 81.7 86 
Urban Open unemployment rate in 2001 17.4 6.2 9.1 
Variation in Urban Open unemployment rate 1991-01* 14.8 -0.1 -2.6 
 
* Urban Open unemployment rate in 1991 in Argentina was 2.6, in Brazil 6.3, and in Chile 11.7. 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on Nicola Phillips. The Southern Cone Model. The Political Economy of 
Regional Capitalist Development in Latin America. Routledge, 2004). 
 
 
 
TABLE 25 
DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED POPULATION BETWEEN 25 AND 59 YEARS OLD BY SECTOR 
OF ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, AND CHILE URBAN AREAS in 1990-9 
 
IN PERCENTAGES Argentina Brazil Chile 
Industry and Construction 24.8 29.2 32 
Retail and Trade 20.6 15.8 19 
Energy, Transport, and Communications 10.8 6.6 9.4 
Financial, Business, and Insurance Services 21.1 5 8.5 
Government, social, community and personal services 32.8 43.3 31.1 
 
VARIATION 1999-0 Argentina Brazil Chile 
Industry and Construction -5 -3 -4 
Retail and Trade 2 1 0 
Energy, Transport, and Communications 2 -1 1 
Financial, Business, and Insurance Services 3 1 -1 
Government, social, community and personal services -2 2 4 
 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on Nicola Phillips. The Southern Cone Model. The Political Economy of 
Regional Capitalist Development in Latin America. Routledge, 2004). 
 
By the year 2000, Buenos Aires presented the worst social indicators of its history, a 
myriad of empty industrial establishments, and a growing population of poor residents. Poverty 
in Greater Buenos Aires was the result of poor migrants, inefficient infrastructure, 
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unemployment, and in the 1990s, declining wages. Briefly, the historical sequence was as 
follows: In the late 1970s, when the dictatorship regime aimed to cast the City of Buenos Aires 
as the example of Argentinean development, it razed all slum from the city proper, and 
relocated its residents all along the urban fringe. In the 1980s, even after the decay of industry 
triggered unemployment among the urban wage-workers, the flow of people into the city in 
search of jobs continued. Because urban infrastructure in the urban fringe was still lagging, 
many of the newcomers located in informal settlements. By the 1990s, even if the exploitation 
of natural resources was the base of Argentina’s insertion into the international economy, the 
urban environment continued to receive the bulk of economic migrants. Accordingly, 
population growth in the city kept its pace, regardless of raising unemployment and declining 
wages. Eventually, as provincial immigrants and urban workers integrated the suburban poor, 
the poverty of the GBA was meaningful to both the rural and industrial societies.  
From the beginnings of national industrialization, all national governments were well 
aware of the socially destabilizing potential of this mass of urban poor surrounding the capital 
city in the most densely populated region of the nation. As proved by the Peronist electoral 
success of 1987, the political management of the urban suburbs was fundamental in tilting the 
national political balance. In the 1990s, as the poverty of the suburbs deepened, the national 
presidency devised new ways to deal with the unsettling consequences of this structural 
mismatch between an overpopulation of job seekers around urban centers lacking 
infrastructure, and the decay of national industries. Since controlling much of the nation’s poor 
required assuaging the demands of the urban periphery, once more, management of the 
metropolis merged with national politics.  
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At all times, national institutions had to deal with Greater Buenos Aires through a 
number of ad-hoc measures. First, the dictatorship regime of the 1960s skewed the distribution 
of legislative representation and fiscal monies against the Province of Buenos Aires, the 
stronghold of the Peronist force. Then, the dictatorship regime of the 1970s promoted a top-
down, non-participatory decentralization of planning powers from the province to the 
municipalities that halted the development of suburban infrastructure. Next, the Peronists of 
the 1990s, who were in charge of both the Argentine presidency and the Province of Buenos 
Aires government, relied on an ad-hoc law that gave the PBA governor direct access to national 
monies to use at his full discretion in the provision of social assistance to the poor living in the 
municipalities of the GBA. As a consequence, even if decentralized, the municipal governments 
of the urban fringe were further disempowered. While they could do little to modify national 
industrialization policies or to provide missing infrastructure, they suffered the direct 
consequences of a growing metropolitan population. As we have seen in the preceding section, 
this prompted municipal governments to relax zoning codes as a way to foster local 
investments. Because, given the overall deindustrialization of the metropolis, one of the few 
investors interested in occupying these undeveloped peripheral lands next to the City of 
Buenos Aires were the developers of gated communities. This island of wealth grew amidst 
lagging suburbs, and hence social contrasts in the urban fringe were more dramatic than ever 
before.  
The interwoven unfolding of the national and urban development trajectories portrays 
the destabilizing consequences of an imbalanced national geography, which eventually 
undermined municipal governance and the basis for a more even distribution of development 
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throughout the nation. While the core of industrial production moved away from Buenos Aires, 
Buenos Aires still retained the majority of the working people and, eventually, of 
unemployment. Ironically, this new spatial outlay diminished the economic relevance of the 
metropolis even if it increased its political relevance. The more consequential the poverty of 
Greater Buenos Aires became for national elections, the fewer rights GBA residents and 
municipal governments received and the more obscure the management of social aid became. 
Besides the political manipulation of urban poverty in national politics, this also reveals some of 
the consequences of the different endurance of economic and spatial transformations. The 
changes in the model of economic accumulation soon made physical scenarios obsolete, in this 
case, the multitude of small industrial establishments that surrounded the City of Buenos Aires 
at the south and west. Ideally, democratic practices should foster policies that buffer and 
compensate the cost of transformation, at least when they affect a sizeable amount of the 
population. Yet, this is hardly the case when governments profit from concentrated poverty. On 
such occasions, governments are likely to perpetuate regional imbalances through top-down 
mechanisms, such as ad-hoc and discretionary measures, rather than through truly 
empowering, bottom-up devices. Also, those suffering material poverty tend to value more the 
economic opportunities of the present rather than the potential growth of the future. Thus, 
they support those governments offering immediate alleviation to their pressing material 
needs. In the next section, we will explore how this social scenario affected the structure of 
society and promoted municipal government practices that ended deepening social contrasts 
within the urban fringe.  
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SECTION III  
NEW PRODUCTION SYSTEMS AND URBAN CLASSES IN THE METROPOLIS  
How did the changes in the dynamic of national production transform the social structure of 
the suburbs?  
 
“It is the main proposition of this essay that in a number of important 
historical instances, industrialization processes, when launched at length in a 
backward country, showed considerable differences, as compared with more 
advanced countries, not only with regard to the spread of development (the rate 
of industrial growth), but also with regard to the productive and organizational 
structures of industry which emerged from those processes. […]In addition, the 
intellectual climate within which industrialization proceeded, its ‘spirit’ or 
‘ideology’ differed considerably among backward countries.”  
Alexander Gerschenkron. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962.  
 
“It was common sense that our entrepreneurial leadership should have 
defended us; that they should have been the first to complain about what was 
going on with Argentine industries. But they did nothing. They did not say a word. 
No one did absolutely anything. […] So what could the owner of an isolated, 
ignored, petty firm of San Martin, La Matanza, or Lomas de Zamora [Greater 
Buenos Aires] do? Not even in the municipal office would someone listen to him, 
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and if they did, what could a municipal bureaucrat do?  
Tortosa, Roberto. La Argentina Indefensa y la Destrucción de la Industria 
Nacional. Buenos Aires, 2002.  
 
 
In the previous chapter, we traced how national development policies affected the 
development of the metropolitan fringe. In brief, Argentine governments’ attitude towards the 
pro-Peronist workers shaped much of the national industrial policies, leading to the stagnation 
of the majority of the municipalities in Greater Buenos Aires, where most national industries 
were located. Certainly, urbanization without industrial growth is not an exclusive feature of 
this case. It has been noted in most Latin American countries, where the scarcity of 
opportunities outside urban nodes fostered a rural to urban migration flow (Di Tella, 1962; 
Castells, 1977; Portes, 1989). However, what is endogenous to this case is the way this 
geography was embedded with the political project of Peronism, and therefore of the anti-
Peronism. This binary dynamic implied that Peronism pushed for a protected industry 
depending on internal consumption, while opposing regimes were likely to allow the 
importation of industrial products that often harmed the urban industrial periphery.  
Nonetheless, protecting the national industries demanded increasing amounts of state 
resources and was ill-adapted to the new international dynamic. Even as the income of the 
majority of the citizens of Greater Buenos Aires were still dependent on these industries and, in 
the long run, all parties abandoned this project. That is, while the cost of running a protected 
economy was becoming unbearable and regressive by itself, the industries that were best fit to 
survive in a market economy were non-urban and concentrated in hands of a few. In practice, 
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this meant that too few industrialists held too much of national wealth, but not much of the 
national labor, and thus the majority of the workers were still dependent on Buenos Aires. In 
that scenario, a democratic state could hardly succeed in articulating social and economic goals, 
at least not as long as Greater Buenos Aires accounted for no less than a third of all Argentine 
voters. Nonetheless, the obsolescence of the industrial model in which Greater Buenos Aires 
thrived in the mid-century was undeniable. Hence, at all times, national governments had 
devised ad-hoc mechanisms to further their controls over the urban masses surrounding the 
Argentine national capital. For instance, the 1970s dictatorship regime coupled open economy 
with social repression, and the Peronist Menem relied on ad-hoc arrangement to dissuade 
social protests even though his overall scheme worsened the distribution of wealth.  
But what about the role of the entrepreneurs and the working masses of the urban 
periphery? How did the changes in the economic activities of Greater Buenos Aires affect each 
of these groups? And more consequential yet, how did the shifting centrality of Buenos Aires in 
the national economy influence the commitment of the industrialists to the development of 
Greater Buenos Aires? During the last thirty years, Greater Buenos Aires had shifted from being 
at the center of both large and small entrepreneurs’ unions and interests of the ‘working 
masses,’ to being the location of an obsolete industrial project on which millions of workers and 
small entrepreneurs still depended, but which failed to develop a political representation for its 
needs. In the following pages, I focus on why these groups did not develop these institutions, 
even after it was evident that they no longer counted with the protection of the state, Also, we 
explore how the lack of institutionalized ties between jurisdictions, workers, and small 
entrepreneurs, as well as among entrepreneurs themselves, factored into the decay of Greater 
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Buenos Aires, as it influenced the planning practices of its municipalities. Certainly, it allowed 
for the uneven geography of the periphery that materialized and perpetuated social contrasts, 
superimposing but failing to integrate the circuits behind wealth and poverty.  
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will present the industrial 
entrepreneurs of the urban periphery focusing on the increasing divergences between large 
and small entrepreneurs. Then, I will describe the transformations of the ‘working masses’ and 
how these relate to the decline of unions and thus, of political representation. Next, I locate 
these variations in the metropolitan geography of the 1990s. Lastly, I conclude with further 
integration of these social changes into an analytical model of the distribution of growth and 
poverty in the urban fringe.  
 
 
THE INDUSTRIAL ENTREPENEURS  
 
By the 1990s, the epicenter of industrial activities had shifted from the older southern 
and western industrial suburbs to the northern and far municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires, 
along the highway connecting the City of Buenos Aires with the Brazilian and Paraguayan 
MercoSur markets. The national policies influencing the location of industry and the terms of 
international trade have been one of the fundamental factors behind these changes in the 
industrial geography of Buenos Aires. In addition, the accumulated legacy of the dictatorship 
regime and the Peronist ad-hoc management of fiscal monies left the municipalities of GBA 
with few resources, overall disinvestment, and swelling poverty. But what role did the industrial 
entrepreneurs play in creating this geography? How did their internal diversity play out in the 
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increasing dismemberment of the metropolis in general and the industrial geography in 
particular?  
Firstly, national governments are not alien to the values and culture of the people they 
govern. The policies they implemented in each period responded to the needs of empowered 
groups within the local society. True, many industrial entrepreneurs have benefited from the 
1970s subsidies for industrial relocation (Azpiazu, and Basualdo, 1990), from the 1980s 
industrial policies (Ostiguy, 1990), and from the 1990s MercoSur agreements (Kosacoff, 2000). 
However, it is a mistake to imagine that the industrial owners constituted a homogeneous 
group with similar interests and needs. Even among those originally located in the urban 
periphery, there were major differences in their needs and development, which eventually 
determined their spatial mobility and political alignment. Some of them were able to enjoy the 
benefits of industrial relocation and changing terms of trade. Others have been unable to adapt 
to the new scenario and became trapped in a subsistence economy. These failing 
entrepreneurs have often stayed in the same suburban municipalities in which industries 
blossomed in the 1950s, which today constitutes the ‘Buenos Aires industrial cemetery’(Tortosa, 
2002).  
Much of this decline has been attributed to the effects of international trade and the 
1990s policies deregulating the economy. But as we dig deeper into the formation of the 
industries in Greater Buenos Aires, we may find that in their original social structure were the 
seeds for the stagnation of industrial development and the eventual concentration of industrial 
value into fewer hands.  
The deindustrialization of Buenos Aires began before the late 1970s, but it was not until 
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the PRN dictatorship that its decline became apparent. By favoring the importation of industrial 
products and the relocation of industrial establishments outside the traditional urban centers, 
the 1977-1983 dictatorship reinforced this tendency of declining industrialization and 
increasing urban unemployment. But these economic losses were not evenly distributed, and 
the policies of the PRN favored larger industrialists over small entrepreneurs and industrial 
workers (Azpiazu, 1985). Thus, at this moment the divergence of interests among the 
entrepreneurial groups, the unions, and the Peronists that had sustained the metropolitan 
growth of the 1960s began.  
During this period the Province of Buenos Aires lost 13% of its establishments,
 
but had a 
4% growth of industrial jobs51 (INDEC, 1985). While it is true that fewer establishments with 
more employees might signal plant optimization, this change was due to the policies of the 
19761982 dictatorship that pushed away industries from the metropolitan region. In the late 
1970s, the metropolis received less than a fifth of the national budget for industrial initiatives, 
in contrast with the 1950s, when the PBA and the CBA received more than half of these funds. 
In addition, because 20thArgentina did not achieve any genuine industrial growth during the 
last decades of the 20th century (Kosacoff, 2000), policies aiming to foster industrialization in 
the Provinces ended deindustrialization of the metropolis. When the PRN offered subsidies to 
industries located further than sixty kilometers from the urban core, it fostered the move of 
                                                          
51
 While it is true that all major industrial cities saw their number of establishments diminishing (Cordoba, Santa 
Fe, Mendoza), only Buenos Airesexperienced a diminution of industrial jobs (Mabel Manzanal and Alejandro 
Rofman. Las Economias Regionales de la Argentina. Crisis y Politicas de Desarrollo. Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de 
America Latina, 198). 
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industrial establishments beyond the traditional industrial suburbs52. However, since only large 
firms could afford the cost of relocation, small industries still populated suburban peripheries. 
This State subsidy modified industrial geography in the suburbs53.
 
By 1984, all major industrial 
suburbs (i.e. Avellaneda, General San Martín, Lomas de Zamora, Vicente Lopez, and San Isidro) 
had lost a significant number of industrial jobs. At the same time, Escobar and Pilar, which 
stand just beyond the 60-kilometer line, increased their industrial employment. As noted by 
Schvarzer (1987), in his study of Argentine industrialization:  
“It is enough to travel through some of the routes going away from the 
city to be able to observe the large enterprises and industrial parks clustered 
exactly at the boundaries of an imaginary circle of 60 kilometers radius.”  
Additionally, there was a qualitative change in the kind of industrial products favored, 
with industries based on the exploitation of raw products surpassing those considered labor-
intensive. Because the bulk of urban industries were labor-intensive, this shift was especially 
harmful to the economic livability of Greater Buenos Aires. During the 1970s, the top three 
industrial branches were petroleum, metals, and meatpacking, which accounted for a fifth of 
industrial value and a tenth of industrial labor. By 1984, car production displaced meatpacking, 
and metals decreased in importance while petroleum increased. Still, the three top added to 
about 20% of production value However, given their less labor-intensive nature –in particular, 
                                                          
52
 However, due to the decline of industrial production throughout the nation, between 1975-1985, the share of 
the national industrial value of Buenos Aires grew from 47.6% to 52.4% (INDEC, 1985). 
53
 National law 21608/77  
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petroleum – they employed only 6% of labor. As a result, the economic importance of the 
industries located in Greater Buenos Aires declined faster than its industrial workforce. At the 
same time, either because of the nature of the industry (i.e. petroleum) or their affiliation with 
larger industrial conglomerates, fewer enterprises accounted for a larger share of economic 
wealth, while waged workers dispersed in a myriad of small urban firms.  
The number of people living in Greater Buenos Aires kept growing regardless of the 
shrinking labor market (Bariffi, 1981). As I have explored in the previous chapter, the dispersion 
of the industry was promoted by all non-Peronist governments, who sought to de-concentrate 
the almost unconditionally pro-Peronist urban labor that surrounded the City of Buenos Aires. 
Even though they have attained different degrees of success regarding industrial relocation, 
neither of the industrial incentives have succeeded in halting the flow of new immigrants to the 
city. During the 1970s, urban population continued to grow at a 2.3% annual rate, while 
national population did at a 1.7% rate (Weaver, 1980). This urbanization trend continued its 
rate and location, and by the end of the century more than a third of all Argentines lived in the 
Buenos Aires conurbation (Escolar and Pirez, 2001).  
The added effect of continuing urbanization and the growth of non-urban industries 
changed the distribution of wealth in the nation, dividing sharply among the interests of small 
and large entrepreneurs. The smaller establishments of the urban belt declined and led to rising 
levels of unemployment, while industries based on natural resources blossomed. These non 
labor-intensive establishments, usually located outside the urban realms and employing 
relatively few workers, belonged to a few, large firms, thus skewing even further the 
distribution of resources. After the 1977-1982 dictatorship, about a third of all manufacturing 
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jobs from 1970 were lost and industrial wages were at their lowest level, about 30% less than in 
the mid1970s(Azpiazu et al, 2004). Moreover, industrial activity shrank to its pre-ISI levels, and 
accounted for only 22% of national GDP (Di Tella, and Dormbusch, 1989). At the same time, 
fewer enterprises accounted for a higher percentage of industrial value. These mismatches 
between industry and labor altered the fundamentals of social organization, mostly in ways 
that made it more difficult to supersede the social cost of declining resources. Upon the return 
of democracy, the tensions between the interests of the urban periphery and the national 
economy, between the structure of unions and of the actual labor, were a continuous source of 
conflict and social instability. As proven by the defeat of the UCR in the 1989 presidential 
election, a national project could not be sustainable if it did not accommodate the claims of 
Greater Buenos Aires.  
 
Differences among Industrial Entrepreneurs and the Urban Geography  
After 1983, when democracy returned to the country, the decadence of the suburbs had 
already begun. The aggregated impact of an obsolete industrial capacity, the inflow of displaced 
poor from the city’s core, and the decentralization of service provisions and land 
administration, left localities with few resources to generate alternative modes of 
development. Moreover, as these reforms were taking place under a dictatorship government, 
there was almost no room for these localities to pose their concerns. Still, it is fair to ask why no 
social claims have been articulated under regional organizations, a puzzling absence if we take 
into account that the GBA accounted for almost a third of the national population and half of its 
production value (Escolar and Pirez, 2001). Neither during the democratic years of the 1980s 
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and 1990s, nor during the 1976-83 period of State repression, had suburban localities managed 
to present their needs as a consolidated, strong voice in local politics.54
 
 
One of the possible causes for this silence is the internal diversity of the physical 
infrastructure of the urban fringe, which led to different needs throughout the periphery. How 
was the landscape of Greater Buenos Aires in 1983, when democracy returned? In the 
municipalities within 30 kilometers of the urban core, the grid and the infrastructure resembled 
those of the city itself: a monotonous extension of the Spanish squared block, although well-
served with electricity, paved streets, piped water, sewerage, and gas. In the northern 
municipalities of this region, the most affluent ones, residential land uses were most common  
(i.e. Vicente Lopez, and San Isidro). Conversely, the small industrial establishments of less than 
ten workers were typically located in the southern and western municipalities. A little further, 
but still within 60 kilometers of the city core (i.e. Escobar, Moron), the urban grid vanished, and 
clusters of houses and industrial establishments spread out along a vast territory lacking urban 
services. Outside of the small towns, private estates, some industrial establishments, and 
informal settlements usually occupied those lands next to the train tracks – – or the highway— 
leading to the downtown of the City of Buenos Aires. A little bit farther, beyond the imaginary, 
60-kilometer border that the dictatorship regime used to determine the limits of the 
metropolis, larger and newer industrial establishments took advantage of state incentives 
(Schvarzer, 1987). Across this territory, municipal boundaries were not evident, and the 
decentralization of planning capacities of 1977 was still an abstraction. Therefore, suburban 
                                                          
54
 Still, in spite of the severe State repression, other groups (i.e. union leaders) did manage to voice their concerns.  
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demands varied widely: while deindustrialization affected the usability of the industrial 
establishments of the closer municipalities, lack of infrastructure was the main problem for the 
other jurisdictions.  
The relocation of industrial establishments also affected their inner organization. It was 
clear that the geographical incentives and the difficult access to credit favored the 
concentration of wealth (Smith, 1989; Lewis, 1990, Peralta-Ramos, 1992; Kosacoff, 2000; Godio, 
2000; Azpiazu et al, 2004). As a result, it is surprising to learn that during the mid-80s both the 
smallest and the largest firms were shrinking, while the mid-sized ones were faring much 
better. In effect, by 1974, three-fourths of all industrial establishments employed less than five 
people, and produced 5% of all industrial value. Ten years later, they accounted for less than 
70% of all establishments, and contributed 3.5% of industrial value. At the other extreme, and 
during the same period, the 1% of all industrial establishments that employed more than 200 
people, lost almost a tenth of their employment share. While the first reduced their 
participation in the economy due to their lack of competitiveness, the latter one did due to 
increases in efficiency that allowed them to function with fewer workers.  
However, more germane to the fate of the suburbs, and hence to the metropolis, was 
the correlation between this geography and the social structure of industrial producers. In the 
same way that the urban fringe was hardly homogeneous, industrial entrepreneurs’ internal 
differences show them as a disjointed group of dissimilar concerns and aspirations. According 
to the 1981 Argentine industrial census, about half of all industrial establishments had no more 
than five employees and produced less than 3% of national industrial value. At the other end, 
only 5% of all establishments had more than a hundred employees and produced more than 
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70% of all industrial value. The rest of industrial production displayed a similar logic, as a large 
number of small establishments had proportionately low levels of production (INDEC, 2001).  
The implication of this imbalanced distribution in the geography of the urban periphery 
was that the municipalities that had the largest number of industrial establishments were the 
ones closer to the urban core. These municipalities had a myriad of industries that employed 
many laborers, albeit in smaller establishments. When the support for local industries halted, 
these entrepreneurs and their localities suffered most, as their sustainability depended 
exclusively on Buenos Aires’s consumption needs. However, the absence of a shared industrial 
agenda that represented the needs of all industrialists was not rare (Dorfman, 1983), nor was 
the lack of powerful alliances among the workers and owners of these small establishments. 
Simply put, there were many small industrialists employing a small fraction of labor, there were 
few large establishments occupying more than 60% of the industrial workforce, and hence, 
there was no strong, unified organization to voice the concerns of the declining industrial 
periphery of Greater Buenos Aires. In contrast, the larger firms that were already located 
outside the urban realm, or that had enough resources to afford relocating there, could take 
advantage of national incentives and were usually well-aligned with national politicians (Sabato, 
1991; see Table 26 and Figure 13).  
187 
 
 
TABLE 26 
PROPORTION OF WAGED WORKERS BY ESTABLISHMENT SIZE 1974-84 
 
 Percentage of Workers by Firm Size (Measure in Number if Workers(%) 
 All (number)  1 to 10 
1974 1,133,788 10 
1984 1,175,601 12 
1994 1,000,09 20 
Variation 1974-1994 -11% 100% 
 
Source: INDEC, 2001. Censo Industrial Argentino. Serie Histórica. 2001 
 
 
 
FIGURE 13 Relation Between Scale Of Industrial Establishment And Value Of Production  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INDEC, 2001. Censo Industrial Argentino. Serie Histórica. 2001. 
 
One of the practical consequences of this disproportion was that most union leaders 
emerged from large industrial enterprises, but most waged workers worked in smaller 
enterprises. As we shall learn soon, this mismatch negatively affected in the unions’ capacity to 
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represent the needs of the urban workers. Likewise, relevant industrialists’ voices came from 
the minority of economically powerful, but socially unrepresentative large companies, which 
were by and large located beyond the urban fringe. Moreover, as the national debts were 
crushing the economy, those industries limited to trade within the metropolis increasingly lost 
weight in national politics. Since smaller industrial establishments sold about 90% to the local 
market (Giacinti, 2001), their own sustainability and the one of the suburbs in which the 
establishments located was constantly in jeopardy. In contrast, the few exporting industries –
mostly the ones based on exploitation of raw materials – and the agro, increased their leverage, 
as they were the able to bring fresh financial resources to the country (Di Tella and Dormbusch, 
1989).  
 
Blurring Identities of Small Entrepreneurs  
Regardless of their low contribution to industrial value, small entrepreneurs make up 
the primary source of employment in the manufacturing sector and they account for the largest 
number of firms. Yet, they have shown little inclination to recognize themselves as part of a 
group, which could have led them to voice their concerns collectively. In contrast to the waged 
worker whose interests were advocated by the unions, and to the larger entrepreneur who had 
direct links with national powers (Sabato, 1990), the small entrepreneur remained an isolated 
figure. In truth, they had never acquired the economic transcendence to merit a careful look 
from the large investors or national economic policies, as the combined production accounts 
for less than 5% annually of all industrial value. On the other hand, in the last decades, they 
have become an impressively large share of Argentine entrepreneurs, as three out of four 
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industrial firms employ five people or less. Still, this group remains an elusive, undefined 
political force in the nation.  
In many senses, this surge of entrepreneurs was more the outcome of individual 
responses to deter national economic failure than to a Schumpeterian spirit. National 
industrialization policies both fostered and hindered the progress of the small entrepreneur. 
The high population concentration in Buenos Aires eased the distribution and lowered the costs 
of the small firm. In addition, even if declining, internal consumption was quite high, hence 
entrepreneurs profited even if they sold their products only within the metropolis. 
Nevertheless, as we have seen, the unevenness of Argentine developmental geography and the 
protection of internal consumption were unsustainable. Therefore, long-term credits fostering 
entrepreneurial activities were missing. Since little technological innovation and low 
specialization characterized the activity of the small enterprises, it is not strange that they had a 
low level of productivity and competitiveness (Yoguel, 1993). Moreover, they had very high 
mortality rates and the life span of these endeavors averaged five years or less (see Table 27, 
Table 28, and Table 29). Why, given such a dubious record of success, has the quantity of small 
firms continued to grow in the city?  
Small entrepreneurs were often the mirror image of unemployment and massive 
layoffs. Particularly in the 1990s, after the privatization of many of the state companies, the 
changes in labor regulations, and the fading strength of unions, many former waged workers 
launched their own commercial endeavors. The typical Argentine entrepreneur of the end of 
the twentieth century was a male between forty and sixty years of age, had his house and his 
business in Buenos Aires, and was paying high financial costs for the money he had borrowed 
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from private banks (about 27% annually). His firm typically employed two other people, who 
most likely were part of his family, and he sold his whole production, which was usually labor 
intensive55, to the local market (UIA, 1997). He might have been unemployed for a while, or he 
might have been a former state employee whose company had been privatized.  
Yet, more often than not, these small entrepreneurs did not solve, but only masked the 
problem of unemployment. As Enrique Rodriguez, the head of the national Ministry of Labor in 
1993, said:  
“People made the wrong investments with their voluntary retirement 
program; they had no guidance on how to invest. They were left to their own 
devices. It was the government role to be aware of what was going on, of 
thinking of alternative modes of production. Juicy compensation packages were 
misused in taxis that yielded nothing, in setting up small shops in places where 
cities were shrinking. Obviously, they were doomed to failure. In that sense, all 
the monies the State gave were wasted.”56
 
 
 
                                                          
55
 For that reason, many of the classic labor categories used to analyze industrialized societies, which point out a 
correlation between level of development and proportion of people employed in secondary and tertiary industries 
(see the classic book of Colin Clark, 1940. The Conditions of Economic Progress. London: McMillan) do not portray 
well the evolution of less industrialized societies. The Argentine case shows that level of industrialization might not 
be the consequence of technological progress and development of credit institutions, -one that would follow 
Alexander Gerschenkron’s historical development model (1962)-but the outcome of policy distortions. 
56
 Enrique Rodríguez. 1999. Interview in Santiago S Gonzalez and Fabian Basoer. El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de 
Menem. Buenos Aires: El Corregidor. 
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TABLE  27 
FINANCIAL COST AND SOURCES OF CREDIT BY NUMBER OF WORKERS (1984) 
Financial Cost and Sources of Credit by Number of Workers in 1994? 
 
 Industrial Establishment by Number of Workers (%) 
 1 to 10 11 to 50  51 to 100   101 or more 
Public Banks Credit (%) 30 45 45 45 
Private Banks Credit (%) 45 40 44 55 
Other Sources of Credit (%) 25 15 11 5 
Annual Financial Cost 26 26 21 11 
 
Source: Adapted from Miguel Angel Giacinti. 2001. PyMES: Un desafío de la Argentina Visión sobre el desarrollo. 
Economía Regional y Pautas Culturales. Buenos Aires: Ediorial Biblios.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE 28: 
CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF JOBS BY FIRM ANTIQUITY 1995-2000 
 
 Firms Antiquity in Years 
Variation 1992-2000 (%) Less than 2.5 2.5 to 5  6 to 10 11 to 25 More than 25   
New Jobs 46 14 11 8 5 
Lost Jobs 18 20 18 -13 11 
Net Result 28 -6 -7 -5 -6 
 
Source: Victoria Castillo, et. al. 2002. “Dinámica del Empleo y Rotación de las Empresas: La Experienc ia en el 
Sector Industrial de Argentina desde Mediados de los años Noventa.” Serie Estudios y Perspectivas. 9. Buenos 
Aires: Oficina de UN-CEPAL.  
 
 
TABLE 29: 
CREATION AND DESTRUCTION OF JOBS BY FIRM SIZE 1995-2000 
 
 Firms by Number of Workers 
Variation 1992-2000 (%) 1 to 5 11 to 50* 51 to 100* 101 or more* 
New Jobs 24 16 11 7 
Lost Jobs 26 17 13 10 
NET RESULT -2 -1 -2 -3 
 
*In this study, ‘11 to 50’ firms are those with annual sales of $3,000,000 or less, the ‘51 to 100’between 
$3,000,000 and 18,000,000, and the ‘101 or more,’ more than $18,000,000. 
 
Source: Victoria Castillo, et. al. 2002. “Dinámica del Empleo y Rotación de las Empresas: La Experiencia en el 
Sector Industrial de Argentina desde Mediados de los años Noventa.” Serie Estudios y Perspectivas. 9. Buenos 
Aires: Oficina de UN-CEPAL. 
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The combination of enterprises’ short lifespan, an organization based on family ties, and 
short entrepreneurial experience might have contributed to the low level of political 
association among small urban industrialists. Moreover, it was a common practice among these 
entrepreneurs to navigate the frequent Argentine economic crisis by switching back and forth 
between producing and commercializing goods, according to the exchange tariffs of the 
moment (Johns, 1992). Since the early periods of industrialization, smaller entrepreneurs had 
little commitment to their industrial activities, and they often took advantage from the 
distribution circuits they knew as manufacturers to commercialize foreign goods (Diaz 
Alejandro, 1970). This practice became popular in the 1990s, when the strong local currency 
and the deregulation of the national tariffs and labor market encouraged the growth of tertiary 
over secondary activities in the city.  
“In the whole world, there were less expensive prices than ours. 
Sometimes, someone here –in the neighborhood-went on a business trip and 
bought more stuff here than what they sold there. And it was just like that, the 
industrial-man became a man of commerce. If it was not tragic it would be 
comic. Whenever we wanted to expand our industry beyond our boundaries we 
transformed industrial owners into store owners.”57
 
 
As Torcuato Di Tella (1962) noted, in late-developing, Latin American societies, the 
growth of tertiary occupation was not linked to an evolution of economic activities but to the 
mismatch between economic and population growth.  
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 Tortosa, Roberto. 2002. La Argentina Indefensa y la Destruccion de la Industria Nacional. Buenos Aires. p. 44. 
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But much of the weakness of these small enterprises was due to their absolute 
dependency on Buenos Aires’s consumption. Even in the late 1990s, when the MercoSur was 
quite consolidated, small entrepreneurs sold about 98% of their production within the city (UIA, 
1997). Since local production could not compete with the inflow of imported goods, these 
enterprises were in particular distress when the economy was open. During the late seventies 
an inflow of imported goods hurt those enterprises relying on local technology, while the 
dollar-peso peg of the 1990s worsened labor-intensive productions (see Table 30). The high 
cost of local labor was particularly adverse for the urban industries whose plant size was far 
from optimal international standards58 (Yogel, 2000). Furthermore, some local industrial-
financial conglomerates had been able to take advantage of the strong currency to update their 
technology (Kosacoff, 2000), hence further diminishing the competitiveness of the smaller 
enterprises in the local market.  
 
TABLE 30 
EVOLUTION OF LABOR COST AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS IN MANUFACTURING 
1990-1995 (AVERAGE ANNUAL CHANGES IN PERCENTAGES) 
 
 Argentina Brazil Chile Mexico 
Annual changes in real annual labor cost in USD 14.4 8.5 9.4 1.5 
Productivity 7 7.5 3.2 5.2 
Difference between productivity and labor cost -6.5 -0.9 -5.7 3.6 
 
Sources: Victor Tokman. 2002. “Jobs and Solidarity:Challenges for Labor Market Policy in Latin America”. In 
Models of Capitalism. Lessons for Latin America. Ed. Evelyne Huber. PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.  
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 From their outset, smaller entrepreneurs targeted their business to the local market. As one of them observed: 
“The one who says that small entrepreneurs don’t invest in their own companies has no idea about what an 
industry is. It is impossible to stay alive without updating the technology. Now, one thing is to update and the other 
is to buy new machinery every day. The small entrepreneur moves with no rush and no pause, but he has to be –at 
least-at the level of the local competitors” Roberto Tortosa. 2002. La Argentina Indefensa y la Destruccion de la 
Industria Nacional. Buenos Aires. p.31. 
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Given the ease with which they could switch activities, most successful industrial 
entrepreneurs tended to be less vocal about defending small industries. Overall, there was an 
evident absence of organizational structure, both as a collective organization as well as in 
connection with the national and local authorities.  
“It was common sense that our entrepreneurial leadership should have 
defended us, that they should have been the first to complain about what was 
going on with Argentine industries but they did nothing. They did not say a word. 
No one did absolutely anything. […] So what could the owner of an isolated, 
ignored, petty firm of San Martin, La Matanza, or Lomas de Zamora [Greater 
Buenos Aires] could do? Not even in the municipal office, would someone listen to 
him, and if they did, what could a municipal bureaucrat do?59
 
 
Even though some of these small entrepreneurs found a way to profit from the rapidly 
changing national economic policies, the closing of these ubiquitous urban manufacturing 
establishments impacted the life of their localities beyond the industrial production. The urban 
industrial establishments of Greater Buenos Aires, typically in the southern and western 
municipalities bordering the City of Buenos Aires (i.e. Avellaneda, Tres de Febrero, San Martin) 
were an integral part of the life of these localities. The tight fabric of the city was mirrored by a 
tight net of socio-economic relations, which even when economically inefficient, provided 
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subsistence to a large part of the suburban population, precisely those who would be rapidly 
impoverished during the 1980s and 1990s.  
“It is impressive the number of people depending on these little 
enterprises. These are not only those who participate in their industrial trade, or 
those who provide them with some services. It goes far beyond that. It includes 
the delis, the little food shops, the man who works preparing sandwiches for the 
lunch break. […] All of them were waiting for those who come at 6 am to work 
here.”60
 
 
So when these establishments closed, or when they were turned into warehouses for 
imported industrial goods, their suburban surroundings began their stagnation. In any case, 
small industrialists did not develop a lasting attachment either among themselves or with their 
neighboring localities. Increasingly during the 1980s and 1990s, when the decadence of the 
industrial suburbs was most evident, those who could afford to moved either to the capital city,  
or to a gated community (Svampa, 2001). If they had less capital, they were likely to become 
independent workers in the service sector, trapped in a short-term survival economy61,
 
and 
merged in a fuzzily defined middle class (D. Davis, 2004)62. The continuous decline in the 
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 Roberto Tortosa,. 2002. La Argentina Indefensa y la Destruccion de la Industria Nacional. Buenos Aires. p 24. 
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 For an interesting cross-country approach to this issue in urban Latin American in the 1970s, see Castells, 1977. 
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 It has been argued that a cause behind this lack of organization was that the majority of urban industrialists 
were either immigrants or first generations natives. Hence, they had little proclivity to involve themselves in long 
term projects or political initiatives, as they preferred to take care of their immediate individual interests (Diaz 
Alejandro, 1970; Jhons, 1992). In defense of this idea, we can point out the notoriously consistent coincidence 
between a higher-than-average percentage of overseas immigrants and an intense industrial activity. This suggests 
that many of the newcomers initiated their own entrepreneurial activities in the suburban jurisdictions. Still, 
immigration per se cannot be the only explanatory variable for the lack of cohesion of small entrepreneurs, as it is 
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number of people absorbed by the manufacturing sector since 1960 along with the steep 
growth in the employment share of the so-called services occupations did not signal the 
advancement of the economy, as it might have done in the development trajectory of first 
industrialized nations (World Bank, 1985)63.  
Taken as a whole, it seems that this populous group of small urban industrialists was far 
too diverse, too desperate, or too disengaged from industrial activities to develop meaningful 
institutions of common representation. Overall, the absence of mutual and effective 
identification ties between jurisdictions and small entrepreneurs, and among entrepreneurs 
themselves, was one of the deep, long-standing, factors in the decay of Greater Buenos Aires. 
This condition had influenced suburban development since the 1970s, and even more in the 
1990s, when the MercoSur, the gated communities, and new institutional configurations 
changed the geographical balance of the suburbs.  
 
Shifting Strategies of Large Entrepreneurs  
What about the role of the larger, most powerful entrepreneurs in the development of 
Greater Buenos Aires? Why have they not opposed the industrial decline of the periphery? This 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
also true that there were immigrants in other occupations that managed to have certain institutional 
representation. For example, nonnative low-skilled workers were identified with unions’ demands, and some large 
industrial owners, who become part of the industrial elite, were of foreign origin (Guy, 1984). Therefore, it is more 
likely that the individualistic apolitical nature of the small entrepreneur was the outcome of combining the self-
image of the man who believes his progress depends on personal capacity (Mafud, 1985). This ideology might have 
been stronger among those coming from European nations, with the absence of external political forces that 
would tailor the identity of this group. The appeal to the small entrepreneur was not, before or after the return of 
democracy in1983, -part of the political appeals. This is not to deny that the Conservador and the Radical Parties 
had targeted their discourses to the middle classes. However, they were not identifying it with an entrepreneurial 
class. 
63
 In this category, we include: Commerce, Transportation, Finance, and Personal and Professional Services. 
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is especially puzzling, as they had a tradition of association and participation in the public life. 
This is not to say that they constituted a homogeneous group. To the contrary, internal 
divisions among them in subjects of national development policies were deep and 
consequential to the whole urban, and even national, development. But in spite of those 
divisions, or maybe because of them, they recognized themselves as a group of specific political 
and economic interest, and acted accordingly. Moreover, powerful entrepreneurs had a long 
history of close association with the national government, and many of them were able to trace 
their connections back to the national governing elites of the early 1950s, if not before (Sabato, 
1991; Lewis, 1990).  
To answer this question, we must understand first that large entrepreneurs’ economic 
fate was not bound to the consumption needs of Buenos Aires in the same way that smaller 
entrepreneurs were. Hence, they could follow, or promote, national production models of 
varying geography, like exporting oil from the southern Patagonian provinces, minerals from 
the Northern Provinces, or manufacturing car parts to sell in the MercoSur markets. In a sense, 
this case seems to be the inverse of Logan & Molotch’s ‘Growth Machine.’ (Logan and Molotch, 
1987). Here, the middle and lower income households are less likely to move, and thus their 
income depends more on the economy of the metropolis while the larger capitalists are less 
invested in the fate of the local economy (Kosacoff, 2000; Kulfas, 2000). The point here is that, 
by having the ability to diversify their economic activities, they did have far more alternatives 
than just selling and producing for the Buenos Aires market. True, the open-import policies of 
the 1976-81 years put most of the national industry in jeopardy, and some large firms went 
bankrupt at the time (Ostiguy, 1990). But the strategies needed to survive in this new economic 
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scenario, like being engaged in exporting activities or independent from national credit 
markets, were almost exclusive of large enterprises. In the Argentina of the 1980s, solving these 
needs entailed being engaged in the exploitation of natural resources in which the country has 
an advantage, such as petroleum, non-ferrous metals, and agricultural products (Kosacoff, 
2000); and expanding into financial activities, thus having access to cheaper and more 
predictable credit markets (and often engaging in financial speculation) (Bisang, 2000). 
Whatever the case, it was patent that none of these models would fit the small or middle size 
enterprises. First, ownership of Argentine natural resources was highly uneven. Less than 3% of 
all holdings accounted for more than half of all land tenures (Diaz Alejandro, 1970; Lewis, 1990; 
Brasky and Gelman, 2001). Likewise, financial activities required substantial liquid capital at a 
time when credit was particularly expensive.  
Not surprisingly, this new scenario favored further wealth concentration, as only large 
firms had the means to profit from it. It was then that the current reconfiguration of firms 
engaged in industrial production began. Besides the widening gap between the value of large 
enterprises and that of all the others64,
 
there were two distinguishable groups within large 
enterprises. On one side, there were those who resisted the deregulation of import/export 
tariffs and the deregulation of labor markets. These firms still depended on the productive 
capacities of the State. Likely, they depended on State subsidies or their profit came from 
selling goods to State-owned enterprises (Acuna, 1986; Di Tella, 1989), or to local consumers 
who depended on state-regulated wages. On the other side were those enterprises that 
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 To define large enterprises, I used the criteria of the 1974 Economic Census, which defined them as those 
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managed to expand their activities beyond their traditional practices. Joint ventures among 
already large, consolidated firms embraced added financial capabilities to their industrial ones 
(Dorfman, 1983; Sabato, 1991; Azpiazu et al, 2004). The success of this later strategy was 
impressive; the economic census of the last decade shows these firms growing their market 
share amidst an overall decline in industrial activity.  
Typically, a conflictive relationship between the agricultural and the industrial sectors 
characterized Argentine production dynamics (Diaz Alejandro, 1970; D. Davis, 2004). By the 
1980s, when many of the national conglomerates had profits from both industrial and 
agricultural activities, it would be more accurate to divide economic forces between those who 
aimed for open economy, and those who advocated for State policies protecting local industry. 
To understand this better, it is important to recall what kind of industrial expansion preceded 
the 1970s de-industrialization trend. During the late 1940s and 1950s, when industrial growth 
was at its peak, improving technological capabilities was not the main source of revenue. 
Rather, a myriad of small, labor-intensive, low-competition firms accounted for the bulk of 
industrial enterprises (Weaver, 1980; Amsden, 2001). Lacking credit or capital, these small firms 
had little capacity to invest in innovation or even buy up-to-date machinery (UN, ECLA, 1959). 
On top of this, industrial policies of those years tended to favor national self-sufficiency over 
economic efficiency (Kosacoff, 2000). Therefore, the majority of Argentine industries were unfit 
to compete internationally. Hence, they were fully dependent on national consumption.  
In many ways, the decline of Greater Buenos Aires was the outcome of the mismatch 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
employing 100 or more waged workers.  
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between its economic relevance within and outside the nation. While this region employed the 
largest share of the population, it has little relevance to national exports. Perhaps, one of the 
worst consequences of the dependency of national industry on state protection was that it 
never strengthened its exporting capacities and then allowed the primary activities, such as 
agriculture exploitation and mineral extraction, to keep exerting its influence on national 
development policies. Since the ownership of these natural resources was very concentrated, 
this practice was rarely conducive to social distribution policies.  
Why was the capacity to export so relevant, when these exporting industries accounted 
for a smaller share of national GDP and employed fewer people than the industrial sector? 
Because these economic activities could compete in international markets, they could bring 
fresh capital to the country. In that way, the influence of these exporting groups grew at the 
pace of the swelling national debt, as Argentina’s economy needed even more the inflow of 
foreign currency in order to balance its national deficit (Dormbusch, 1989). By the early 1980s, 
soy, wheat, and corn were still the basis of the majority of Argentina’s industrial exports, while 
these three accounted for a quarter of all exported goods (Manzanal, and Rofman, 1989; Gatto 
and Quintar, 1985). In the 1990s, with the exception of automobiles, only those industries 
dependent on agricultural production or mineral exploitation increased their exportation 
(Baumann, 2002; Lavagna, 1994). The dollar-peso peg made local labor costs too expensive to 
compete with those of other South American countries, such as Brazil or Mexico, thus further 
empowering the exporting industries based on the exploitation of natural resources in the 
national political scene (Bouzas, 1994).  
One fundamental problem for governing the metropolis and the nation was that 
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although most households depended on the urban economy, the industries based on natural 
resources were the most powerful sector of the economy. More than thirty years after the 
Argentine ISI project began, trade based on natural resources was still sustaining Argentina’s 
economy (Peralta Ramos, 1992)65.
 
This situation factored in the growing gap between the 
economic conditions of the City of Buenos Aires and those of the municipalities of Greater 
Buenos Aires. As the CBA concentrated the financial activities of the country, its prosperity was 
assured regardless of the nature of the activity originating the investment capital. Real estate, 
services, and banking blossomed in the CBA throughout the 1990s (INDEC, 2001). Conversely, 
the economy of the GBA did depend on the profitability of the manufacturing sector, and thus 
it experienced unprecedented levels of unemployment and overall economic decline.  
But how did this historical tension within the Argentine society between the industrial 
and the rural sectors translate to the world of global capital? In which ways did it impact the 
Buenos Aires of the 1990s? Towards the end of the century, one could no longer distinguish 
clearly between the profits originated by investments in the primary or in the secondary sector, 
as more large holdings were expanding their businesses across both fields (Azpiazu, 2004). But 
by then, it was patent that local industry dependent on State subsidies was no longer 
sustainable. On the international front, there were mounting pressures to open local markets, 
and within Argentina there was neither the consensus, nor the funds, to keep on running an 
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 The rural sector used its political advantage relentlessly to challenge UCR policies in the early 1980s that aimed 
to protect the local industries by capturing the gains of agricultural exports. As expressed by the then leader of the 
Argentine Rural Society, Guillermo Alchourón: “The rural sector has been left out, because it is inadmissible that an 
economic program is being conceived and implemented with the participation of some industrial leaders of certain 
sectors of the economic activity and with total oblivion of the agricultural sector” (Guillermo Alchourón. In Clarin, 
October 4. 1988; Also quoted in Acuna, 1995. p. 335) 
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inefficient industry. However, most of the industrial structure of the country was unprepared 
for the changes that international competition would introduce. On one hand, smaller 
industrialists still lacked the technology, credit systems, and experience to successfully compete 
with the cheaply manufactured products that flew into Argentina’s markets. On the other, the 
larger ones were able to profit from this new scenario by expanding their companies into 
conglomerates that had assets in the primary, secondary, and even financial, sectors.  
Until the 1980s, entrepreneurs’ preference for a more or less protected industry seems 
to have emerged from the nature of the market they served rather than from the size of their 
capital, as there were large capitalists defending both models. On one side, there were those 
groups that had grown during the 1950s, by providing goods and services to nationally owned 
companies. They resisted any downsizing of the State, claiming it was for the defense of the 
national industry, and the (Peronist) unions66.
 
The majority of the small establishments of 
Greater Buenos Aires, which sold to local markets, aligned themselves to this model. They 
favored higher wages that could sustain local consumption, and rejected the importation of 
manufactured products, as their small scale and outdated equipment did not allow them to 
compete successfully against these. In opposition to this stance, a number of large economic 
groups pushed for stringent fiscal rules, no state controls on market prices, and more state 
controls on labor organizations. In general, these industrialists belonged to the oldest national 
elites (Ostiguy, 1990), and did not depend on national subsidies or consumption for their 
survival. Usually, their fortunes were based on ownership of natural resources and maintaining 
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a certain level of autonomy over their financial activities (Peralta Ramos, 1992) and quite 
independent from the fate of Greater Buenos Aires.  
However, in the 1990s, when Menem’s government finally deregulated many of its 
controls on the industry and labor markets, all large capitalists tended to converge on the same 
model. In both types of companies, i.e. those that had enjoyed State subsidies (e.g. Perez 
Companc, Bridas, Techint, and CIPAL), as well as those supporting fewer state interventions on 
the economy (e.g. Bunge & Born, Quilmes, Alpargatas), the trend towards diversifying industrial 
holdings was fully consolidated, thus integrating industrial production with financial institutions 
(Bisang, 2000; De Pablo, 1990). Many of these firms had begun their rapid growth before, 
during the 1970s PRN regime, when they had preferential access to credits and state subsidies, 
as well as less competition due to the flight of many foreign companies that operated in 
Argentina (Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1989; Smith, 1989), and were then in good shape to take 
advantage of the new opportunities that international markets offered (see Table 31 and Table 
32). What is more, in many cases, Argentina’s economic uncertainty facilitated their expansion, 
since it effaced the competition of both the smaller entrepreneurs who lacked the capital to 
survive a national economic crisis, and the international investors who left the country given its 
high level of risk. Thus, as these large holdings expanded, they lowered their costs, improved 
their output, captured a larger share of the national market, and eventually performed outside 
of national boundaries (i.e. Bunge & Born, Techint) (Ostiguy, 1990; Acuña, 1995).  
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TABLE 31 
ARGENTINE EXPORTS BY TYPE OF PRODUCT AND FIRM SIZE IN 2000 IN % 
 
Type of Products Large Firms* Medium Firms Small Firms 
Primary and Natural Resources Intensive (a) 74 46 40 
Labor Intensive (b) 5 16 19 
Scale Intensive (c) 15 14 14  
Highly Specialized and R&D (d) 6 24 27 
% of Total Argentine Exports 91 8 1 
 
Large Firms are those exporting more than 3,000,000 USD per year, medium are those exporting more than 
400,000 and less than 3,000,000 USD per year, and small are those exporting less than $400,000 but more than 
10,000 USD per year. Firms with exporting values below 10,000 USD are not considered in this chart. 
 
(a) Vegetables, fruits, cereals, meats, woods, minerals, petroleum. 
(b) Tools, textiles, furniture, shoes, printed matters 
(c) Pulp, cement, basic metals. 
(d) Machinery, instruments, chemical products, software. 
 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on Gustavo Svarzman.“Cadenas Productivas y Exportación Pyme. De las 
Ventajas Comparativas a la Competitividad Sistémica”. Ministerio de Economía y Producción de la Republica 
Argentina. Subsecretaria de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa y Desarrollo Regional, 2001.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 32 
EVOLUTION OF EXPORTING CAPACITY IN 1950-2001 AND NATURE OF INDUSTRIAL EXPORT 
IN 2001 IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO AND THE U.S. 
 
 % of variation 1950-2001 
(in value of total national exports) 
% of export of basic products* over 
total exports in 2001 
Argentina 230 43 
Brazil 495 31 
Chile 520 39 
Mexico 4519 6 
United States 863 13 
 
*Primera Transformacion 
Source: Author’s extrapolation based on Gustavo Svarzman.“Cadenas Productivas y Exportación Pyme. De las 
Ventajas Comparativas a la Competitividad Sistémica”. Ministerio de Economía y Producción de la Republica 
Argentina. Subsecretaria de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa y Desarrollo Regional, 2001. 
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Then again, the convergence of interests of the primary and secondary sectors did not 
translate into better social outcomes, at least not with regard to the fate of Greater Buenos 
Aires. As the ownership of these larger holdings was concentrated in fewer hands, increases in 
efficiency not improved social inequalities, but had furthered income gaps within the society. In 
a way, it was the capacity of the largest holdings to end their dependency on the State that 
precipitated the decadence of the State-owned companies (Gonzalez Fraga, 1999). That is, once 
the earnings of large holdings allowed these companies to survive regardless of the fate of 
State companies, they began supporting extensive privatization of the State’s holdings. 
 
In the 1990s, larger entrepreneurs found alternative markets for their productions, 
mostly within the MercoSur markets. As we shall soon see, the consolidation of the MercoSur 
shifted their interest from the wellbeing of Buenos Aires consumers to the overall stability of 
the local economy. Eventually, the original coalition of interests among some large 
entrepreneurs with state subsidies, unions, and small industrialists that had sustained the 
growth of Greater Buenos Aires, was no longer functional. The larger entrepreneurs were 
increasingly independent from the decadent national markets while the smaller ones and the 
workers remained dependent. At this point, the problem of adequate political representation 
of the needs of Greater Buenos Aires became evident in its continuous decline. But, while the 
most powerful capitalists of Argentina were oblivious to the fate of the municipalities of 
Greater Buenos Aires, why did the unions that represented the workers, most of whom were 
living in GBA, abandon GBA as well?  
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THE WORKING MASSES AND THE CITY  
While capital owners are quite capable of moving their assets according to their needs, 
this is hardly the case of the workers. This example of the ‘flows of capital’ (D. Harvey, 1982) 
can explain the changes in the relation between the industrialist and Greater Buenos Aires. But  
1 
Moreover, during the1990s sweeping privatization process, these national holdings were often 
collaborating with international companies to buy state assets (Abadia and Spiller, 1999; Galiani 
et al, 2005), hence becoming active participants in the inflow of these investments to the 
county. Moreover, many of these holdings –which had extensive experience and contacts 
within State companies-were the ones who later acquired the large state companies.  
what happened with the unions, with the institutions representing the millions of workers still 
living in GBA? Taking into account that these ‘working masses’ had been the foundation of the 
Peronist party, why did the overwhelmingly Peronist unions fail to defend the interests of the 
GBA? Why, in the 1990s, when a Peronist was in office, did the government push for those 
policies that harmed the economic sustainability of the workers in GBA?  
From the outset, the industrial workers were highly visible in Greater Buenos Aires. The 
so-called ‘working masses’ have acquired a strong presence in the national imagination after 
the carefully crafted Peronist rhetoric. Since the beginnings of his political career, Juan 
Domingo Perón intertwined the history of his party and that of the urban industrial workers, a 
link that he institutionalized when, during his presidency, he subsidized national industries 
while he also sponsored industrial unions (Turner and Miguens, 1983). By the mid-century, the 
Peronist state wore two hats at the same time: it was both owner of industrial companies and 
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supporter of workers’ unions. In this way, it merged its own identity with that of the workers, 
supplanting the incipient autonomy of workers’ organizations with a loyalty to the Peronist 
discourse.  
“Now, I want you to be once more the example of civilization that the 
working masses have represented in this city [the City of Buenos Aires]. I ask you 
all to keep in your hearts the flag of our struggle. Think that each day of our lives 
we will keep up relentlessly our battle for those acts that embody the goals that 
will lead our Republic to the head of the nations of the world. Remember and 
keep engraved this phrase: ‘from home to work and from work to home,’ and 
with that motto we will prevail”67.  
By providing the urban worker a common identity, even before they had done so 
themselves, the Peronist state superseded any bottom-up approach to claim the needs of the 
urban worker68.
 
In the long run, this blend of workers, unions, and state goals would not bring 
harmony. Since the state institutions were patronizing workers and held sway over private 
production, negotiations between the needs of workers and entrepreneurs could not take place  
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 “Y ahora quiero que demos una vez mas sean ese ejemplo de cultura que han exhibido en esta ciudad las masas 
de trabajadores les pido a todos que llevando en el Corazón nuestra bandera de reivindicaciones piensen cada de la 
vida que hemos de seguir luchando inquebrantablemente por esas consignas que representan los objetivos que han 
de conducir a nuestra República a la cabeza de las naciones del mundo. Recuerden y mantengan grabado el lema 
“de casa al trabajo y del trabajo a casa’ y con eso venceremos.’  
Juan Domingo Peron. Speech given on October 10, 1945. Available at 
www.pjboaerense.org/peronismo/discursos_peron/45_10_10.htm 
68
 This view was particularly strong among the leaders of the Argentine Communist Party, whose leader at the time 
of the Peronist rise to power (1943-1945), Victorio Codovilla, said: “When he [Peron] realized that the workers, the 
peasants, and the people in general where beginning to complain and to organize themselves to ask for their rights 
and for the regularization of the institutions, Peron understood the need to intensify more and more his social 
demagogy with the end the paralysis of the independent action of the workers, and gain their support”(Quoted in 
Godio, 2000. p. 862). 
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within the boundaries of state’s institutions. Therefore, a critique of the social economic 
policies of the nation became a questioning of the existence of the state so deeply identified 
with them. As the story goes, a coup interrupted Perón’s presidency, and a succession of tragic 
dictatorship regimes followed. The association of urban workers with the ousted government 
made them the target of all anti-Peronist biases. The dictatorship regime banned unions’ rights 
and their leaders69,
 
whom they perceived as a dangerous mix of communist and Peronist 
agitators(Godio, 2000), and decreased the protection that labor laws granted to the workers 
(Azpiazu and Basualdo, 1990).  
As we have seen in the previous section, the anti-Peronist biases of the PRN regime 
materialized in the policies mandating the de-concentration of industries out of Greater Buenos 
Aires, where the majority of the urban workers lived (Bariffi 1981). In addition, as we saw in the 
first section, the PRN dictated a number of urban planning laws that made access to land 
harder for Buenos Aires’s low-income households (Clichevsky, 2002). Regardless of these 
measures, or maybe even because of them, Peronism kept its strength among the ever-growing 
population of Greater Buenos Aires. When democracy returned, it was the loyalty of the 
industrial workers of the GBA that empowered unions’ claims against the UCR 
government70.Why were they not more committed to the economic sustainability of Greater 
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 Within union leadership, there were two main groups: one that collaborated with the Dictatorship and the other 
– mostly aligned with leftist and Peronist groups – that it prosecuted. Once democracy returned, only members of 
the latter group become active in political life. (Godio, 2000)  
 
70
 The UCR party government did not amend the biases against the Province of Buenos Aires. The needs of the 
suburban population in general and of the industrial worker in particular were not proportionate to the monies 
they received from the state or the number of legislations on their account At this moment, Peronist unions gained 
political force, becoming the strongest and most vocal opposition to the government, practically monopolizing the 
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Buenos Aires?  
 
The Rise and Decline of Peronist Unions  
Unions’ rhetoric successfully captured the frustration of the urban workers with the 
changes in the national support to national industries. In spite of all the internal disagreements, 
during the 1980s, Peronist unions’ leaders were the strongest voice of Greater Buenos Aires, 
unlike the Peronist politicians who were reluctant to use the old Peronist rhetoric, since this 
could alienate them from a wider audience (Acuña, 1995). Unions proclaimed themselves the 
embodiment of the true pro-labor ethos, which proclaimed that “*Peronism’s+ social base is the 
union organization from which everything else grew”71 (Gaudio and Thompson, 1990). In 
addition, right after the dictatorship regime, these unions’ leaders also held an appeal for the 
population seeking to amend the human rights violations of the former regime. For instance, 
the former Peronist governor of the Province of Buenos Aires said:  
“When the military regime was looking for its enemies, it thought: ‘First are the 
guerillas and the terrorists, and then there are the Peronist Unions.’ Then they 
sought to destroy them. The social and political project of the PRN [dictatorship] 
was to destroy Argentine unions and workers’ rights.”72
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
demands of the urban worker in their discourse. Curving the national deficit demanded a shrinking of state 
expenditure that would mostly affect the income of the urban worker. Accordingly, Peronist unions took upon 
themselves the fight against the reduction of state payroll and of social services provided by the State (i.e. pension, 
health, education) that would follow the privatization plan the government had announced. 
71
 Jorge Triacca. Interview in El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de Menem. Santiago S Gonzalez andFabian Basoer. 
Buenos Aires: El Corregidor, 1999. 
72
 Antonio Cafiero. In Hugo Gambini. La primera presidencia de Perón. Testimonios y documentosBuenos Aires: 
Centro Editor de América Latina., 1983. 
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By the early 1980s, the collective memory of the former repression granted unions a 
certain political immunity, and the UCR government had a hard time managing the opposition 
anytime it successfully merged its critique of economic policies with issues of human rights. 
Inasmuch as the opposing unions were successful in linking the maintenance of the State’s 
production system with that of workers’ dignity, a governmental response based only on 
economic rationale was not acceptable, even less so when the previous dictatorial government 
had repressed unions and advocated of the minimization of the State’s expenditures (Peralta 
Ramos, 1992).  
In the 1980s, the unions gave form to many of the claims repressed by the PRN regime -
labor rights, urban industries, and Peronism – thus capturing an audience larger than ever 
before. Through their actions, even if there were considerable ideological divergence within 
them, unions acted as both the political opposition to the government and the advocates of the 
workers73. As one of the leaders of the UCR in the Province of Buenos Aires complained:  
“If the CGT pretends to fulfill the role of the opposing party, this 
essentially implies a distortion of its specific function, and exceeds the 
institutional framework of the work legislation and the spirit of work 
organization.”74
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 See Acuna and Godio for a detailed history of the union leaders of the UCR party. 
74
 Juan Manuel Casella, in Clarin newspaper, 26 January 1986. In Acuña, 1995. 
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Still, at that time, this strategy was very successful75.
 
Unions’ discourse of the 1980s was at the 
point where the large industrial entrepreneurs who traded with the state and the small 
entrepreneur who made a living selling to the urban dwellers converged. Accordingly, unions’ 
critiques were more often than not targeted at the UCR State rather than at the private sector, 
claiming to keep state protection of local industry.  
But the convergence of interests behind the unions’ claims was not to last. Party 
ambitions, corporate strategies, and the most urgent needs of diverse social groups were soon 
to become divergent (Nun and Portantiero, 1986). In addition, once there was a Peronist 
president in the nation and a Peronist governor in the Province of Buenos Aires, much of the 
raison d’etre of the unions’ activities disappeared. Many unions’ leaders had been very vocal 
about their support of Menem’s presidency, while others resented the economic deregulation 
policies76,
 
and others still had lost their public credibility after the accusations of cooptation and 
corruption (Matsushita, 1999). But truly, unions, the political careers of which began with 
Peron’s sponsorship and were put on hold during PRN regime, had little experience 
participating in democratic dialogues and even less in criticizing a Peronist government. As one 
former union leader and the Minister of Labor during Menem’s presidency said: “the main 
contradiction is that whenever unions are with the governing party, they have no discourse.”77
 
                                                          
75
 Statements like the following were common: “We have to bring back the wealth and invite multinational capital. 
Iknow some will say that I am a capitalist or a liberal, but this is the only way.” Jorge Triaca, secretary of the CGT 
and leader of the group ‘Union y Trabajo.” Quoted in Acuna, 1995. pp.162-3. 
76
 At that point, unions’ internal divisions became patent and divided, with one group loyal to the government 
(CGT San Martin), the other fiercely opposing it (CGT Azopardo) (Godio, 2000). 
77
 Rodolfo Diaz. Interview in El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de Menem. Santiago S. Gonzalez and Fabian Basoer. 
Buenos Aires: El Corregidor, 1999. 
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Therefore, in the end, this confusion between unions and Peronism undermined the autonomy 
of unions and the validity of their political project.  
Closely akin to the Peronist trend of blurring party politics and workers’ interests, was 
the new regulatory framework for unions. Some of the former union leaders were members of 
the presidential cabinet, and in that new role, they launched a series of measures that 
weakened unions’ fiscal autonomy. By allowing workers to choose to which unions they 
preferred to subscribe, it increased the dependency of union organizations on state subsidies 
(Phillips, 2004). In the reforms of the State management, too, the Peronist government 
weakened unions. For instance, transferring the management of primary and secondary 
education from the national to the provincial and municipal governments implied the 
subdivision of teachers’ unions into a myriad of smaller, far less threatening, agencies (Torre, 
1999). In that sense, while decentralization minimized state structures, it also destabilized the 
institutions of social representation modeled after large centralized organizations. In brief, the 
Peronist government either absorbed or superseded the capacity of unions to represent the 
demands of the waged worker. This, and the changes in the structure of production and of 
labor, ended with much of the contestation power of the unions. Unions’ strength decreased, 
and with it much of the population of Greater Buenos Aires lost their main venue for expressing 
their needs.  
 
Unions and the Changing Social Structure of the Argentine Productive System  
Towards the end of the 20th century, unions represented a smaller percentage of the 
working population all over the industrial world (Freeman and Rogers, 1999). This is the reason 
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why we might take for granted, or even naturalize, their decline in the Argentina’s political life. 
However, to truly understand the relevance of their fall in Greater Buenos Aires we have to 
consider them within the specifics of Argentine industry; the history of a state-protected 
industry has its correlation in the Peronist sponsorship of unions. How did ending the 
protection of national industry impact unions, one of the main political forces in Greater 
Buenos Aires?  
The first consequence of ending state protection of the industries concentrated in GBA 
was the shift from manufacturing to service activities. This led unions representing workers of 
service and commercial trades78
 
to have more affiliates than those representing manufacturing 
workers79 (Diaz, 1999; see Table 33).
 
Since these jobs tended to be less stable than those in 
manufacturing, unions had a unsteady base of affiliates. The second transformation, closely 
connected to the former trend, was the decline in unions’ financial resources. A product of new 
labor regulations and employment scarcity, job conditions deteriorated greatly. Informal or 
part-time hires became common even within formal companies. Between 1997 and 2000, in 
the 100 largest companies operating in the country, wages declined by 10%, while the number 
of employees decreased by 15%, and payments to unions plummeted by almost 25%. This 
divergence between the changing rates of employment and the contributions to unions was 
                                                          
78
 In fact, during the 1990s, with more than 800,000 affiliates, the union assembling commercial employees had 
the largest membership in Argentine history (Diaz, 1999). 
79
 Between 1979 and 1986, union membership decreased by a fifth, or about 500 million members. Conversely, as 
employment grew in services, construction, and commerce, where firms tended to be more numerous, but of a 
smaller scale than in the manufacturing sector, the proportion of workers enrolled in smaller unions raised from a 
third to more than a half. All in all, middle sized unions –those with 10 to 50 thousand affiliates – were lost the 
most, while the smaller entities captured a higher share of affiliates (CID, 1987). 
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equally true for non-labor-intensive industries, such as petroleum – those accounting for a large 
percentage of waged labor. For instance, the three most important sectors in terms of their 
weight in union funding –—food and beverage (23%), chemical products (15%), and 
automobiles (8%) — (INDEC CNE, 1994, 2004), reduced their contribution. Simply put, payment 
to unions –— and hence unions’ finances, declined faster than wages or payroll size.  
 
TABLE 33 
DISTRIBUTION OF UNIONS’ AFFILIATES BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 1936-1984 
 
Economic Activity 1936 1945 1965 1986 
% Manufacturing  12 36 38 31 
% Construction  9 4 1 6 
% Communication and Transportation 41 31 17 10 
% Commerce, Finance, and Services 37 21 29 42 
% Agriculture and Cattle 1 2 3 2 
Total Number of Affiliates/Waged Workers 370,000 528,000 1,765,000 3,972,000 
 
 
Sources: Julio Godio. Historia del Movimiento Obrero Argentino 1870-2000. Buenos Aires: Ediciones El 
Corregidor, 2000. 
  
 
 
The third critical transformation in industrial employment was the rapidly increasing 
polarization of entrepreneurial capital (Diaz, 1999). This last transformation has had the most 
evident consequences in the decline of Greater Buenos Aires industries. On one hand, larger 
enterprises consolidated their operations into holdings that encompassed manufacturing, 
agricultural, and even financial services. They seemed to have taken advantage of the 
restrictions on union activity and labor protest (Godio, 2000), which, combined with better 
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technology, allowed them to reduce their plant sizes while increasing their output80.
 
On the 
other hand, large companies layoffs were followed by the creation of a multitude of smaller 
firms, whose lack of credit and competitiveness accounted for their high failure rates. Their 
rapid turnover and short lifespan was notorious within the “1-to-5 workers” category, and in 
spite of diminishing production levels, establishments with less than 3 people increased their 
employment level by 7.5%, thus suggesting that this growth was more a survival strategy of an 
impoverished social segment than “pure entrepreneurial spirit.” These were the firms that 
typically located in Greater Buenos Aires, which in turn suffered both the loss of industrial 
employment and the diminishing investments of the smaller firms (E. Rodríguez, 1999).  
The polarization of industrial capital was also correlated to the increased weakness of 
unions. When unions had to mirror the regrouping of the industry, their negotiation capacity 
was subdivided and their finances weakened. Still, embedded in the logic of the protectionist 
state, where the national government owned large enterprises and central management of 
unions was very effective, they did not accommodate their organization to deal with the more 
dynamic conditions of labor (see Table 34).  
                                                          
80
 This might explain the rise in the productivity of the largest firms, which by 1983, had 30% more production per 
hour of waged workand 20% lower salaries than in 1974 (Azpiazu et al, 2004). 
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TABLE 34  
SIZE OF UNIONS AND DISTRIBUTION OF AFFILIATES 1963-1986 
 
 
1963  
% Affiliates 
1986 
% Affiliates 
Large Unions (50,000 or more affiliates) 64 41 
 
Middle Unions (10,000 to 50,000 affiliates) 18 21 
  Small Unions (less than 10,000 affiliates) 18 38 
 
Source: Julio Godio. Historia del Movimiento Obrero Argentino 1870-2000. Buenos Aires: Ediciones El 
Corregidor, 2000. 
  
 
Argentine unions created under the ethos of the Peronist urban factory worker, were 
ill-prepared to comprehend the demands of an atomized, urban labor. As Menem’s first head of 
the Ministry of Labor and former union leader, Jorge Triacca said:  
“While the economic reorganization [of Argentina] produced 
unemployment levels of 20%, unions were discussing if workers should or should 
not get two uniforms per year.”81
 
 
In the same venue, Enrique Rodriguez, another former head of Menem’s Ministry of 
Labor, said:  
“Unions realized too late that there was a new model of labor relations. 
They thought that a centralized unionism and collective negotiation were still 
efficient. That model comes from Perón, and it was for a different country, where 
production relations were highly centralized within a Fordist-Taylorist model of 
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country.”
2 
 
Finally, all of these transformations were linked to the preexisting trends in the 
production structure. As we have seen, secondary activities in general, and manufacturing 
establishments in particular, had experienced declining employment levels since the 1970s. 
However, only in the 1990s did the Argentine State fully departed from the protection of the 
urban industry. In sharp contrast with Perón’s direct intervention in labor and production 
markets (Mora y Araujo and Smith, 1983; Weaver, 1980), Menem’s government reversed this 
approach. Claiming that “In Argentina the time for unfair privileges under the protection of a 
bankrupted State is over,”
 
it abruptly ended the protection of national industries and privatized 
state companies82.
 
But, since Argentina’s government was the direct sponsor of the unions -
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 Jorge Triaca. Interview in El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de Menem. Santiago S Gonzalez and Fabian Basoer. 
Buenos Aires: El Corregidor, 1999. Rodríguez, Enrique. Interview in El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de Menem. 
Santiago S Gonzalez and Fabian Basoer. Buenos Aires: El Corregidor, 1999. 
82
 Moreover, the belief was that that State’s inference was a source of social inequality, as it disproportionately 
favored certain groups over others. This idea is evident in the discourses of all Argentine governments of the last 
three decades, regardless of their political ideology or capacity to implement it. In 1981, the military dictatorship 
described its economic policy in the following terms: The active participation of the State in the economy had 
caused a number of distortions in the private sector. One is the progressive corrosion of the national 
entrepreneurial class, who –given the rules of the game that the State imposed– has tended to develop activities 
that depend on the State, characterized by low risk and high return. […] Such economic schemes resulted in a 
structure alienated from the market’s performance, implying a suboptimal use of resources, and distorting private 
enterprise, subordinated [the entrepreneurial class] to State paternalism and limited it to peripheral activities, 
devoid from freedom, innovation, or risk.” (Ministerio de Economia de la Nacion Argentina, 1981. Memorias de 
Ejercicio. Republica Argentina. pp. 68-69). Few years later, Dr. Raul Alfonsín, claimed: “We have talked about the 
State, and it is necessary to anticipate that the role it must assume will not be a continuation of the overgrown and 
inefficient [structure] it is today, which only serves the interests of a minority and goes against the interest of the 
whole, and against the national goals. This heavy, fat, obsolete State of today, should be transformed -through a 
deep administrative reform—into the ideal instrument for the realization of greatness and prosperity of our nation” 
(Raúl Ricardo Alfonsin Discurso Inaugural de Sesiones Ordinarias del Congreso. Republica Argentina, 1983). Finally, 
in the ’90s, the Peronist Dr. Carlos Menem promised: “In Argentina the time for unfair privileges under the 
protection of a bankrupted State is over. No one could feel alien or ignored in front of this conviction. It was, it is, 
and it will be necessary to change the situation that has weakened us for years, and that no one –until now-had 
dared to change: A situation that pushed us to hyperinflation, and even worse, to the abyss of hyper-frustration, of 
the hyper-poverty of a great share of our people, of the hyper-stagnation of our economy and culture. With such a 
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with about three out of the ten largest unions composed of state employees (Godio, 2000) – 
reforming the State had a direct impact on unions’ power83. The privatization of state 
companies led to massive lay-offs and the subsequent reduction of union affiliates.
 
 
But even more germane than the unions failing to adapt their strategies to the 
changing labor environment, was that they were not prepared to deal with massive 
unemployment affecting Greater Buenos Aires, which peaked towards the end of the century 
(see Table 35). As Dr. Rodolfo Diaz, a Peronist lawyer and the man in charge of the Ministry of 
Labor between 1991 and 1992, said:  
“The union is the institution that organizes those who are employed. The 
institution that organizes those waged workers working in the formal sector. 
Those changing from one job to the other within the formal sector are also 
contained within the unions. They come and go; there is certain flow within the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reality, there is no political sovereignty, economic independence, or social justice”(Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem. Mensaje 
del Señor Presidente de la Nación, , 1 May 1990). Privatization of state enterprises was one of the most 
contentious issues between state and unions. Unions’ fear of massive lay-offs after the private sector took over 
state companies proved to be true. Yet, many state employees were dismissed even before that stage. In the 
largest companies, like passenger and cargo railways, airlines, gas, power generation and distribution, 
telecommunications, postal services, and the water and sewage systems (EIU, 2000), the national government was 
responsible for reducing the staff as part of the preparatory steps to effective privatization. By 1991, lay-offs at 
public enterprises were wide spread: About 7,000 workers were discharged at the military fabrics, 10,000 at the 
Sstate oil company (YPF), 13,000 at the national rail company, and 16,000 public administration employees, among 
others, while an additional 200,000 state workers were uncertain about their employment (Gonzalez and Bossoer, 
1999). Yet, given the scale and political weight of these massive lay-offs, the government sought to appease social 
discontent through a number of ad-hoc measures. Many of these companies offered a program of voluntary 
retirement, in which workers received a rather generous monetary compensation package if they chose to leave 
the company (Abadia and Spiller, 1999).  
 
83
 From Perón’s first presidency until Menem’s extensive privatization program, state workers accounted for a 
large share of union membership. That is, they were either direct employees of the State (e.g. state bureaucrats), 
or they were working in a company that was owned by the state, yet was supposed to be managed as if it were 
private (e.g. Aerolineas Argentinas, the national commercial airlines). 
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workforce. However, the situation is different with those marginalized and 
excluded from the formal job market. Unions do not organize that people. Those 
persons might or might not have other ways of social organization, but not the 
unions.”84
 
 
So in the 1990s, with Peronism in power, the UCR still looking for leadership, and unions 
in decline, the urban poor had virtually no political organizations through which to vent their 
claims. Once more, we go full circle from economics to the configuration of political 
institutions, to broadening urban poverty in the urban fringe.  
 
TABLE 35  
URBAN EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE 1990s 
 
 Employed Population Unemployment 
 In 1000 (1990=100) In 1000 (1990=100) 
1990 9,797 100 785 100 
1991 10,222 104 744 95 
1992 10,498 107 806 103 
1993 10,633 109 1,092 139 
1994 10,609 108 1,327 169 
1995 10,328 105 2,065 263 
 
Source: Julio Godio. Historia del Movimiento Obrero Argentino 1870-2000. Buenos Aires: Ediciones El 
Corregidor, 2000. 
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 Rodolfo Diaz. 1999. Interview in El Sindicalismo en los Tiempos de Menem. Santiago S Gonzalez and Fabian 
Basoer. Buenos Aires: El Corregidor, 1999. 
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Much Aid, but Little Rights for the Urban Poor  
 
Perhaps the most deleterious effect of the indoctrination of the urban poor with 
Peronism was that the former never developed autonomous, bottom-up modes of 
participation. Thus, when unions’ strength declined and the Peronist government changed its 
protectionist policies, the ‘working masses’ of Greater Buenos Aires had no powerful 
organization to voice their needs. The development of bottom-up claims broke down in its 
infancy, at the time Juan Domingo and Eva Perón took on the State, catering over the urban 
poor rather than fostering genuine participation (Mora y Araujo and Smith, 1983). From then 
on, the urban poor have been the target of any anti-Peronist government, as well as the source 
of much of Peronist political power. Initially, when most of the urban poor could relate to the 
ethos of the urban worker (D. Davis, 2004), unions were the strongest link between the 
‘working masses’ and Peronism. But once the unemployment became more typical, factories 
less common, and the Peronist government of Menem distinguished clearly between state and 
unions, other means of connecting with the urban poor were necessary.  
In truth, the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires were no longer the main target of 
industrial investments, nor were they the only place in which living conditions were 
deteriorating rapidly. But they were still the stronghold of any movement invoking the poor, 
partly because of their scale – more than five million people lived in the urban fringe – and 
partly because of their location, next to the residences of Argentine elites and core institutions. 
In any case, managing the urban poor was a necessity for those aiming to win a national 
election as well as for those aiming to protect the real estate market of the City of Buenos 
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Aires.  
In 1989, when hyperinflation was at its worst, a series of food riots exploded in the 
urban peripheries. In the poorest neighborhoods of Greater Buenos Aires, supermarkets were 
looted, private property destroyed, and the streets taken by assault. Rising unemployment and 
inflation had taken their toll on the population, and, for first time since the dictatorship regime 
of the late 1970s, displaced the urban poor from the city. The poor were visible, and people of 
the capital realized, ‘that the urban poor really existed, that they could loot, and that they could 
have fire arms, too.85”
 
But as the claims of the people of Greater Buenos Aires became more 
central to the national politics, the genuine needs of the poor became more likely to suffer 
manipulation for political reasons. According to the head of the Ministry of Government of the 
Province of Buenos Aires, Carlos Alvarez:  
“about 80% of the people who looted the supermarkets had a genuine 
social problem or were truly hungry, but 15% were political activists from 
different political parties, and the remaining 5% just wanted to destabilize the 
system.86”
 
 
These foods riots marked the end of the UCR government. However, when the Peronist 
Carlos Menem became president, the specter of the food riots was still haunting the city. As we 
have seen, the biased distribution of national monies that the province suffered after the 
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 Maria Rosa Neufeld, and Maria Cristina Cravo. “Entre la Hiperinflacion y la Devaluacion: Saueos y ollas 
populares en la memoria y la trama organizativa de los sectores populares del Gran Buenos Aires (1989-2001). In 
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legislative changes that former non-democratic regimes had implemented was solved through 
ad-hoc sources of money. In 1994, Eduardo Duhalde, the Governor of the Province of Buenos 
Aires and Menem’s vice-president, got access to 10% of national fiscal monies. These funds 
were for alleviating social problems in the urban periphery, and the Governor had total leeway 
to spend them according to his judgment. The administration of these monies was given to the 
Governor’s wife, Mrs. Hilda Gonzalez de Duhalde, who used them to funding the largest plan of 
social aid in Argentina’s history, the “Manzaneras.”  
The “Manzaneras” took their name from the Spanish word used for urban-block, 
“manzana,” and evokes both the target and implementer of the program, the urban female 
poor. The program covered the poorest neighborhoods of the urban periphery, where about 
35,000 women chosen from each neighborhood distributes food to pregnant women and 
mothers of children under the age of five87. In theory, each Manzanera is in charge of about 
ninety women, thus reaching a population of 600 residents. These women were supposed to be 
chosen by the local neighbors, although it goes without saying that affiliation to the Peronist 
party s almost a precondition for this position. They do not earn any salary, but they have prime 
access to the boxes of food the program distributes and considerable discretion on how to 
distribute them among locals. Overall, locals received the program well, although accusations of 
fund mismanagement, favoritism, and cronyism have been constant. 
Beyond the implementation issues of this program, which had some true successes, it 
was yet another example of how the institutional circuit of the Province of Buenos Aires was 
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customarily replacing constitutional rights for special favors. That is, firstly, the province did not 
receive funds through normal channels but through a special law that connected it directly to 
the executive rather than to the legislature. Second, the Governor of the province controlled 
the distribution of these funds, thus bypassing the authority of municipalities and local councils. 
However, since local poor women enacted this social-aid, it had some features of a bottom-up 
initiative, thus undermining the social organization of authentic local activism. Once more, in 
Greater Buenos Aires, social aid became a way for gaining political loyalty and defusing popular 
discontent.  
 
MODELS OF PRODUCTION AND URBAN GEOGRAPHY  
To discover how the changes in the dynamic of production transformed the social 
structure of the city in general and of the urban periphery in particular, one must place these 
transformations within the specific geography of Buenos Aires. In the course of the last thirty 
years, much has changed in the form and society of the city. Yet, while these two entities are 
influencing each other, each one has its own pace of transformation, and hence previous 
configurations have a distinct endurance in each of them. As early as the 1960s, urban workers 
were shifting from secondary to tertiary occupation and evidence of a more regressive 
distribution of wealth is apparent already in the mid seventies. All of which suggests that there 
is a substantial time lag from the moment social trends began until they become evident, in the 
form of abandoned industrial buildings, street protests, and shantytowns, in the architecture of 
the city. Therefore, many of the economic and social changes implemented in the 1970s only 
224 
 
become evident in the 1990s.  
To begin with, the city in which these social changes were taking place was not 
homogeneous. Also, the epicenter of these transformations was not static but its location 
shifted along the metropolis. For instance, after the MercoSur agreements, industrial 
investments move from the South to the North of the city. Consequently, the urban periphery 
did not constitute a homogeneous ring but one that contains deep social contrasts. What has 
been the result of the sum of these late social reconfigurations in the urban space? How does 
the superposition of novel and old models of accumulation transform Buenos Aires geography?  
 
Entrepreneurs and Working Masses: From Cohesion to Divergence  
In a stylized account of the last thirty years of Buenos Aires, the discontinuities in the 
national policies and development course are unmistakable. Briefly, and in agreement with the 
analysis presented thus far, there are four distinct stages in the interaction among the State, 
the industrial producers, and the labor. First, a convergence of interests in the expansion of the 
urban market characterized the organization of the city at the time that the PRN dictatorship 
regime took over the presidency. Second, after the dictatorship regime’s new economic and 
labor rules, there was a fracture between the interests of the urban core and the urban 
periphery. Next, in the democratic government of the UCR, there was a failed intent to 
harmonize the pressures of both the urban periphery and the industrial elites. Finally, when the 
Peronism was back in power the interests of those depended on the local markets and those 
who did not are in frank opposition. Spatially, while the first one kept its core-periphery 
configuration, the other expanded through the northern highway.  
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Up until the 1970s, Buenos Aires was still the incarnation of the local version of the ISI 
model, as devised through the development policies of Juan Domino Perón. Briefly, the 
interests of the national government, the waged labor, the unions, and the national industries 
converged in fostering the concentration of people and goods in Buenos Aires while relying on 
the internal, mostly urban consumers of its industrial production (Diaz Alejandro, 1970). This 
model furthered the spatial unevenness of national development and the immigration trend 
towards Buenos Aires (Keeling, 1997). At the metropolitan scale, the City of Buenos Aires was 
the main locus of consumption while Greater Buenos Aires was the center of production and 
labor (Dorfman, 1983). When the military coup of 1976 ousted Perón’s widow, it sought to 
break the effects of the alliance between state and unions through a distinct anti-labor bias. 
However, its metropolitan policies did reinforce the core-periphery organization of the city.  
By pushing industries beyond their traditional location, the dictatorship regime 
emphasized the incipient trend of spatial mismatch between population and industrial growth. 
In addition, the modified institutional structures minimized the relevance of the urban 
periphery in national affairs and precluded any social resistance movement associated with 
waged workers. Therefore, the periphery suffered from two evils: one was the halt on industrial 
investments, which so far had been the main engine of development in suburban 
municipalities. The second was the decline of industrial wages parallel to the proscription of 
unions, hence harming the income of a large number of suburban households. As a 
consequence, the differences between the urban core and the periphery deepened. By the end 
of this regime, the suburbs were notoriously impoverished while the urban core appeared more 
prosperous. This was partly because the PRN launched a beautification program in the City of 
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Buenos Aires, and partly because it relocated the urban poor to the suburbs. In any case, this 
divergence conditioned the location of new investments in the periphery for years to come.  
During the third stage, the democratic UCR government aimed for a kind of national 
truce among the UCR, the Peronist unions, the industries and the waged workers (Acuna, 
1994). However, the state no longer had the economic resources to sustain the inward-looking, 
protectionist state that many of these sectors claimed, nor did they have the political capital to 
discipline unions that went on strike anytime the state attempted to rationalize the national 
budget. In the metropolis, this meant the beginning of a novel geography of core and periphery. 
Although poverty was evident also in the former, the periphery began to show the signs of a 
more complex geography, in pace with the polarization of industrial firms and labor, those 
municipalities that had been nodes of industrial investment became centers of unemployment 
and physical decay. In addition, because the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires were under 
the provincial government, which had a Peronist governor and the City of Buenos Aires was 
under the national government, which had a mayor from the UCR party, institutional 
mechanisms for social aid became an occasion for political competition.  
Finally, during the 1990s, the alignment of the state, industries, and labor was broken. 
With larger industrialists acquiring financial capabilities and having access to MercoSur markets, 
the difference between the large and small entrepreneurs widened. The latter were still tied to 
Greater Buenos Aires and fully dependent on urban consumers. But, given the decline of unions 
and waged workers, the urban market was less prosperous than before. The divergence of 
interests among these groups began to be visible in the divergent development of the 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. Old industrial municipalities were in decline, while those 
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located along the road connecting to the new MercoSur markets captured fewer, but larger 
investments over the course of the decade: large industrial parks, shopping malls, and gated 
communities for the urban residents moving away from the impoverished city (Sica, 2001). But, 
since this region has been one of the less developed in the past88,
 
the inflow of new 
investments was one of the most striking contrasts in the periphery. Unlike the City of Buenos 
Aires where social indicators were quite steady, in the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires, 
the swelling poverty ran parallel to an inflow of affluent households and large investments, thus 
increasing the gap between the wealthy and the poor at the municipal level.  
 
State Infrastructure and the New Urban Model  
Obviously, without an adequate transportation infrastructure, the 1990s model of the 
city would not have materialized. In effect, in the early 1990s, the government privatized and 
upgraded the international highway connecting the City of Buenos Aires to the Brazilian City of 
Săo Paulo. Perhaps, nothing reveals more the extent to which the centrality of the metropolis 
to the nation curtailed the actual rights of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires than the 
upgrade of this highway.  
From its outset, the development of a highway that crossed through the Province of 
Buenos Aires was a project originated and managed by the national government As soon as 
Menem became president, he launched a number of decrees privatizing all major roads 
connecting the City of Buenos Aires with the rest of the country (decrees 823 of 1989, and 2039 
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 In 1980, Pilar was the municipality with highest percentage of poor households (more than 50%) in the entire 
urban periphery (INDEC, 1980).  
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of 1990). With about half of these roads in need of repair and only a quarter of them working 
properly, these roads were in need of major investments (Abadia and Spiller, 1999). For years, 
the national roads had been in decay, but once there was a project to expand industrial trade 
with other markets, the national state and the largest local companies made of this highway 
connection a central concern. The privatization and upgrade of the highway system in general 
and of the northern one in particular, were under the discretionary management of the 
Argentine Ministry of Economy. The deep commitment of the national government to this 
project is patent in the angry words the president of the nation had against the local residents 
and municipal planners, who opposed to the expansion of the highway in their region. During 
the opening ceremony of the northern highway, recalling them with anger, he said,:  
“I don’t regret having commanded the ‘forces of order’ to act without any 
contemplation against those groups that promoted blocking the roads. […] I told 
the police: ‘go ahead, uproot the trees with people and everything.”89 
Right there, in the heart of the urban periphery, the President of the nation, Dr. Menem; 
the president of the national congress, Mr. Pierri; the head of the national Ministry of Economy, 
Dr Cavallo; the governor of the Province of Buenos Aires, Mr. Duhalde; the mayor of the City of 
Buenos Aires, Dr. Dominguez; and no municipal mayor of the Greater Buenos Aires region, 
celebrated the road connecting Buenos Aires to Pilar, and then to Brazil, thus, signaling the 
national government’s direct management of the urban periphery. Much had changed from the 
classic Peronist alignment of the state, the ‘working masses’ of GBA, the large unions, and the 
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 La Nacion. “Pilar esta mas cerca de lo que se creia”. 28 June 1996.  
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national industrialists that sustained the expansion of the urban market and hence of Buenos 
Aires. In the 1990s, the state allied with the international and national holdings participating in 
the highway expansion (the Spanish company, Dragados, the Italian, Imperiglo, and the 
Argentinean, Socma); the financial institutions backing up this operation (the American Citibank  
and the Spanish-Argentine Banco Rio Galicia), the urban real estate developers, the large 
industrialists targeting MercoSur trade, and the upper-income urban residents moving to gated 
communities. All these sectors profited from the expansion and upgrade of the northern 
highway (Galiani, et al, 2005).  
The residents and local governments of the suburban municipalities that the highway 
trespassed (Vicente Lopez, San Isidro, Tigre, and San Fernando), were opposed to this project. 
They brought forward ecological, economical, and equity issues. The new highway demanded 
cutting down some valuable trees and disrupted local circulation. It also required extra funds 
from local municipalities for the maintenance of the local road system that was ill prepared to 
deal with the extra demand that the inflow of cars to the region would trigger within these 
municipalities (Pirez, 1994). Finally, the toll system had a regressive impact on the household 
income of the suburban population, which was worsened by the subsequent adjustment of this 
toll at a rate about three times faster than that of the national price index between 1991-2001 
(Azpiazu and Basualdo, 2004). Once more, the lack of institutional mechanisms to voice 
suburban residents’ desires and needs in the process, was patent. In the same fashion that their 
votes at the national level carried less weight than in other jurisdictions, municipal 
governments had no say in the expansion of the highway.  
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Changing Layouts of Growth and Poverty in the Urban Fringe  
The result of the changing alliances among the interests of the state, the entrepreneurs, 
and the waged workers in the urban periphery was a higher level of differentiation on the 
development conditions of this region. Up until the 1970s, they shared an interest in fostering 
the growth of a large mass of consumers in Buenos Aires. However, by the end of the century, 
the divergent needs of waged workers and small and large entrepreneurs undermined the 
social basis for the urban model of the mid-century. Still, since these transformations were 
gradual and involved different spaces at different stages, the urban periphery was not 
transformed at once, but increased its internal differentiation. Typically, the changes in the 
urban fabric outlasted the coalitions that gave birth to them, and hence the metropolis 
presents at once a collection of failed and active projects. In that regard, each of the 
municipalities in the Greater Buenos Aires region falls into one of the following four categories. 
First, those prosperous in the 1980s and in the 1990s, too; second, those prosperous in the 
1980s, but decaying in the 1990s; and third, those that were undeveloped in the 1980s, and 
remained in that condition. Finally, there were those municipalities undeveloped in the 1980s 
that grew in the 1990s.  
However, before we implement this classification, let us briefly discuss some of the 
difficulties in tracing municipal evolution along long time spans. To begin with, prosperity is an 
evasive concept and even more so when the definition of local community is contested. As we 
have seen, during these thirty years, the shifts of people along the periphery have been 
remarkable. From the displaced urban poor of the 1970s to the gated community dwellers of 
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the 1990s, there has been little correspondence between community and municipal 
boundaries. Therefore, as population is highly movable and local inequality is on the rise, 
individual and regional prosperity are increasingly divergent. As a result, measures of 
percentage of poverty do not suffice to describe the population conditions in the periphery. 
Likewise, whatever the variable we use to measure prosperity is, measuring it at the local level 
might be deceiving. Not only does corruption in municipal governments obscure our knowledge 
of local prosperity, but also the institutional framing in which municipalities operate 
complicates the issue. A number of legal changes in the fiscal distribution of resources confuse 
historical comparisons of municipal budget. On top of this, the national and provincial 
governments manage much of the monies localities receive, hence blurring more local 
accounts.  
Finally, as we have seen, capitalist activities in Greater Buenos Aires have been changing 
over the course of these years. When local industries were under state protection, having a 
large number of industrial workers was a good proxy of a strong economic activity (Dorfman, 
1983). However, once the purchasing power of the waged labor declined, this was no longer 
true (Azpiazu, 1994). Equally, new economic activities flourished in the suburbs, most 
remarkably real estate and construction of gated communities (Coy and Pholer, 2002).
 
Suburban municipalities captured rural-urban immigrants from impoverished Argentine 
provinces and neighboring countries, who usually could not afford to live in the city. In addition, 
they received the inflow of the displaced urban poor, as well as from the upper middle-income 
households of the city choosing to live in gated communities. Therefore, isolated measures of 
population tell little about the social conditions of the municipality. Thus, we correlate changes 
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in the number of substandard households with the increase in building permits throughout the 
1990s. The idea is that while much population growth is related to a rise of informal 
settlements, building permits are a clear indicator of formal investment in the municipality. 
Accordingly, the four situations outlined above correspond to these four cases: 1) municipalities 
with low number of poor households and high number of building permits; 2) municipalities 
with low number of poor households and low number of building permits; 3) municipalities 
with high number of poor households and high number of building permits; 4) municipalities 
with high number of poor households and low number of building permits.  
More interesting yet, is the correspondence between these categories and the 
footprints of the former modes of urbanization in Buenos Aires. Real estate investment 
followed the highway expansion, but did not delete former poverty indexes. The municipalities 
in the far south that had not had strong industrial investments before, kept their stagnation (i.e. 
Almirante Brown and Florencio Varela), while the wealthier municipalities of the northern 
border which used to be industrial, but then moved into more residential and service-based 
land use, kept their prosperity (i.e. Vicente Lopez and San Isidro). However, as income of waged 
workers and small entrepreneurs shrank, the western and southern municipalities that 
accounted for most industrial activity and labor in the 1970s and 1980s, declined even though 
they had not lost their industrial capacity (i.e. San Martin, and Avellaneda)90.
 
In contrast, the 
poor municipalities of the north that  
1 
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in the 1970s lacked strong industrial development, kept their high percentage of poor 
households regardless of the inflow of investments to the region (i.e. Pilar and Escobar). It was 
precisely in these municipalities along the new highway that social contrasts where higher.  
Location played a defining role in the development of the suburbs. The new MercoSur 
markets at the north of the City of Buenos Aires, namely the Paraguayan city of Asuncion and 
the Brazilian city of Săo Paulo, disrupted the concentric growth structure that led to the 
expansion of Buenos Aires. Even if it was true that there was an overall decrease in the number 
of industrial establishments and employment, these increased in the northern municipalities of 
Greater Buenos Aires (Briano, Fitzche, Vio; 2003). While the western and southern industrial 
municipalities suffered disinvestment, the northern municipalities grew according to the new 
demands of the market. After three decades of adverse policies, the small entrepreneurs who 
located in the old industrial suburbs to the south and west of the city could not afford to 
improve their machinery and establishments. The lack of subsidies for urban industries in the 
outskirts of Greater Buenos Aires (Schvarzer, 1987), combined with the state support of large 
holdings (Azpiazu, 1998) with plants outside of the metropolis (Ferruci, 1986), redirected major 
industrial investments out of GBA. Also, the trade policies implemented in the 1970s and the 
1990s flooded the City of Buenos Aires with industrial goods cheaper or better than those 
locally produced (Kossacoff, 2000). Small industries dependent on local consumption declined, 
and with them, the GBA municipalities in which they were located.  
Conversely, the situation was much different in the outer northern suburbs. To begin 
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 This is what distinguishes their case from that of the former industrial towns of the US. In Argentina, they have 
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with, they had less industrial activity than in the southern and western jurisdictions next to the 
city (i.e. Avellaneda, San Martin). For years, most of their land lacked most of the basic urban 
infrastructure, thus only some dispersed towns and some informal settlements located there. 
Most of their territory was underused, allocated to activities that did not yield much to the 
finances of local municipalities, such as little parcels for farming activities, and large ones for 
recreational estates. Hence, there were very few municipal investments in public infrastructure, 
such as sewerage and piped water. Once the upgrade of the highway and the MercoSur 
increased road traffic along this municipality, this relative backwardness put them at the 
forefront of the next investment wave.  
However, even when the new highway improved the exportation opportunities for all 
industries, only large indusial establishments profited from this trade. During the 1990s, large 
firms accounted for 90% of Argentine exports to the MercoSur. In contrast, only 10% of small 
establishments participated in some export activities, and less than 1% of them had 
international quality certifications (ISO) (Clarín, 1998). Furthermore, the differential tariffs that 
many MercoSur products enjoyed (Baumann, 2002) contributed to the high mortality rate of 
the small Argentine industries. Noticeably, in the far municipalities along the MercoSur highway 
(i.e. Pilar, Escobar, and Tigre) industrial turnover was faster than in the rest of the suburban 
ring: about half of all firms went out of business in less than five years. Location was not 
enough to compensate their small investments and lack of credit, thus small entrepreneurs 
could not compete in the international market, and, once more, economic gains were made at 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
kept their production capacity, but this no longer sustains local prosperity. 
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the larger end of the industrial spectrum (Kulfas, 2000).  
Briefly, the mapping of prosperity and growth in the urban fringe in the 1990s reveals 
that the distance to the urban core was no longer defining municipal growth. Industrial and real 
estate investments have grown all along the northern highway. However, when it comes to the 
distribution of poverty, the concentric explanation is still valid: the farther a municipality is from 
the urban core, the poorer its people are. Because of the institutional configuration in place, 
the national and provincial governments control the largest share of fiscal monies and social aid 
in the urban periphery. Therefore, municipal governments captured little of the 1990s growth. 
Besides the highway, most land in these municipalities does not have basic infrastructure yet. 
Accordingly, informality and poverty have been growing, too. The result of all these changes in 
the distribution of wealth and poverty has been the widening gap between rich and poor within 
municipal boundaries (see Figure 14 and Figure 15).  
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FIGURE 14 An Impoverished Family Collecting Garbage in Pilar, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the suburban population growth, poverty in the suburbs affect a higher number of households.  
 
 
FIGURE 15 Slum Dwellers Moving Furniture in One of the Roads Leading To a GC in Tigre, 2004  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Besides the issue of access to infrastructure, the ways new roads are used reveals the social contrasts in the region  
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CONCLUSION  
The Splintering Suburban Society  
 
In this section, I sought to understand the changes in industries’ and labor’s social 
organization and how these furthered social polarization. In brief, by the 1990s, the 
convergence of interests among entrepreneurs and workers around Buenos Aires markets was 
shattered. While the most prosperous firms were no longer dependent on Buenos Aires 
consumption, waged workers and the smallest firms were still dependent on this market.  
The development tragedy of the Argentine democracy was the structural divorce 
between social and economical rationale. Perón’s protectionism, with lower levels of social 
exclusion, was achieved at the expense of an inefficient and uncompetitive State apparatus. But 
those industries Argentina could use to launch a strong economy were those with fewer owners 
and non-labor intensive. Therefore, appeasing the demands of Greater Buenos Aires, where a 
third of the national workers resided, was central to pursuing any national project. But this was 
increasingly difficult as the interests of large and small entrepreneurs increasingly diverged. 
While the former profited from open competition, like MercoSur trade and the privatization of 
state companies, small firms were trapped in a survival economy.  
New modes of wealth accumulation not only reshape economic organization, they also 
reconfigure the social and institutional practices that might resist their expansion, thus making 
more difficult the implementation of alternative (social) projects. In the Argentina of the 1990s, 
this transformation entailed the change from a state-led to a market-led urbanization through a 
three-pronged process. First, there was a massive shift from secondary to tertiary activities 
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associated with the increasing polarization of the industrial sector. In Greater Buenos Aires, 
very large holdings successfully expanded their financial activities and market share while the 
mortality rate of small firms was rising. Second, and in close connection with the first trend, the 
privatization and decentralization of the state infrastructure eased the concentration of private 
wealth at the same time that it weakened the institutions of collective representation. The still-
centralized structure of unions did not keep up with the changes affecting the urban workers, 
who were more often than not working outside of the traditional industrial establishments, 
employed in small firms, in service sectors, or both. Third, the social costs of these previous 
transformations increased the need for social aid in the formerly industrial metropolitan 
centers. In Greater Buenos Aires, national and provincial, but not the municipal governments 
had access to manage this aid. The central and discretionary management of social aid 
undermined self-organization capacities of the urban poor and weakened municipal 
governments. In the long run, this practice hampered the notion of local community, which 
influenced the practice of urban planning in the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires and was 
a large factor in the formation of the walled urbanism of the end of the 20th century.  
These changes did not diffuse evenly throughout the metropolis. In the urban periphery, 
the new northern highway made evident the reconfirmation of the industry and of economic 
growth. From gated communities to large industrial compounds, the new sources of wealth are 
visible on both sides of the road. Yet, about two-thirds of the region’s new gated communities 
located in those municipalities where —according to the national census data of 1980— – 
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almost one of out every three households was living in precarious conditions91.
 
Hence, on the 
northern side of the metropolis two realities are superimposed: wealth along the road and 
poverty around it. But the causal mechanisms behind growth are not the same as the ones 
behind poverty. The combination of the urbanization without industrialization trend that began 
in the 1960s, with inadequate municipal infrastructure following the 1970s decentralization of 
basic urban services, and the successive biases against suburban municipalities in managing 
fiscal monies were fundamental causes of poverty. Yet, wealth goes through a different circuit 
based on the successful exploitation of the new real estate opportunities that do not rely on 
municipal infrastructure and on the new MercoSur markets. Because of this, the distribution of 
poverty in the metropolis had not presented any significant changes since the 1960s: the 
farther from the urban core, the higher the municipal poverty index. In contrast, the map of 
wealth has been much more dynamic, moving away from the core-periphery structure into a 
linear pattern following the northern highway. Therefore, the (next) fundamental question is: 
which type of local governance is constructed under circumstances of extreme polarization?  
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 I use the NBI value as the indicator of population conditions. The INDEC defines this index as a percentage of 
households of the total number of households ina municipality. To be classified as a NBI a household has at least 
one of these characteristics: a) More than three people per room; b) unsound building structure, c) no water-
closet; d) at least one child aged between 6 and 12 who does not attend school; e) four or more people dependent 
on a single breadwinner who has no schooling beyond third grade. 
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SECTION IV  
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
“Hegel remarks somewhere that all great world-historic facts and 
personages appear, so to speak, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, 
the second time as farce.”[...]“Men make their own history, but they do not make 
it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under 
circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”  
Karl Marx, 1852. In “The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon.” New 
York, International Publishers, 1964.  
 
 
Social inequality was evident in Buenos Aires since at least the mid-1960s, when the first 
immigrant workers migrated to the municipalities bordering the City of Buenos Aires, the region 
known as Greater Buenos Aires. However, towards the 1990s, the ideal urban model of the 
mid-century, in which industrial establishments and labor resided on the borders and fed the 
consumption needs of the more affluent urban core, was uprooted. Social inequality not only 
increased, but poverty and wealth clustered all along the metropolis. While distinct locations 
received the bulk of international investments (Cicollela, 1999), the number of slums grew.  
Ironically, about two decades later, after PRN authoritarian regime of the 1970s relocated 
slums out of the City of Buenos Aires into the peripheral municipalities, affluent metropolitan 
residents would gladly move to these same municipalities in search of a pleasant suburban life 
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in a private gated community. In addition, while many of the small industrial establishments of 
Greater Buenos Aires became either obsolete or were abandoned, new, large industrial 
compounds flourished after the new MercoSur trade. This double movement of industrial 
establishments and residences reconfigured the socio-economic dynamics of the suburban ring, 
hence giving way to a more complex pattern of urban growth.  
Noticeably, these social and spatial changes were taking place along with other major 
institutional changes. The decentralization of urban planning controls since 1977 and the 
democratization of the nation since 1983 were two turning points in the institutional 
management of the metropolis. It was during these last democratic decades of the 1980s and 
1990s that the gap between the haves and the have-nots widened most. Why were the recent 
democratic governments characterized by an even more regressive distribution of wealth? 
Moreover, is there a causal link between the decentralization of urban government and the 
expression of this social inequality at smaller and smaller scales? And if it is so, which is the 
direction of causality?  
In order to answer this question, this study has traced the formation of such patterns in 
Greater Buenos Aires since the late 1970s, when the decentralization of urban planning powers 
in the Province of Buenos Aires began, until 2001, when an economic crisis submerged –even if 
transitorily – more than half of all metropolitan households below the poverty line. By the end 
of the century, fortified centers of affluence (i.e. gated communities, consumption centers and 
industrial parks) amidst stagnating jurisdictions characterized the municipalities of Greater 
Buenos Aires. From the 1970s to the present the population of Greater Buenos Aires increased 
by almost a third. During these years, the country experienced alternating periods of growth 
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and decline, each one of them more extreme than the previous one. In the long run, the 
differences between the wealthiest and the poorest more than doubled, and even more 
notable, the differences between the middle and the top enlarged.  
This research for understanding the formation of new patterns of urban inequality has 
proceeded based on one assumption and a two-step strategy of inquiry. The assumption is that 
a disjointed urbanization, in which discontinuities in the quality of the structural environment 
are abrupt and evident, is a symptom of social disparities. Extreme social inequalities trigger a 
fragmented pattern of urban growth, among other manifestations. As socio-economic groups 
become more polarized, the material barriers between these groups become more evident. 
Inaccessible shantytowns, gated communities, and private, policed malls are some of the 
architectural manifestations of a broken social tissue. Yet, the simultaneity of growth and 
stagnation within the same metropolis suggests that contrasting urban conditions might be 
interacting with –if not depending on – each -other. Thus, by tracing the dynamics that create 
spatial differences in the city, this study hints at those that foster social inequality.  
The two step strategy of inquiry supposed that both pushing and pulling forces are 
active in the generation of novel patterns of social inequality in the metropolis. The first section 
of this research focuses on the pulling factors of the periphery. It investigates how the 
decentralized planning practices of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires have impacted 
the growth of Buenos Aires. In that way, it explains the cluster of affluent gated communities in 
the poorest municipalities of the urban periphery as the outcome of the special permits that 
these municipalities gave to real estate developers. That is, the needier these municipalities, 
the more likely they were to regard gated communities as engines for local development. Thus, 
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this section correlates the increase in social inequality within municipal boundaries with local 
governments’ practices. Conversely, the following two sections revolve around the pushing 
factors of this kind of metropolitan growth. In that sense, they explain the historical 
circumstances that led these municipalities to accept –and even foster – these social contrasts 
within their municipality.  
Section II explains how national development policies have contributed to the 
impoverishment of these municipalities. It depicts how these policies have generated a 
persistent flow of poor residents to Greater Buenos Aires at the same time that they have 
diminished the economic sufficiency of local governments. Section III shows why these 
municipalities did not resist these transformations. Basically, it shows the disintegration of the 
alliance that had supported the growth of Greater Buenos Aires. In brief, the divergent 
economic path of larger and smaller industries and the disconnection between unions’ 
discourses and workers’ needs crumbled the institutions for political representation that could 
voice the needs of these municipalities. As a result, this section comes back to the pulling forces 
of social inequality. Focusing on the decaying economic conditions of the small entrepreneur 
and the wage-workers of Greater Buenos Aires, it links the immediacy of the needs of these 
people with the acceptance of development policies based on social inequality, such as inflow 
of gated communities next to informal settlements. Moreover, the lack of precedence of 
bottom-up movements contributed little to the cohesion of vision of municipal residents.  
This research has found that national industrialization policies determined much of the 
fate of Greater Buenos Aires, but within these circumstances, peripheral municipalities’ 
planning practices and local polities have determined the specific geography of social 
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inequality. The 1970s dictatorship regime’s biases against the typically Peronist urban 
industries, coupled with the 1980s’ subsidies of far industrial locations fostered the flight of 
large industrial investments out of the municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires. In addition, 
during the late 1970s, and even more so in the 1990s, exchange tariffs and currency valuation 
favored the uncontrolled flow of imported goods to urban markets, thus undermining the main 
consumption base of the myriad of small establishments still populating Greater Buenos Aires. 
As a result, many of the suburban municipalities found that their prosperity was tied to a 
superseded model of production, and that they can no longer consider industrialization as a 
strategy for their development.  
However, these large changes did favor a segment of the national industry, which 
managed to expand into financing and exporting activities. In particular, in the 1990s, when the 
MercoSur consolidated, the convergence of interest among large and small entrepreneurs, 
workers, unions, and the state in sustaining national industry through Buenos Aires’s 
consumption needs ended; with its conclusion, social contrasts in the urban periphery 
worsened. These contrasts materialized and perpetuated in the uneven geography of the urban 
periphery. There, the decay of the national industry was patent in the shift from a concentric to 
a linear distribution of growth along the MercoSur highway, which superimposed new wealth 
to the ring of impoverished households surrounding the City of Buenos Aires. Likewise, this 
realignment of large entrepreneurs and the state transformed the social and institutional 
practices that might have resisted these changes. Increasing polarization of the productive 
structure paired with the privatization of national infrastructure eased the concentration of 
private wealth at the same time that it weakened the representation of the institutions of 
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labor.  
Furthermore, changes in national development policies also modified the institutional 
framework of urban governance. Because the vote of the urban periphery could decide the 
outcome of national elections, anti-Peronist governments biased electoral laws against the 
primarily Peronist Greater Buenos Aires. Yet, no democratic government could survive without 
attending to the needs of the poor living in the periphery. Eventually, while municipalities 
acquired autonomy in their urban planning capacities, direct social aid to the suburban poor 
remained in control of the provincial and national governments.  
However, this picture of municipal weakness is deceiving. Even if their funding was 
inadequate, or maybe because of that, municipalities exercised great influence on the urban 
growth of Greater Buenos Aires. Once the highway upgrade improved the communication 
between the urban core and the northern peripheries, the poorest municipal governments 
actively modified their planning codes so as to bring gated communities to their territories. 
Therefore, social inequality within their jurisdictions increased dramatically. In part, this was a 
strategy to bring private investments to land lacking basic infrastructure. This was also a 
materialization of the eagerness of the impoverished middle-income household to distance 
itself from the local poor. In all cases, this revealed that social polarization was not due to lack 
of interaction among metropolitan peoples, but to a social dynamic dependent on furthering 
these differences.  
Viewing Buenos Aires as an exemplary case of urban growth with widening social 
inequality, this conclusion answers the two questions that guided this research. Namely, under 
which conditions would a democratic society further social polarization throughout the 
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metropolis? Moreover, why is this social polarization becoming evident on smaller and smaller 
scales?  
 
ON LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND INEQUALITY  
Truly, the fact that participatory institutions have been associated with increasing 
inequality is deeply troubling. In theory, diffusion of political rights should prevent a skewed 
distribution of resources. Yet, there are just too many examples of a different course of events, 
and while economies have been oscillating between development and decay, social polarization 
in Buenos Aires has grown steadily
 
(Turn and Carballo, 2005). Often, changes in the production 
structure of the country and on international trade dynamics were associated with the cause of 
this inequality. Yet, the fact that these changes have taken place in a decentralized democracy 
cannot be taken lightly. Either people supported those transformations, or they did not. In the 
case of Buenos Aires, there was a bit of both.  
 
Social Aid vs. Social Rights  
Institutional arrangements are ingrained into cultural patterns and daily practices 
(North, 1990). Hence, a democratic regime that comes after a dictatorship is defined by this 
precedence. Beyond the impact this past has for the construction of a national identity, the 
practices of former governments are embedded in the expansive legal body of a nation. While 
access to voting is fundamental for constituting a democracy, there is more to a democratic 
practice than the existence of elections. In the case of Argentina, the historical confrontation 
between the Peronist, industrial, overpopulated municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires and the 
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anti-Peronist regimes was evident in the skewed electoral system that undermined the weight 
of suburban voters. The same slanted distribution repeats at the level of the Province of Buenos 
Aires, where given the district allocation of legislators, the vote of a suburban resident counts 
about ten times less than one in rural settings. Likewise, the distribution of fiscal revenues 
suffers similar biases, and the more heavily populated and poorer municipalities surrounding 
the city live in a chronic deficit.  
Clearly, there is a need for a better distribution of people and wealth in a country where 
almost half of all national production and a third of all residents cluster on about 2% of the 
national territory. Yet, in the case of Argentina, central governments diminished the rights of 
the suburban dwellers, but did increase those of remote locations. Instead, the national 
government granted extra monies directly to the government of the Province of Buenos Aires 
through a circuit that bypassed any form of electoral representation or municipal controls. 
Hence, residents’ rights diminished92.  
A genuine framework for political participation would have strengthened the rights of 
the local poor in ways that allowed them to voice their concerns among those of competing 
interests. In this case, social aid, which was discretionarily managed by an ad-hoc organism 
created by the Province of Buenos Aires’s government, came to replace actual rights. One of 
the consequences of this practice is the dependence of the local poor on provincial aid, which 
furthered the social disintegration of society at the municipal level.  
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 Between 1983 and 1998, its GINI coefficient climbed from 0.417 to 0.456 (FIEL Study, 1999). Quoted in 
Frederick Turner and Marita Carballo. In “Argentine, Economic Disaster and the Rejection of the Political Class.” 
Comparative Sociology. 4. No 1-2. 2005.  
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Choosing Polarization  
However, it cannot be said that locals did not participate in this new democracy. Even 
with its shortcomings, the electoral processes enabled social participation, and local residents 
elected local governments. The truth was, there were no visible social movements struggling 
against the social polarization taking place within each municipality. The inflow of gated 
communities had a cross-class appeal in the suburbs. From those who were looking for 
employment in the suburbs to those who were living there, there was something for everyone 
behind the gates. The institutional circuit of money left municipalities with little autonomy, but 
the capacity to change planning codes so as to activate local economy. Once the state stopped 
sponsoring national industrialization, there was little chance of developing the yet un-serviced 
land through state investment, and development of gated communities were happy to locate in 
those lands where the local towns –but not shantytowns— – were most unlikely to expand, or, 
in the land lacking urban services next to the highway.  
Moreover, in many ways, the overall impoverishment of the middle-income households 
that followed the transformation of the national economy, led many local residents to embrace 
gated communities even as they increased social polarization within their localities. On one 
hand, these were seen as buffers to the expansion of informal housing in these municipalities, 
as well as a way to undo the reputation of poverty that had haunted these locals since the 
military regime relocated all slums from the city into the suburbs. In sum, democracy as an ideal 
regime differs from the practices of democratic governments. In this case, the legal framework 
inherited from the dictatorship regime was still ingrained in the regulatory body of Argentina. 
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Therefore, many of the pre-existing inequalities were carried on well into democratic times. 
Moreover, the mechanisms to alleviate them, such as extra government funding, become an 
occasion for political maneuvers that furthered the distance between citizens’ say and 
government actions. In addition, the different longevities of spatial outlays and political regimes 
imply that new governments would operate on inherited scenarios, which conditioned 
development choices. In essence, this is a call for including history and space in our 
understanding of political regimes, as well as a cautionary note on the preexisting inequalities 
that democratic procedures can perpetuate, rather than extinguish.  
 
ON DECENTRALIZATION AND INEQUALITY  
 
During the last twenty years of the 20th century, metropolitan inequality not only rose, 
it did so within municipal boundaries. This was even more evident after the decentralization of 
planning capacities, when gated communities popped up all over the poorest municipalities of 
the northern periphery. Is there a causal connection between the rise of inequality at smaller 
scales and the decentralization of planning controls? And if that is the case, what is the 
direction of causality?  
 
Inequality as a Cause for Decentralization  
Did inequality trigger decentralization or vice versa? History shows that the answer 
varies with respect to the scale of our analysis. It was the inequality between the core and the 
urban periphery that fostered the decentralization of planning capacities. From the outset of 
the metropolis, residents of the urban periphery were poorer than those living in the urban 
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core. In addition, the urban infrastructure of the suburbs was incomplete, and the municipal 
governments were less funded than the one of the City of Buenos Aires. Additionally, as the 
income of the majority of the urban dwellers depended on national industries, the urban 
periphery was the traditional Peronist stronghold. These characteristics contrasted with those 
that the last dictatorship regime had envisioned for the capital of the nation: an exclusive 
residential realm open to international trade.  
The non-democratic government of the late 1970s launched the decentralization of 
planning capacities of the urban periphery so as to further control state expenditures on the 
expensive –and expansive – infrastructure of the urban periphery. It contained no participatory 
initiatives and responded solely to the rationalization of the national budget, as the national 
government understood it. Aiming to reverse the actions of the Peronist government that 
allocated national resources to Greater Buenos Aires to “promote and protect the industrial 
sector so as to increase its profit without reference to market principles such as productivity or 
efficiency,”93
 
municipal governments were held responsible for their own infrastructure 
development. That is, the preexisting differences between core and periphery triggered a policy 
of decentralization, and the enactment of the first planning law of the Province of Buenos Aires, 
where each municipality was allocated responsibility over its land uses.94 
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 Memoria del Ministerio de Economía Argentino. 1976-1981. Presidencia de la Nación Argentina. p. 38. 
94
 Ley de Organización territorial de la Provincia de Buenos Aires.1977. 
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Decentralization as a Cause for Inequality  
 
In the light of the urban growth that followed – most particularly in the light of the 
social contrasts that emerged out of the municipal practice of rezoning to allow new 
investments95
 
– decentralization of planning capacities promoted local inequality. True, much of 
it was due to incoming wealth on top of inherited poverty. But after the new investments 
materialized, there was no evident diffusion of wealth from top to bottom. Moreover, given the 
fiscal laws regulating real estate investments, municipal budgets did not show noticeable 
increases, even more when there was not an adequate system of checks and balances in place 
to control corruption at all levels of government.  
Furthermore, because municipal autonomy did not emerge out of a bottom-up claim, 
municipal boundaries had hardly contained an integrated society within them. There was little 
correspondence between municipal and community boundaries. Formal and informal 
settlements were scattered all along the periphery, and shared almost no urban infrastructure 
or civic institutions. In that regard, there is a danger that decentralized municipalities are 
becoming ‘little feudal democracies.’ That is, the dependency of the local poor on the jobs 
created by gated communities fosters policies that perpetuate those social differences. For 
instance, while major roads are privatized and functional, municipal governments are in charge 
of the local grid. Nevertheless, because these governments are under-funded, they achieve 
public works through ad hoc arrangements with the private investors. For instance, they swap 
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 Strictly speaking, we should call this practice ‘changing land uses.’ to change land use designations. Therefore, 
municipalities were changing land uses, not zoning designations.  
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construction permits for the upgrading of an unpaved local road, but poor residents do not 
choose the location of these roads.  
To summarize, the decision to decentralize was a reaction to the imbalanced national 
development. However, once decentralized governments were in place, their practices 
furthered social inequality within their own boundaries. As a corollary, the physical 
infrastructure of this region was unevenly distributed, which conditioned the future growth of 
the region.  
 
ON THE FUTURE OF THE METROPOLIS AND INEQUALITY  
By now, we have sufficient evidence that the world is more urbanized, but not more 
evenly developed (UNDP, 2005). But as the drivers behind urban growth encompass a larger 
number of causes, the contrasts in this periphery augment. Likewise, tackling those challenges 
demands a wider alignment of institutions. In a way, the shortcomings of traditional categories 
in describing recent metropolitan social structures reveal the depth of the transformations of 
the urban society. Moreover, the absence of an adequate terminology to describe this society is 
mirroring the atomization –or vacuum – of urban political representation. As there are multiple 
processes leading to the densification of the urban periphery, the divergences among actual 
suburban residents rises.  
In the absence of a shared institutional background, the metropolis grows in the form of 
isolated –but not disconnected – enclaves. In the case of Buenos Aires, the dollar peso peg 
attracted immigrants from neighboring countries, and the national imbalanced development 
continued the flow of immigration from the inner provinces into the metropolis. Also, the 
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wealthy suburbanized into gated enclaves as the conditions of the city deteriorated. Hence, 
urban peripheries became the repository of low-paid labor as well as the getaway of the urban 
affluent. The spatial proximity of these two contrasting conditions triggered a dynamic of 
uneven growth. Moreover, it is now ingrained in the infrastructure of the periphery. For 
instance, while private capital took care of major roads that allowed for international trade, 
local streets remain unpaved and in poor condition. In the absence of a national development 
project for the metropolis, poor municipalities and private developers found their interests 
aligned in the construction of private urbanization. And yet, neither democratic institutions, nor 
a pragmatic agreement among different groups would necessarily imply community.  
In sum, the extreme contrasts in the infrastructure of the region became a necessary 
feature for the production of the current suburban geography. This shows that: 1) physical 
scenarios condition democratic performances, and 2) inequality promotes a dynamic that 
depends on the perpetuation of these differences, not only for economic transactions, but also 
for decisions concerning physical planning. Therefore, the quest for social justice cannot end in 
the provision of political rights, insofar as the material context in which these rights are 
exercised is already deeply imbalanced. Otherwise, it is likely that, in a market-led society, the 
choices of citizens living in unequal conditions will tend to reproduce these same inequalities in 
their own habitats.  
 
On the Future  
To be sure, we must forgo a shallow faith in the redemptive power of urban planning. As 
we have seen, historical circumstances, spatial constraints, and cultural limitations are not 
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easily changed, but loom heavily on our future. Yet, as soon as we understand the specific 
connections between these realms, opportunities for action appear. With that end, identifying 
the following contradictions could become the entry point for improving the living conditions of 
this urban periphery, and may then provide useful guidelines for others too.  
So far, we have explained social inequality in Greater Buenos Aires as the consequence 
of the development strategies of the deeply impoverished municipalities of this region. Thus, 
the root of this inequality is the preexisting and persistent poverty of municipal governments. 
Why should one of the most dynamic, populous, and productive regions of a nation also be the 
poorest? Because of the embedded contradictions between its economic and political 
representations, and between political divisions and polity identities, poverty has become 
endemic in these localities.  
Let us explain each of these one by one. To begin with, although natural resources are 
the base of Argentina’s international trade, metropolitan industrial activities are the source of 
income for the majority of the population. As a consequence, not only are national 
governments trapped amidst their needs for income and their needs for votes, but the 
municipalities of Greater Buenos Aires also suffer the effects of this vicious circle of 
dependency. On one hand, since most of its industries are geared towards the national 
markets, they depend heavily on the national government for their economic sustainability. On 
the other, as national governments aim to control these populations and their weight in the 
political balance of the nation, they have systematically undermined the political autonomy of 
these municipalities, which has furthered their dependency on national policies.  
Secondly, besides the lack of, or rather incomplete, agency of municipal governments, 
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there is the question of representation. There is a deep disconnection between the territory of 
municipal governments and the actual boundaries of the municipal communities. In this 
context, it is not surprising that municipal governments do not foster social cohesion or that 
there are no social movements that identify themselves with these territories. These conditions 
precede the development of gated communities, and are relatively autonomous from the 
changes in the City of Buenos Aires. Thus, these are the pulling forces of the periphery. 
Moreover, these are the opportunities to tackle the problems of urban inequality from a 
different perspective than that of the urban core.  
Many of the causes of local poverty are at the level of the nation, like immigration from 
poor provinces and adverse development policies. Conversely, the particularities of the local 
interaction might demand an even closer look than the municipal governments can provide. 
Thus, we should distinguish democracy from decentralization. A course for action in this case 
would be to recentralize the provision of infrastructure at the level of the Province of Buenos 
Aires. Likewise, the provision of social aid should be managed through a transparent process, in 
which municipal governments are active participants rather than spectators. Finally, at the 
other end, new institutions for social representation should be created to capture the social 
complexity of this metropolitan periphery. There is an urgent need of an institutional voice for 
the millions of independent workers who are not participants in unions or in elite discourses. 
Unlike the higher or lower income groups, these people’s material life is fused with the 
prosperity of the metropolis. Therefore, they are the ones who can articulate long-term goals 
for the metropolis, and thus scale political institutions to the actual territorial entities they are 
representing.  
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BEYOND URBAN BOUNDARIES  
Perhaps, one of the most persistent misconceptions in the study of development is the 
assumption that dramatic institutional reforms can encompass sharp developmental changes. 
Many policies’ recommendations are promoted on the basis that certain institutions have 
shown success in other situations. This belief may be doing a disservice to the same values we 
want to promote. Why should we promote democracy and participation as the front door to 
equal development, as if equal access to political rights was not precious enough? This is not to 
say that inequality is acceptable, but rather that alleviating it may require strategies other than 
changing the political regime. Moreover, assuming that bottom up participation would bring 
even development might jeopardize democratic regimes inasmuch as their intuitions’ 
performance is judged by their economic records rather than by their political institutions.  
Equally, we are doing a disservice to democracy when we rapidly take for granted that 
democratic regimes consistently implement democratic practices. In those occasions, we are 
not seeing the outcomes of democratic performance, but of other non-participatory forms of 
government. Actual government performances tend to contain both democratic and 
nondemocratic practices. Even more when there is a local history of dictatorship regimes. As 
Douglas North noted, institutional performances are not isolated, fully describable creatures, 
but they contain in themselves the grain of history. National regulatory bodies cannot be 
changed all at once, nor can cultural practices be transformed in a reformatory fiat. Hence, we 
should aim for high specificity when understanding links between institutional practices, regime 
modes, and development stages.  
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So long as institutional performances cannot be comprehended in absence of their 
historical circumstances, they cannot be assessed without referring them to their spatial 
constraints. This assertion is far from an advocacy of some kind of ‘place fetishism,’ even less 
for a Kantian negation of materialism. Rather the opposite: in order to advance our 
comprehension of the built environment in ways that enable us to foster justice and prosperity, 
we should no longer abstract our analyses from their specific scenarios. There is no better place 
to start this task than with the conception of the metropolis.  
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APPENDIX A  
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
  
Given that this dissertation aims to understand the institutional and spatial aspects of 
metropolitan growth, as well as the interaction between the two, I have relied on a 
combination of data sources and methodological approaches. In fact, one of the most 
challenging aspects of this research was linking the data on institutions and society with the 
graphic material illustrating urban form. Accordingly, my argument depends on relating four 
types of data: 1) quantitative data on urban population; 2) legal documents and archival 
material on metropolitan development; 3) in depth interviews with local residents; 4) maps and 
graphic material illustrating the metropolis. In addition, I tried as much as possible to study and 
present this material so as to cover the 1977-2001 period of Argentine history; that is the years 
from the first law mandating the decentralization of urban planning powers in the Province of 
Buenos Aires, until the worst economic and social crisis of the metropolis.  
Most of the time, I have drawn on the household data that the INDEC, the National 
Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censos) 
provides. For national comparisons, most useful were the decennial censuses, which count each 
Argentine household. For historical comparisons, I relied heavily on annual household statistics 
that measure metropolitan population characteristics and poverty levels. The INDEC does not 
provide comprehensive data on income level by household. Rather, it counts the number of 
households with unsatisfied basic needs (NBI) per district. To be classified as an NBI, a 
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household has at least one of the following characteristics: a) more than three people per 
room; b) unsound building structure; c) no water-closet; d) at least one child aged between six 
and twelve who does not attend school; e) four or more people dependent on a single 
breadwinner who has no schooling beyond third grade. Thus, this NBI index merges both social 
and housing indicators (i.e. access to piped water and sewerage). On one hand, working with 
this indicator made it harder to learn about the specific causes of poverty in these households. 
On the other, the proportion of NBI households per municipality was a good indicator of 
municipal development, as it was closely related to the level of infrastructure existing in each 
jurisdiction. Another useful source of data for quantifying the conditions in the metropolis was 
the Economic Ministry of the Province of Buenos Aires. Distribution of industrial 
establishments, industrial labor, and construction permits per municipality were available in its 
annual publication. Finally, the studies conducted by the Argentinean Industrial Union (UIA) on 
the conditions of the medium and small enterprise (PyME) and the UN CEPAL initiative on small 
enterprises were invaluable for scaling and locating the data on the Province of Buenos Aires.  
As all researchers interested in history know, archives are fundamental in capturing how 
institutions and societies change over time. For information on the years when the PRN 
dictatorship was in place, 1976-1983, I consulted the Memories of the Argentine Ministry of 
Economy of the Argentine Republic, and the Atlas on Buenos Aires published by the government 
of the City of Buenos Aires. For the years when a democratic regime was back in office, 
19832001, I relied largely on articles from Clarín and La Nación, the two most read newspapers 
of Buenos Aires. In addition, I consulted some smaller, local newspapers, including the online 
versions of Pilar Total (www.pilartotal.com.ar); La Guia de Pilar (www.pilar.com.ar); Periódico 
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General Pacheco (www.pgeneralpacheco.com.ar); and Estar Informado 
(www.estarinformado.com.ar).  
Between August 2004 and December 2006, I informally interviewed residents living and 
working in the municipalities of Pilar, Tigre, and Escobar, San Fernando, San Isidro, Avellaneda, 
and General San Martin. In total, I interviewed thirty residents. However, I put most of the 
effort and attention into interviewing urban planners working in those municipalities where the 
bulk of gated communities were developed in the 1990s. Between August and September of 
2004, I visited the planning offices of the municipalities of San Isidro, San Fernando, Tigre, Pilar, 
and Escobar. In each of these municipalities, I interviewed between two and three urban 
planners. Each of these interviews lasted about 45 minutes, and was conducted in Spanish. In 
addition, in November of 2005 I conducted short phone interviews with officers at the 
municipalities of Vicente Lopez, San Miguel, and General San Martin, and revisited some of the 
people I interviewed in Tigre, San Fernando, Pilar, and Escobar. While the questionnaire I used 
in these interviews was quite flexible, these three questions were asked in all cases: a) Why do 
you think gated communities are being developed in your municipality; b) How do you regulate 
the development of gated communities?; c) What do you think they bring to your municipality? 
Table 36 summarizes the answers of the thirteen interviews I performed in August 2004.  
Finally, I have devoted a lot of time, energy, and dedication to trace the spatial 
transformations of Buenos Aires. In many cases, I had to construct the maps in this dissertation 
by mapping the quantitative data I was provided. In other cases, I used maps provided by real 
estate developers and municipal governments (San Fernando, Tigre, and Escobar 
municipalities). Also, aerial photographs were especially valuable for understanding the spatial 
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consequences of developing gated communities in the periphery of the City of Buenos Aires. 
The Military Institute of Geography of the Republic of Argentina (Instituto Geografico Militar) 
was the source for the aerial photographs of the 1980s and early 1990s. I have relied on 
Google-Earth (http.//earth.google.com) for up-to-date images of the region.  
These multiple sources of information mirror the multiple methods I used to make sense 
of this wealth of data. Briefly, two techniques proved most useful. One was comparing the 
numerical indicators among municipalities that were located within the same region of Great 
Buenos Aires. By comparing the development of the municipalities along the northern highway, 
I was able to attribute the differences among these municipalities to institutional practices 
rather than to geography. The second technique was to asses the evolution of these indicators 
before and after changes in policies. These longitudinal comparisons were useful to evaluate 
the impact of legal and institutional changes in the development of the metropolis. In addition, 
the interviews provided an invaluable way to understand the role of individuals and institutions 
in all these cases.  
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TABLE 36 Summary of Interviews of Municipal Planners (August, 2004; Province of Buenos 
Aires) 
 
Municipality # Why you thing GC are 
being developed in your 
municipality? 
 
How do you regulate the 
development of GC? 
What do you think GC 
bring to the municipality? 
San Isidro I 
 
 
It is an urban 
phenomenon 
 
All developments are 
rules by the same rules 
They are not good for our 
community 
II Because of our location All developments are 
rules by the same rules 
They increase private 
policing in the area 
San Fernando III Because of the highway They have to comply with 
the PBA requirements 
Uses for underutilized 
land 
IV Because of our location They have to comply with 
the PBA requirements 
It depends where they 
locate. They might be 
good or not, 
Tigre V Because of the 
guarantees that we 
provide to the 
developers 
We apply Tigre GC’s 
regulations 
Jobs and new businesses; 
upper middle income 
residents 
VI Because of our new 
urban code 
We apply Tigre GC’s 
regulations 
New residents and 
prestige to the locality 
VII Because of our approval 
process 
We apply Tigre GC’s 
regulations 
New jobs, people, 
prestige.  
Escobar VIII Because we have empty 
land 
It is a case by case 
approach 
May be jobs 
IX Becaude developers 
want it 
We use Escobar 
regulations and then a 
case by case approach 
Uses for underutilized 
land 
X Because of the highway We use Escobar 
regulations and then a 
case by case approach 
May be jobs and what 
they trade with the 
mayor 
Pilar XI Because we have many 
GC already 
Most of the times it is a 
case by case approach 
New jobs, new residents 
XII Because of the highway It is a case by case 
approach 
Some infrastructure(but 
not sufficient) 
XIII Because we have empty 
land 
It is a case by case 
approach 
New residents inside the 
GC and new informal 
settlements around the 
GC 
 
263 
 
APPENDIX B  
A NOTE ON LITERARY REFERENCES  
 
The multidisciplinary nature of this dissertation and its object of study – the 
contemporary metropolis – led me to diverse paths through the literature. The work of a broad 
and varied number of scholars has nurtured the discourse and theories I present in this 
dissertation. What I have taken from these books might differ from what is most cherished by 
their authors. However, my intention in this brief note is closer to a genealogy of ideas than to a 
literature review. Thus, I present the main influences on my work according to four entry points 
I used in this dissertation.  
Lewis Mummford’s work is an obvious reference for one of the main questions of this 
dissertation, namely, which are the causal connections between the form of a place and the 
social interactions staged in it. From his classic book, The Culture of Cities (1938), I have learnt 
about studying urban culture through its material productions, while at the same time 
acknowledging that the form of the city is likely to last longer than the culture that created it. In 
that regard, Richard Sennett’s book, The Uses of Disorder (1970), is also closely connected to 
the way I interpret the relationship between social forces and urban form. By acknowledging 
how individual behavior can lead to a certain mode of urban growth, his book opens up new 
avenues for exploring the city as a social construction, even as the notion of metropolitan unity 
is challenged. Finally, Lawrence Vale’s study on the construction of twentieth century capital 
cities, Architecture, Power, and National Identity (1992), casts light on the subtleties and 
conflicts of purposefully infusing social meaning into the built environment. In that sense, from 
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these two books I took the notion of the construction of urban form as a bottom-up as well as a 
top-down social process.  
A second significant set of scholarly works presents the study of the city as a system of 
power relations, in which technology is the main determinant of spatial organization. In this 
realm I place Social Science and the City (1968). Leo Schnore’s visionary approach to urban 
research centers on urban infrastructure, and shows how this material outlay relates to both 
urban form and urban governance. Also, Sir Peter Hall’s body of research presents urbanization 
as an outcome of technology and culture, while including the notions of historicity and 
multimodal structures. In particular, his book Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of 
Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century (1988) triggered this thesis’s interest on 
how municipal planners participate in the generation of the metropolis, even when the latter 
responds to a decentralized structure of decision. In that regard, Saskia Sassen’s book,The 
Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (1991), was a call for attention to the interaction between 
local and transnational determinants of urban development. More than her work on the 
development of global centers of control, I was interested in her description of a shifting urban 
geography within national boundaries.  
This fundamental distinction between ‘the hardware’ and ‘the software’ of urban 
organization was continued in some aspects of Manuel Castells’ trilogy, The Information Age: 
Economy, Society, and Culture (1996-1998). His comprehensive study illuminates the 
connections between new modes of communication that bypass territorial boundaries, and the 
formation of networked spaces of power that can be selectively deployed around the world, 
regardless of physical distance. In this way, his work allows for a conceptual distinction 
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between spatial propinquity and effective connectivity, as well as between structures of power 
and agency. Yet, as he and John H. Mollenkopf acknowledge in their research on the late 
twentieth century transformation of New York City, Dual City: Restructuring New York (1991), 
the resulting deeper social contrasts that the current metropolises present do not imply lack of 
interaction, but rather a social dynamic that perpetuates social difference at the local level. 
Finally, Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin’s work, Splintering Urbanism: Networked 
Infrastructures, Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition (2001), produces a careful 
and insightful map of this new, locally fragmented, internationally networked urban space. 
Tracing the transformations in the provision of urban infrastructure, the book shows how the 
privatization of infrastructure disturbs the urban patterns set by a state-led mode of 
urbanization. This dissertation understands the relationship between technology and society as 
emerging from this body of work; specifically, technology (that is, the means of organizing 
material production) defines the configuration of political struggles, but does not determine 
their outcome.  
A third line of inquiry use in this study refers to the interaction between institutions of 
urban governance and urban form. Douglass North’s seminal work on institutions and national 
prosperity, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), opened up new 
ways of exploring social change. By answering the question of why some societies prosper while 
others stagnate through an analysis of how institutions regulate social behavior; it placed 
historical research at the forefront of development studies. In the same venue, I have taken 
from Clifford Geertz’s study of developing Indonesian towns, Peddlers and Princes: Social 
Development and Economic Change in Two Indonesian Towns (1963), two fundamental 
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hypotheses that inform this research: one, that the physical form of a settlement conditions 
institutional practices even as local society upgrades its technology; and two, that the question 
of urban development transcends urban scale. This seminal idea is also present in Diane E. 
Davis’s comparative study of Argentina, Mexico, Taiwan and South Korea, Discipline and 
Development: Middle Classes and Prosperity in East Asia and Latin America (2004). Focusing on 
the influence of rural middle classes on national development, she shows how national political 
struggles impact urban growth, and vice versa. Clearly, this notion of the embeddedness of 
national categories on urban development is essential for this dissertation’s argument.  
The fourth structuring idea of this study is that urban peripheries cannot be explained 
through the changes in the urban core, but these present their own growth dynamics. I took 
this concept from two different sources. The first is Robert Redfield’s well-known essay “The 
Folk Society” (1947). Precisely at the moment when modern cities are at the focus of urban 
sociology studies, he aims to define life in backward settlements. In this way, he presents a 
dialectic approach to change, while showing that development is not a categorical term but a 
comparative one. The other reference for studying the periphery is Max Weber’s essay, “The 
Social Causes of the Decay of Ancient Civilization” (1896). Briefly, this piece explains economic 
decline in the Roman Empire as the outcome of inflation that followed a decline in the number 
of slaves after Rome ceased its physical expansion. Weber thus focuses our attention on the 
changes in the fringe of the Empire to elucidate the decadence of the central government.  
To conclude, I would like to emphasize that this list is neither complete nor conclusive, 
but it is an attempt to trace this dissertation’s intellectual and scholarly roots.  
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